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I develop a particular view about the normative explanans of the content of concepts and 
the meanings of linguistic items, according to which the notion of a rule plays no critical 
role. Rather, the account centers around an objective notion of a norm which is not 
automatically coextensive with any social or psychological phenomenon. According to this 
view, general normative principles of inquiry, interest-grounded norms of communication, 
and moral norms are all potentially relevant to the determination of content. The advantage 
of this approach is that it can explain anti-individualist data about the relevance of worldly 
and social factors to the determination of mental content and linguistic meaning. I respond 
 iii 
 
to challenges to the coupling of a normative theory of content and a truth-theoretic or 
reference-oriented semantics, by enforcing a strict distinction between semantic and 
metasemantic theories and by insisting on constitutive explanations in metasemantics 
rather than merely accounting for the attribution of semantic or intentional properties. I 
argue that my norm-based metasemantics avoids the kind of subjectivism at play in 
Brandom's and Gibbard's normative theories of meaning, and that it avoids the regress of 
rules lurking in rule-oriented treatments of the normativity of meaning. I address the 
problem for a norm-based metasemantics that we deploy bad meanings and concepts 
with bad essential inferences, conceptual connections, implications, etc., particularly slur 
terms and concepts. I explain how the perverse norms needed to explain slur meanings and 
concepts can arise and proliferate and how the metasemantic and normative elements of 
the norm-based metasemantic theory can be constructed so that moral and epistemic norms 
do not preclude the explanation. I also show how the norm-based framework can be 
extended to the case of natural language metasemantics, in part by evaluating 
conventionalist proposals for explaining public language meaning. If the resulting 
metasemantic theory is successful, we will be one step further in the project of accounting 
for intentional relations as well as accommodating their dependence on our environments. 
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Preface 
 
 
“Concepts lead us to make investigations. They are the expression of our interest and direct our 
interest.” 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: 570  
 
 
The topic of this dissertation is the possibility of providing a constitutive explanation of 
what I shall call, broadly, “intentional relations”. Intentional relations are those between a word and 
its meaning, a concept and its content, and so on. If you prefer, you may translate my talk of 
constitutively explaining intentional relations into talk of foundational theories of content or 
content-determination, or into talk of metasemantics. While this task does not automatically rise to 
the level of reduction, I’m after an answer to the question of whether an illuminating account can 
be given of what it is for an intentional relation to obtain, or of what the metaphysical basis is for 
the obtaining of such relations. In order to speak with maximal neutrality, I’ll mostly refer to the 
kind of explanation or theory at issue as a metasemantics. Though most of the dissertation deals 
with metasemantics for concepts, I will also have something to say about metasemantics for natural 
language. While I will not be attempting a reduction of any intentional relations in the 
metasemantics I favor, my treatment of conceptual and linguistic metasemantics can be understood 
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as steps on the road toward understanding the fundamental nature of intentional relations 
themselves.  
  I defend an approach that cites normative facts in its explanation of intentional relations. 
These are facts about, for example, how one ought to deploy a particular word or concept. Such 
facts, on my preferred explanation, explain why a concept has the content that it has.1 Though I 
believe the thesis can (and, ultimately, must) be extended more widely, I here focus on only two 
types of intentional relations: those between concepts and their contents and those between 
linguistic expressions and their meanings.2 I will mainly be interested in concepts, though I will 
discuss linguistic meaning when doing so is fruitful or necessary to this primary interest. 
 I am attracted to a normative theory of intentional relations for a simple reason: I believe 
that this type of theory offers the most promise of any type of theory of intentional relations for 
accommodating and explaining anti-individualism about content. However, as I will argue, the 
argument from anti-individualism to a normative theory of content will bear equally well against 
the most prominent normative theories of meaning and content currently on offer. In particular, just 
as a straightforward dispositionalist cannot accommodate a robust anti-individualism, neither can 
the subject-oriented metasemantics of the kinds offered by Allan Gibbard and Bob Brandom.  
Dedicated individualists about meaning and mental content may not find my approach 
attractive. Nevertheless, my starting point is a familiar one, and I will not be motivating anti-
individualism in any substantial or novel way. However, I will be defending anti-individualism to 
the extent that it is true that a new approach to the fundamental questions of metasemantics is 
                                                           
1 I talk of concepts as semantic vehicles, about whose content we can independently inquire. Those who 
would not permit even such talk of a concept’s content floating free of its nature may freely translate my talk 
of the determination of a concept’s content into talk of the explanation of its nature. I choose my way of 
speaking for ease of presentation and unity of treatment among different types of intentional relation. I 
believe that the notion of content is sufficiently amorphous to permit this.  
2 The term “content”, when used this broadly, may mislead in certain respects. With respect to natural 
language, when meaning can be pulled apart from content, in some sense, I will typically (here) be interested 
in the meaning, rather than the strict semantic content, though I may use the term “content” freely. For 
example, I will be interested in facts concerning how the meaning of the first person pronoun “I” is 
determined, rather than in explaining how it is that, on a particular occasion of use, a token of “I” refers to a 
particular speaker. Such latter facts, on my taxonomy, will qualify as semantic rather than metasemantic.  
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needed to account for how anti-individualism could possibly be explained by more basic facts 
about the nature of intentional relations and I show that a satisfying account that meets this demand 
can be provided. 
  In Chapter 1, I explain how it is that anti-individualism motivates going normative in 
developing a metasemantics for concepts, and how the resulting norm-based approach can be 
distinguished from other ways of going normative about meaning or content. I explain Mark 
Greenberg’s persuasive argument that deference cannot rescue traditional, disposition-based 
theories of content from these difficulties. I further explain why, aside from deference, there are 
quite general reasons to believe that purely dispositional theories of content cannot explain either 
social externalism, as it is sometimes called, or worldly externalism, as it is sometimes called, 
along with quite general reasons to believe that normative theories of content may succeed where 
these accounts fail. As a first gesture toward explaining what kind of normative account this 
requires, I explain the kind of objectivity the normative facts cited in the account must exhibit.  
In Chapter 2, I criticize the types of normative theory developed by Gibbard and Brandom. 
Both theories, for related reasons, will not be able to do justice to anti-individualism. As will 
emerge, the power of a normative theory of intentional relations becomes clearer when we enforce 
a clear line between semantics and metasemantics, and focus on providing a true constitutive 
explanation rather than a theory merely of the attribution of intentional relations, as Gibbard and 
Brandom do. Enforcing these distinctions allows for the normative theory to be perfectly 
compatible with truth-conditional treatments of the semantics of natural language and to be 
consistent with a perfectly realist take on intentional relations. 
I move on in Chapter 3 to focus more directly on the Kripkean source of much recent 
interest in claims and theories running with the normativity of meaning banner. I show that it is 
possible to construct a normative theory of content that does not in any way rely on the relevant 
norms being followed or even reflected in a thinker’s psychology. The thought that it cannot results 
from a confusion about the claims of a normative theory of content, and its commitments about 
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guidance.3 One might also think that, for metaethical reasons, a normative theory of content will 
have to have subjectivist commitments of that kind. I argue that this is also a mistake. Finally, I 
show that without these additional claims, a normative theory of content can overcome the most 
damning recent argument against it: Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss’ argument from regress and 
idleness.4 
 In Chapter 4, I address a package of worries, some fairly indirectly, including (i) that the 
normative theory being developed, so far mainly by contrast, cannot be suitably naturalistic, in the 
specific sense that it does not make systematic, testable predictions in the way that a 
psychologically- or socially-based theory does, and (ii) that our ability to deploy some concepts 
whose content seem to essentially involve bad commitments, behaviors, or patterns of thought 
seems at odds with the commitments of a normative theory of content. To rebut these worries, I 
develop and explain some strategies that the normativist can deploy in explaining how a particular 
intentional relation holds, even in the most problematic case of slur concepts.5 
  In Chapter 5, I turn to pubic language meaning, insofar as it is distinct from mere idiolect 
meaning. One approach that can come off as implicitly normative is the conventionalist approach 
to explaining meaning. I argue that conventions are not necessary for public meaning in the way 
conventionalism requires. Nevertheless, the kind of norms relevant to convention still obtain in the 
kinds of cases I allege are free from convention. I point the way toward the construction of a 
normative metasemantics for language that can take the place of conventionalism. The theory can 
                                                           
3 One reason why I make a point not to rely on Kripke’s arguments concerning the normativity of content is 
that they lend themselves to interpretations on which the problematic sort of guidance is required to carry 
content. In this way, as I explain, a normative theory of content does not necessarily run afoul of arguments 
like the dilemma of regress and idleness proposed by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss. 
4 Glüer and Wikforss (2009). I address their argument in Tracy (forthcoming), drawn from Chapter 3. 
5 I believe that slur terms and concepts pose the most difficult problem possible of this variety, given the 
essential and clear badness of the relevant commitments or inferences. If that is correct, then showing how a 
normative theory can explain these contents goes a long way indeed toward showing that it offers a viable 
theory with genuine explanatory power with respect to our actual contents.   
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still make widespread explanatory use of convention and, as the relevant norms are roughly 
instrumental norms, does not pose a threat to naturalistic explanations of public language meaning.  
 In Chapter 6, I summarize the arguments of the dissertation and take stock of their 
significance and survey some reasons we have for optimism and pessimism about the kind of 
norm-based metasemantic theory elaborated in stages throughout the dissertation. 
 I intend that any reader will find the dissertation intelligible and readable. Partly to that 
end, I have tried to construct each Chapter so that it is as self-contained as possible given the very 
specific dialectical trajectory and aims of the work as a whole. One effect of this is that some 
arguments or clarifications are repeated. Much of the material in Chapter 1 is collected or 
elaborated from arguments that occur in in other Chapters. This is also primarily for the benefit of 
non-specialist readers, who may find the introduction to the issues of the theory of content, the 
discussion of anti-individualism, featuring a variety of concrete examples, and the general 
dialectical framing of the dissertation helpful in digesting subsequent Chapters. Thus, specialist 
readers may benefit from skipping Chapter 1, especially considering this important fact, which 
ought to be kept in mind: I do not aim to argue that anti-individualism is correct, nor even to 
convince specialists that anti-individualism definitively requires bringing norms into the theory of 
content. Rather, I am exploring the kind of theory of content or metasemantics we must adopt if we 
are to bring in normative factors with the aim of accommodating anti-individualist data. Still, one 
will find at several points in this dissertation explanations of why we ought to believe anti-
individualism and what reason we have to draw on normative factors in constructing our 
metasemantics. This is primarily because I do not in any Chapter assume that the reader already 
knows what anti-individualism is or what it has to do with norms. As I clarify in Chapters 1 and 2, 
the reader should also bear in mind that not every way of filling in the negative thesis of anti-
individualism is correct; for example, social factors are no better than individual ones in their 
ability to adequately predict our conceptual competence. 
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Chapter 1: Norm-Based Metasemantics and Anti- 
 Individualism 
 
 
 
0. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER 
 
In this introductory chapter, I explain the metasemantic tasks I pursue in the dissertation, beginning 
with an introduction to the subject matter and some terminological clarifications and stipulations 
about my metasemantic target that will prove important for the arguments to come. I then explain, 
in brief, why we might find a norm-based metasemantics plausible on the background of some 
notable failures of alternative, non-normative bases for metasemantic explanations. I advocate, 
though do not exhaustively defend here, an argumentative route from anti-individualism about the 
mental to a norm-based metasemantics for concepts, by contrast with more standard paths, derived 
from the arguments of Wittgenstein or Kripke, concerning rule-following and the allegedly a priori 
normative import of the notion of semantic correctness. I do not adopt the pre-theoretic 
“normativity constraint” on theories of meaning proposed by Kripke. Rather, I take the data on the 
ground about concept possession captured by anti-individualism as the starting point for 
investigation into the best metasemantics for concepts. The central question of the dissertation is 
not whether anti-individualism is correct, but rather what sort of metasemantic theory for concepts 
is needed if anti-individualism indeed motivates bringing normative facts or properties into 
metasemantic explanations concerning concept possession or content determination. By the end of 
this chapter, I hope that the reader will appreciate the way in which I contend anti-individualism 
  
2 
motivates adopting a norm-based metasemantics and will thus be prepared to encounter the ensuing 
arguments concerning the particular kind of norm-based metasemantics we need to develop from 
this starting point and why the resulting metasemantics is an improvement over other normative 
alternatives. 
 
I. THE SUBJECT MATTER FOR METASEMANTIC THEORY: A BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I believe that it is now sunny in Los Angeles, that my first name has four letters, and that 
the furry creature laying on my feet is a dog. Each of these beliefs is either true or false. What it 
takes for one of them to be true or false is, we might say, for the world to be a certain way, and for 
the beliefs to be about something such that, given that way the world is, they are made true or false. 
 We can treat these beliefs as we treat sentences in a public language, as having components 
that are about things, and can be true of various entities. With regards to my belief that the furry 
creature laying on my feet is a dog, I might single out one element: the concept DOG. As the word 
‘dog’ has a meaning for us, according to which it is true of my dog, this concept has a content such 
that it is true of my dog, among many other creatures like her. Thanks in part to the fact that it has 
this content, and since this furry creature is a dog, my belief that she is a dog is true. 
 What about me, though, makes it the case that this concept of mine is true of all and only 
the dogs—why does my dog fall under this concept? A foundational theory of content provides an 
answer to this question, just as a foundational theory of meaning, or a metasemantics1, for natural 
language attempts to explain why my linguistic items have their meanings.2 Such theories aim to 
                                                           
1 My usage here conforms with that used by Speaks (2014). In these case of linguistic meaning, some prefer 
“metasemantics” to “foundational theory of meaning”. This usage originates primarily with Kaplan (1989), 
and is now in wide use, as exemplified in Burgess and Sherman (2014). 
2 Foundational theories of content do not automatically provide any account of the nature of contents, just as 
foundational theories of meaning (“metasemantics”) provide directly neither a semantics for natural 
languages nor a theory of the nature of semantic contents. Perhaps the contents of concepts are individuals, 
properties, intensions, or any of those under a mode of presentation (or, these are individuative of concepts, if 
the latter are semantically typed or individuated). 
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provide a constitutive explanation of semantic relations between a thinker, her representations, and 
their contents. Such an explanation, we might say, gives the nature of the phenomenon in question, 
or tells us what the latter consists in.3 
A useful device for appreciating why the nature of semantic and intentional facts proves 
difficult to explain in a satisfying way is the device of a skeptic about meaning. Saul Kripke, 
channeling Wittgenstein’s thinking in the Philosophical Investigations, imagines such a skeptic, 
who denies that our word ‘dog’ and our concept DOG have the meaning and content we think they 
do. The skeptic argues against our face-value attributions of meaning and content, challenging us to 
explain what might make it the case that ‘dog’ has the meaning we think it does, rather than some 
other meaning. 
 For example, ‘dog’ could have had a meaning such that it was true of all dogs except the 
one laying on my feet, or a meaning such that it was true of all dogs plus the most recently born 
rabbit.  A potential infinity of alternative interpretations like these are available. Why, then, does 
our word ‘dog’ have the exact meaning we think it does? In the face of this challenge, it would be 
hard to deny that we owe an answer if we are to retain the face-value understanding with which we 
began.  
 We could dig in our heels and insist that the word has the meaning we attribute to it, but 
deny that there is any more fundamental explanation to be given. But this is not an attractive or 
satisfying option. We want to be able to explain what it is about us that gives our word and our 
concept their meanings.   
 This is a familiar demand, answerable in other domains. Without the ability to provide this 
sort of explanation, there is a feeling that we are not justified in holding fast to our face-value 
judgments about meaning. Ideally, we can reply to the skeptic, “Yes, your word ‘dog’ means DOG! 
It has property P, and that’s what it is for something to mean DOG! Anything with that property has 
                                                           
3 More strongly, they may reduce, or, more weakly, specify the grounds of such facts.  
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this meaning.” The difficulty in this case is how specific a property we are trying to explain. An 
adequate account must predict that ‘dog’ is true of each dog and nothing else. The account must 
predict the meaning or content with the right extension (in every possible world), and there are 
many nearby alternatives.  
 I take it that any satisfactory theory of meaning or content—any metasemantics—will have 
to explain facts like this. That is, it must explain why a word or concept has a content such that it is 
true of various things (or true in various worlds or situations) and not others.4 Any theory of 
meaning must predict the correct semantic sorting, in terms of which things and situations satisfy 
and do not satisfy an expression. I assume that this explanatory demand on an account of meaning 
is appropriate.  
A couple of obvious strategies for answering the skeptic can be quickly dismissed. First, 
we might try saying that the rule I apply in my use of ‘dog’ determines its meaning. The rule I use 
in such applications is intuitively a matter of my beliefs and intentions, both of which are further 
states of mine that are characterized intentionally—in terms of their meaning or content. This 
strategy therefore only puts off the problem, and the skeptic can fairly ask of these states what 
makes it the case that they have the contents they have.5  
 Second, we might try saying that the stereotype I have in mind when I use the term gives it 
its meaning. But stereotypes both are not necessary for particular meanings and do not distinguish 
properly between various candidates for meaning. For example, you or I might associate different 
stereotypical dogs or doggish properties with the word ‘dog’. As such, neither particular stereotype 
is necessary for the word to mean what it does. Further, both of these stereotypes are not sufficient 
to distinguish the meaning of ‘dog’ from others. Stereotypes are surely more complicated than this, 
                                                           
4 This assumption is common, though not universal. For example, Horwich (2010) denies it.  
5 The problem here can be fairly characterized as a regress problem. Chapter 3 deals with a regress 
potentially facing certain versions of the normativity of content inspired by Kripke’s discussion of meaning 
and content.  
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but we can make things simple for now. Suppose my stereotype involves only the typical properties 
of a pug. Maybe I’ve only ever spent substantial time around dogs who are pugs. If this stereotype 
guides my use of ‘dog’, though, why should ‘dog’ mean DOG rather than PUG for me, if meanings 
are given by stereotypes?  
 This latter problem can be framed as one of underdetermination.6 The property of 
associating a particular image or stereotype with a word is insufficient to determine uniquely its 
meaning—the relevant property seems just as well-suited to the attribution of an incompatible 
alternative meaning. It might very well be, under either attribution of meaning, that the very same 
stereotype would be had in mind.7 This sort of underdetermination problem plagues many attempts 
to specify what it is for my word or concept to have its particular content. Both this 
underdetermination problem and the related non-necessity problem recur, as we will see, for more 
sophisticated associations with or features of our words and concepts. 
 Rules and stereotypes are features of my psychological relationship to a word or concept 
that explain their use—they guide my application of words and concepts. Rather than what explains 
use, perhaps we should take up Wittgenstein’s slogan—“Meaning is use”—and try to identify use 
itself, something about certain activities, as what determines my meaning. Use theories can go one 
of two ways: dispositional or normative.8 We could use facts about how I do use or am disposed to 
use words, or facts about how I ought to use them, to explain their meanings. I will argue that 
underdetermination cuts clearly against dispositional use theories (standing in for a broad range of 
                                                           
6 Underdetermination is meant here to be a metaphysical or modal notion, not an epistemic or evidential one. 
The issue can be put in terms of supervenience. 
7 There is some degree of choice about how to present the problem I have in mind. Underdetermination 
seems suitable, given that it emphasizes the looseness of fit between our dispositions and our meanings, to be 
contrasted with the tightness of fit between meanings and norms. It also fits with the angles of Kripke and 
Gibbard discussed in Chapter 2. I could have chosen simply to say that our meanings do not supervene solely 
on our dispositions. Put in that way, it fits less naturally with Kripke’s and Gibbard’s treatments, but better 
with anti-individualist insights about the subject-centered requirements on content. 
8 Dispositional theories stand in, in a way, for a wider class of naturalistic or non-normative theories of 
content. Most such theories are overtly dispositional, however, and all might be relevantly sufficiently similar 
to dispositional theories, though I cannot dwell on these points any further here. 
  
6 
non-normative theories of meaning or content), and does not cut clearly against a normative theory 
in the same way.   
 Certain kinds of activity, let’s suppose, can be singled out as relevant to the determination 
of meaning and content. Let’s further suppose that there is a way of describing such activity that 
does not presuppose any particular contents. Concerning linguistic meaning, let’s say that the 
relevant behaviors are acts of uttering words or sentences. I have uttered the word ‘dog’ in the 
presence of many dogs, with my attention focused on them, on occasion even pointing to them. To 
use a technical term for these sorts of acts, I tokened the word ‘dog’ in these circumstances.  
 We can also use the vocabulary of tokenings to describe the occurrence of psychological 
states involving concepts. When I see a dog and think, dog, or when I come to the belief that this is 
a dog, I have tokened my DOG concept. These events, of tokening a word or concept in certain 
circumstances, seem especially relevant to their meaning and content. Further, they can be 
described without presupposing any particular contents.  
As noted, I assume that a theory of content must explain why it is that particular symbols 
have the satisfaction conditions they have. I will also limit the discussion at this point to theories 
explicitly holding that the facts explaining meaning and content have to do with the thinker or 
language user’s activity. In my terminology, both approaches are therefore use-theoretic accounts 
of content-determination or metasemantics. Whereas my own view holds that the crucial facts are 
facts about what sort of use is appropriate, non-normative theories are variations on the view that 
the crucial facts are facts about what sort of use is actual. They cite facts about how an agent 
actually has used, does use, or is disposed to use, her expressions to explain what meanings they 
have.  
Having explained the subject matter of the theory of content, or, as I will usually put it, 
metasemantic theory, and introduced the challenge of explaining the facts of content, I’ll now turn 
to setting out my own specific aims in the dissertation, along with my metasemantic target, more 
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precisely. I’ll then explain my reasons for favoring a norm-based metasemantics and the way in 
which these reasons frame the dialectical structure of the rest of the dissertation. I begin by setting 
out the terms of the discussion in somewhat more precise and technical detail. 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL METASEMANTICS 
 
A conceptual metasemantics, as I will use the phrase, attempts to explain what it is in virtue of 
which concepts—mental representations at the level of thought—have the particular content that 
they have.9 This is the conceptual analogue of a metasemantics for natural, public language, which 
attempts to explain what it is in virtue of which the expressions of a language have their meanings 
for an individual or community. As I will assume here, a conceptual metasemantics offers a 
constitutive explanation of the relations being explained—an account of what it is for them to 
obtain. 
 It is common for a conceptual metasemantics to cite a particular sort of use of the concept 
in the explanation of its content. I will call the use of any concept which is key to its individuation 
or the explanation of its possession a canonical pattern of use. Such patterns can be understood in 
many different ways. For example, a reference-based semantics10 can be explained by citing 
patterns of application or activation of a concept; an inferential or conceptual role semantics11 can 
be explained by citing patterns of inference or transition. Since we are focused only on conceptual 
metasemantics, and not semantics, we will not assume that a canonical pattern of use genuinely 
                                                           
9 For the most part, I ignore the difference between this way of talking and others in which we would say that 
a conceptual metasemantics attempts to explain what it is in virtue of which concepts are particular concepts, 
where we regard concepts as having their semantic properties essentially. My way of putting things, that is, is 
not intended to assume an ontology on which there are intrinsically non-semantic vehicles for semantic 
content in thought, as on one way of reading talk of mental representations.  
10 Such a semantics is extensional and intensional, as of actual and possible entities. 
11 See Greenberg and Harman’s “Conceptual Role Semantics” (2008) for elaboration. 
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individuates semantic or intentional contents (or, on some terminologies, concepts).12 Rather, the 
pattern is canonical in that it is the pattern of use which the metasemantic account cites in 
explaining why a thinker deploys, for example, the concept OR rather than the concept AND by 
deploying a particular mental representation. On certain views, the canonical pattern of use for the 
concept OR will be the pattern of inference a thinker needs to be disposed to carry out for it to have 
its distinctive content. Such a view is silent as to whether the semantics of the concept is best 
explained in, say, purely referential or purely inferential terms.13  
 What makes one conceptual metasemantics different from another, then, is the relation it 
cites between a thinker and a concept’s canonical pattern of use as explanans. When this relation 
obtains, so says the conceptual metasemantics, the thinker possesses the concept in question. This 
explains why a particular concept in an individual’s repertoire has its particular content. 
 Schematically, a conceptual metasemantics takes the following form: 
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when relation R holds between A, S, and 
the CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for A. 
 
 The main question for any conceptual metasemantics is the nature of relation R, though 
they commonly differ also about the nature, in general, of canonical patterns of use.14  
One divide among conceptual metasemantics is whether they cite any normative 
ingredients in the specification of relation R. According to what I’ll call a norm-based conceptual 
                                                           
12 Of course, there is an attractive simplicity in translating semantic accounts fairly directly into canonical 
patterns of use in this sense. The point is just that these are separate tasks and, in principle, the metasemantic 
project can be carried out to some degree independently of the semantic investigation. 
13 This metasemantic approach is in a certain sense use-theoretic. Unlike, for example, Paul Horwich, for 
example in Horwich (2010), I make room for a use-theoretic metasemantics that does not imply a use-
theoretic semantic theory.  
14 We can also profitably distinguish between Relation Metasemantics and Profile Metasemantics, where 
Relation Metasemantics, roughly, identifies a candidate relation R and Profile Metasemantics identifies a 
general form or content of CPUs.  
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metasemantics, R is a matter of what a thinker ought to do. A normative conceptual metasemantics 
may simply say that  
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when A ought to deploy S in accordance 
with the CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for A. 
 
 This contrasts with non-normative conceptual metasemantic accounts, which are mainly 
dispositional theories of one sort or another.15 A dispositional conceptual metasemantics may 
simply say that 
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when A is disposed to deploy S in 
accordance with the CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for 
A. 
 
 I will proceed for now as if these two broad types of theory, though not exclusively in these 
overly simple and underspecified forms, are exhaustive of the possible types of conceptual 
metasemantics.16 This will aid in explaining the virtues of a norm-based metasemantics, and in 
clearly articulating the challenge posed by slur concepts. However, as we will see in later Chapters, 
the failures of dispositions correspond to the failures of the full range individualistic factors. For 
example, Paul Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning17 is centered on regularities in use—particularly, 
law-like regularities in use—but for our purposes, as will become clear, we may treat all of these as 
                                                           
15 Such theories can diverge substantially as to how they explain and individuate contents and canonical 
patterns of use. I aim to keep these dimensions of variation sharply independent. At the level of discussion of 
metasemantics above, Paul Horwich’s (ibid.) and Jerry Fodor’s conceptual metasemantics, for example, may 
come to the same thing, as they can be interpreted as offering similar accounts of the relation R. They go on to 
differ substantially as to the nature of content and as to the sorts of things that can qualify as a concept’s 
canonical pattern of use. Georges Rey (2009) discusses the possible equivalence of these two theories of 
content. My distinction between metasemantic projects can provide a way of endorsing Rey’s claims about 
Fodor’s and Horwich’s theories in a way that respects their differences.  
16 It is plausible that all non-normative conceptual metasemantics are just versions of the dispositional view. 
17 Horwich (1998, 2005, 2010). 
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sophisticated versions of the actual-use type of theory discussed above. For simplicity of exposition 
and the continuity of the discussion, we will, for the most part, use dispositions to stand in for the 
range of relevant internal or individualistic features of language or concept users.  
 We might also be interested in the possibly independent matter of natural language 
metasemantics. Typically, theories of content are developed neutrally with respect to mental or 
linguistic contents, or they are developed exclusively with an eye to one or the other of these 
phenomena, with some gesture about how mental contents are to be linked to a public language. 
There are, I believe, good reasons to limit one’s focus to one or the other subject matter. In our 
case, the linguistic waters may seem considerably muddier for a normative metasemantics, given 
the plausibility of a mentalistic explanation of linguistic meaning in terms of some connection to 
mental contents. Whether that kind of picture is to be developed in, say, Gricean or conventionalist 
ways18, it is plausible that the most promising form of a norm-based metasemantics for public 
language is one citing instrumental norms surrounding communicative acts. Though I will pursue 
this possibility in later chapters, making clear how the approach differs from the one generally 
pursued throughout the dissertation with respect to mental contents, I concentrate my focus on 
conceptual metasemantics. Still, it will occasionally be useful to speak neutrally or to consider 
linguistic examples to develop certain points or to illustrate relevant semantic data. 
 I have claimed that the main task for any metasemantics, as I will pursue it in this 
dissertation, is an explanation of the relation R as it occurs the above formulations of general 
metasemantic claims. I have further identified a norm-based metasemantics as holding that the 
relation R is to be explained in normative terms. For now, we can maintain the highly abstract and 
predictively opaque formulation in terms of an ought-fact oriented to the canonical pattern of use 
                                                           
18 I take a stand on this question in my Chapter 5, in which I mainly argue against conventionalist theories of 
meaning. I argue, ultimately, that the correct approach to linguistic metasemantics is mentalistic and 
normative, and that the appropriate level at which to cast a normative theory of linguistic meaning is that of 
the instrumental norms of the sort implicitly involved in both Gricean and conventionalist theories of 
meaning, with the addition of distinctive audience-oriented norms of inference to accommodate slur terms. 
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for a particular concept and a particular thinker. This will suffice for the argument and contrasts I 
will develop in this chapter. Subsequent chapters will be devoted, directly or indirectly, to the task 
of determining the general nature, source, and scope of the relevant ought-facts. As I will explain, 
neither of the two most obvious and common proposals—the traditional notion of a semantic rule 
nor the notion of a social practice—will be able to play the required explanatory role.19 
 First, though, I will explain why a norm-based metasemantics is attractive in the first place. 
I do not take any argument surveyed or offered here to be decisive in favor of a norm-based 
metasemantics—more needs to be said about each of them. My aim is to explain some of the main 
reasons I endorse for going normative in developing a metasemantics in a way that will orient the 
subsequent discussion of various specific developments of a norm-based metasemantics for 
concepts that is motivated by anti-individualism. Though I discuss alternative, common arguments 
for a norm-based metasemantics, or for the normativity of content more generally, the crucial 
argument for my purposes is the argument, pioneered by Mark Greenberg, that anti-individualism 
requires introducing normative elements into the theory of content, as non-normative factors 
(ultimately various candidate dispositions or regularities) cannot explain the data about content 
captured by anti-individualism. After this chapter, we will be considering exactly what kind of 
norm-based metasemantic theory would be suitably adapted to accommodate and explain anti-
individualism and, especially considering the challenging case of slur terms and concepts, provide 
a plausible metasemantic theory in its own right.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
19 This brief remark, elaborated below, marks how the view I will develop differs from both the rule-based 
views derived from Kripke’s discussion of the normativity of meaning and the practice-based views of the 
kind developed by Brandom. I will note here that neither of these contrasts are motivated by the worry that 
normative constraints are intrinsically incompatible with a rule-based or practice-based picture. This is yet 
another way in which my own contribution differs from that of previous discussions of the normativity of 
meaning and content. 
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III. THE NORMATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
I will begin this section relatively informally, explaining the general problems besetting 
disposition-based metasemantic theories for concepts, still proceeding, for now, on the assumption 
that such theories represent the plausible alternative to norm-based metasemantic theories. I then 
turn to the specific kinds of arguments offered by Kripke for the normativity of content, which will 
be especially important for understanding the arguments of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, and the 
dialectically distinct reasons why anti-individualism seems to require that we bring in normative 
factors. As we will see, accommodating anti-individualist data is a more demanding task than 
merely responding to the failure of disposition-based theories. As I will argue, existing normative 
theories of content are equally ill-suited to accommodate anti-individualism. 
A disposition-based metasemantics, as specified in its simplest form above, cannot be 
correct. The most obvious reason for this is that often we are in error about our own concepts or 
their extensions in such a way as to make us disposed to use them in ways which diverge crucially 
from their canonical patterns of use. For example, I may possess the common concept TABLE even 
if I were to develop a non-standard theory of the nature of tables, according to which even desks 
counted as tables. Suppose I believe that I’ve been systematically misled as part of an experiment 
in which I’ve been convinced, erroneously, that desks are not to be counted as tables. Assuming 
either that the canonical pattern of use of TABLE makes reference to inference patterns which track 
the defining features of tables or that it makes reference to applications of the concept to the 
members of its extension, my use of the concept will conform to neither if I believe this non-
standard theory. In a case like this (which in certain respects may be relevantly similar to many, or 
even most, of my actual concepts), my dispositions for use do not match my concept’s CPU 
sufficiently closely for the disposition-based metasemantic account to predict and explain the 
correct conceptual content. 
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 One way to understand the lesson here is that CPU-conforming dispositions are not 
necessary for the possession of a determinate particular concept. By the same token, CPU-
conforming dispositions  not sufficient for the determination of a particular concept, as, in this 
case, for example, my DABLE-matching dispositions are not sufficient to make the concept I 
express simply the DABLE concept. Simply put, my dispositions to apply TABLE in the above 
scenario cannot be taken to determine on their own the content of my concept. My dispositions in 
that case could obtain whether I actually deploy the standard concept under non-standard theory or 
deploy the alternative concept DABLE, which includes desks and tables in its extension.20  
Why think that a norm-based conceptual metasemantics can thrive in place of the simple 
dispositional account? Simply put, in the first place, the negative data about dispositions of use are 
not matched by corresponding negative data about norms of use. A norm-based conceptual 
metasemantics can explain why a concept TABLE can be possessed in common between 
community members who understand it properly and those who don’t, provided that the diverging 
community members ought to use it in conformity with the standard use, their non-normative 
divergence notwithstanding.  
 Non-standard theory will clearly impact one’s dispositions for the use of a concept, along 
with one’s beliefs about or involving it, but it will not clearly impact how one ought to use the 
concept, at the end of the day. Even under non-standard theory, I ought to apply TABLE to all and 
only the tables. When my non-standard theory gives rise to dispositions which equally fit TABLE 
and DABLE, the fact that I ought to apply the concept to the tables but not to desks can provide the 
                                                           
20 These widely-appreciated lessons about simple dispositional accounts can be traced back to the work of 
Kripke (1980), Putnam (1970, 1973, 1975), and Burge (1979, 1982, 1986). In my view, they are extendable 
far beyond the simple version of a dispositional account, and have not been adequately addressed by the 
defenders of dispositional metasemantics of concepts. However, I will simply proceed in this discussion as if 
the simple view can stand in for the rest, as my aim here is not to argue decisively in favor of anti-
individualism or the inadequacy of all disposition-based or non-normative metasemantic theories. See Wilson 
(2006) for a fascinating study of many cases that resist the narrow models of traditional theories of meaning 
and content. See Sawyer (2003) and Wikforss (2001, 2004) for critical discussion of the traditional way of 
understanding the thought experiments offered by Putnam and Burge motivating anti-individualism. 
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determination, whether the norms obtain thanks to common practice to which I ought to defer or 
thanks, in some way, to the way the world is.21  
 This relatively simple problem for a simple dispositional metasemantics, and the way in 
which it strikes a point in favor of norm-based metasemantic theories, can be extended in different 
ways, for example from dispositional metasemantics to all metasemantics based on factors wholly 
internal to each individual concept user. There are also more specific and conclusive arguments for 
the normativity of content or the need to bring norms into our metasemantics. Next, I will turn to 
the kind of argument offered by Kripke and others inspired by his treatment of Wittgenstein in 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language for the normativity of content.22 I’ll then turn to my 
own preferred kind of argument, from anti-individualism writ large to a norm-based 
metasemantics. First, Kripkean arguments concerning correctness normativity. 
My actual activity and dispositions struck Kripke as a paltry base from which to attribute 
an expression’s meaning. I have, for example, applied ‘dog’ to cats in dim lighting. If we just look 
to actual uses, what grounds do we have to attribute one meaning, on which this is an error, rather 
than a slightly different one, on which ‘dog’ is true of the cats to which I’ve applied it? My 
applications are also limited in number—to capture most dogs, projection is required beyond my 
actual uses. But on what grounds can we attribute a meaning on which all the remaining dogs falls 
under it, and nothing else does? Why not, for example, claim that ‘dog’ has a meaning that only 
includes the dogs to which I’ve actually applied the term? Some further projection is needed, but 
actual use does not seem to provide sufficient grounds to determine the correct one.  
                                                           
21 A point in need of emphasis is that mere reliance on the community, whether a sound theoretical move or 
not, cannot solve these particular modal problems, as the entire community can be just as mistaken as the 
solitary individual. In such cases, the thought has been that the world can help to determine content, 
independently of any of the agents’ dispositions. It is much more plausible that the world can help to 
determine one norm from another in the way required—say, that GOLD ought to be applied to a certain 
chemical element, thanks, in part, to the way the world is, even if we were to be ignorant of the nature of this 
chemical element such that we systematically misapply the concept—than it is that the world can distinguish 
otherwise identical dispositions as needed. 
22 Kripke (1982).  
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These problems extend to dispositions. We can imagine some dogs that aren’t recognizable 
to my senses as dogs; these creatures plausibly fall outside the range of my disposition to apply the 
word ‘dog.’ This is related to Kripke’s problem of finitude for dispositional theories—though my 
dispositions only extend to a finite number of cases, the extension of my term is in principle 
infinite.23 We could also imagine some breeds of cat, or robots, that have all the characteristic 
appearances of dogs; I might be just as disposed to apply ‘dog’ to these creatures as I am to actual 
dogs.24 This is Kripke’s problem of error—if my dispositions settle my meanings, then however 
I’m disposed to apply the term will turn out to be correct. 
 Kripke suggests that we must be able to account for the fact that we can make mistakes in 
our use a term with its ordinary meaning. If our actual dispositions straightforwardly determined 
our meanings, whatever we were disposed to apply a term to would count as satisfying it. He also 
suggests that we must be able to account for the fact that one projection of my actual uses to 
unconsidered cases is uniquely correct. My dispositions, like my history of actual uses, have a 
finite range of determinate application, leaving open multiple possible assignments of meaning.25  
Kripke proposes that an underlying source of these (dialectically independent) desiderata is 
that meaning is normative. Normativity, again, is the subject matter of judgments of what one 
ought to do or think, what good reasons there are for beliefs and actions, and others matters of a 
                                                           
23 This is a simplification of Kripke’s mathematical example, which is a better illustration of his problem of 
finitude. While the cases are not analogous in important respects, as Andrew Hsu has helped me to 
appreciate, this example will do for my purposes, since it illustrates the fact that one semantic projection 
beyond my tokens and dispositions is called for. It is metaphysically possible (and sometimes actual) that my 
dispositions fall well short of a disposition that matches exactly the correct extension. 
24 Kripke considers various responses to this problem. Attempts to conditionalize our dispositions on certain 
conditions are argued to be inadequate or to depend on a prior understanding of the expression’s meaning.  
Wedgwood (2009) and Warren (forthcoming) argue that dispositional theories can evade Kripke’s finitude 
objection.    
25 Such views face a well-known series of objections. Kripke, still channeling Wittgenstein, raises three 
problems for the idea that tokening events—these actual uses of words and concepts—can account for their 
meaning. The first is error, the second is finitude, and the third is normativity. There is too little space here 
by far for an adequate explanation of how these relate to my own normativity claim. 
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similarly prescriptive character.26 If meaning is normative in the relevant sense, then the fact that a 
word has its meaning has necessary consequences for how it ought to be used. According to Kripke 
and others, this is a third fact about meaning that we must account for if we are to provide an 
adequate account. According to this normativity constraint, meaning facts entail facts about how 
we ought to use our words—the facts alluded to above concerning correctness conditions. How, the 
thought goes, could our actual history of tokenings tell us how we ought to go on using the term, or 
whether those uses themselves were correct or not?  
As I hope to have made reasonably clear, there is an underdetermination problem for actual 
use and dispositions of use. In principle this is independent of the thesis that meaning is normative. 
We thus do not have to rely on the normativity of meaning to establish or endorse Kripke’s 
underdetermination problem for dispositions. 
Some may doubt that, for Kripke’s Wittgenstein, the underdetermination problems (and 
more specifically, the problems of error and finitude) are truly independent of his claim that the 
relation of meaning to use is normative.  Partly for that reason, we will benefit from examining an 
alternative route to something like the underdetermination problem: anti-individualism. According 
to anti-individualism, the contents of each individual thinker’s mental states depend in part on 
conditions external to that thinker and, ultimately, on conditions external to any collection of 
thinkers. A wide range of thought experiments have been offered in support of this general thesis.  
One of the main differences between this source of the problem and Kripke’s is that one of 
Kripke’s core problems with dispositional theories relies on a normativity claim, and all of his 
objections rely in part on abstract, a priori considerations against dispositionalist theories of 
meaning. Anti-individualism depends mainly on thought experiments designed to show more 
directly the modal relationships between the properties of an individual thinker and the contents of 
                                                           
26 Even this subject-matter-based characterization is not uncontroversial. Hopefully these pointers will get the 
reader onto the unified subject matter or class of judgment-types I have in mind.  
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her mental states. By contrast, the particular arguments I will emphasize from anti-individualism to 
normativity, Mark Greenberg’s, take more basic difficulties dispositionalist theories have 
accommodating the facts on the ground concerning concept possession and the nature of our beliefs 
as the basis for bringing norms into the picture. Thus, as we will see, this un-tethers the normativity 
of content from Kripke’s contentious arguments and from the fraught debate over the interpretation 
of the notion of semantic correctness. 
We’ve been considering normal users of the English word ‘dog’ and the concept we 
standardly express with it. This example helped us to get a grip on the problems of error and 
finitude for our dispositions. But dispositions are only one of the many factors that could be cited 
in attempting to explain meaning and content on the basis of the properties of the thinker. 
According to anti-individualism, holding all of these constant, our meanings and contents can still 
vary.  
Suppose that there is a planet extremely like Earth in another galaxy. The planet is so much 
like Earth that it is molecule-for-molecule intrinsically (but non-numerically) identical, except for 
one thing: the creatures that are called “dogs” there are robot spies from another civilization. Let’s 
call them “thwogs”. They no more occupy dogs’ place in our evolutionary tree, or a corresponding 
one in our counterparts’, than do our artifacts. Let’s further suppose that this is a time before the 
theory of dogs has gotten very sophisticated. Minimal grasp of the concept expressed by ‘dog’—
their concept of thwogs—is conveyed with stereotypical examples and reliable but defeasible 
generalizations about their properties and appearance.  
We have lots of beliefs about dogs—for example, that all living dogs are on earth. This 
belief is true. It is not falsified by the existence of thwogs not on earth. Thwogs are not part of the 
extension of our concept of dogs—they don’t falsify this generalization. The situation is the same 
with respect to our counterparts’ beliefs about thwogs—they are not about dogs. Our two concepts 
differ in extension. But the only non-identity intrinsic differences between me and my counterpart 
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are environmental. The difference is just that the actual creatures around me are of different kinds. 
Every “internal”, non-normative property of me and my counterpart are the same—our 
dispositions27 are identical, our evidence about the external world is identical, the appearances of 
these respective creatures to us are identical. As will become important later, our conceptions of 
our respective creatures are also identical—we have, save the concepts at issue, parallel beliefs 
about them. Still, the contents of our thoughts differ. 
In this way, anti-individualist cases provide us with fairly direct and general evidence of 
the intuitive and plausible dependence of the contents of our mental states on factors which are 
independent of the internal properties of the thinking agent. I’ll note just briefly that no recourse to 
the community is available here. As I’ve specified the situation, the knowledge of my larger 
community is limited as my own state of understanding is, and their dispositions are 
correspondingly imperfectly matched to the concepts they deploy. Therefore, we are given as much 
reason in cases like this (though some of the thought experiments in the literature do suggest a 
degree of community dependence) to deny subjectivism about content—the idea that the contents 
of one’s mental states depend solely on any internal properties of thinkers or even other thinkers 
with whom they share concepts, a language, practices, etc.28  
Burge formulates one of the lessons of his own arguments in relation to actual use: “Both 
the conventional linguistic meaning and the cognitive value expressed by an individual may vary 
with the individual’s environment, even as the individual’s activities, individualistically and 
nonintenionally specified, are held constant… ‘use’ (individualistically or socially conceived) does 
not necessarily ‘fix’ cognitive value.” This is in part because the question of whether conception of 
our meanings should be accepted—“whether the totality of communal (or individual) practices 
                                                           
27 Taking these dispositions to be individuated partly by the creatures causing them to manifest would not do 
any better for the internalist about content determination. I won’t argue for this here. 
28 I will not defend these conclusions further here. Those who would resist the conclusions of these thought 
experiments can take the argument of this paper as conditional on them 
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should be revised—can always be raised”.29 These wider lessons will become the focus in Chapter 
2, especially regarding their applications to our conceptions. For now, let’s retain a focus on 
dispositions as a representative property of thinkers that is insufficient to determine the correct 
meanings and contents, as this preserves some continuity between Kripke’s and related discussions 
of underdetermination, meaning, and normativity and the anti-individualist route to the normativity 
of content.  
Anti-individualist data concerns a much wider range of concepts than natural kind concepts 
like DOG and WATER. Consider the following case: Carla has only ever witnessed uses of the term 
‘vicariously’ that are neutral with respect to two distinct interpretations. She has often heard the 
term used in the following kind of sentence, uttered in a context in which the referent of “you” is 
doing something the speaker considers exciting and desirable: “Go ahead and do it—I can live 
vicariously through you.” When Carla hears this sentence, she believes that the speaker means 
something like I can live excitingly through you, not something like I can live as you by observing 
you. As such, Carla is prone to false assertions and beliefs using ‘vicariously’ and the concept she 
expresses with it. When she thinks I’m going to live vicariously through Norm today, because she 
believes Norm will be doing something exciting, she is wrong to think that her belief about Norm 
licenses her belief that she will be able to live vicariously through him.  
Carla’s own use of the term does not predict the semantic fact that her word ‘vicariously’ 
and the concept she expresses with it have the contents they do. Nevertheless, her word does have 
its standard meaning in our public language, and she is able to express the same concept we do 
when uttering sentences containing it. This is how she is able to be wrong when she asserts and 
believes according to her own pattern of use. This take on this sort of situation reflects anti-
individualism about meaning and content—Carla’s specific, determinate meanings and mental 
contents are beyond what her own internal properties can explain.  
                                                           
29 Burge (1986), p. 273. 
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Some theorists of content attempt to show that dispositions are enough to explain situations 
like Carla’s. Theorists of content defending dispositional theories of content in the face of such 
invoke a “deference” mechanism. They contend that deference, for example from Carla’s possible 
deferring in some sense to the usage of those around her, allows her to possess a concept possessed 
those others, even though she lacks the mastery of the concept had by the allegedly originating 
possessors of the concept. The claim is that if the individual thinker defers, in some sense, to 
another thinker with mastery of the concept, who exhibits dispositions reflecting such mastery, she 
can thereby possess the concept in a way that ultimately rests on dispositions that reflect complete 
understanding or conceptual mastery. There are three main reasons why this strategy is inadequate. 
First, we can point out that cross-personal conceptual piggybacking is not the only kind of 
situation in which thinkers are capable of possessing a concept that they do not fully master. If that 
is true, then the deference strategy, even if successful, will not amount to an adequate tool for 
enabling traditional theories of content to accommodate anti-individualism, or thinkers’ incomplete 
understandings of their own conceptual contents. I return to this point below. 
Second, we can point out that deference, whatever it is, is not required even for the cases in 
which we do piggyback on another’s conceptual repertoire. If that is true, then the deference 
strategy is not an adequate tool even for enabling traditional theories of content to explain 
conceptual piggybacking. In our case, it is not obvious that Carla’s minimal conceptual grasp, of the 
concept VICARIOUSLY, depends on her in fact deferring to any particular thinkers who have full 
mastery of the concept.  
Third, we can point out that the deference strategy is itself at odds with the theories of 
content it is designed to salvage from anti-individualist challenges. If this is true, then not only will 
deference be an inadequate strategy for explaining the phenomena, but the kind of explanation it 
offers will be unavailable for traditional theorists of content. This point will apply even if the first 
two points did not. 
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The third concern, compellingly articulated by Mark Greenberg30, is that the deference 
strategy requires theorists of content defending traditional theories of content to abandon the hope 
of giving a unified, constitutive account of concept possession. This is because, of course, in our 
case, Carla’s own dispositions or internal properties are not what is doing the work in explaining 
her determinate conceptual repertoire. Rather, the internalist account plus deference seems to admit 
that the initial account was mistaken, and that deference provides a second way of gaining the 
ability to use a concept in thought. Greenberg argues further that the kind of theory of content that 
is in this deep tension with the deference strategy is large, encompassing all disposition-based 
metasemantic theories (or theories of content), which includes standard conceptual role and 
informational theories.  
Greenberg contends that the problems facing the deference strategy, and this general fact 
about the failure of dispositional theories of content to explain even what is often called “social 
externalism”, show that we need some other kind of theory of content that can do the job. He argues 
that the plausible alternative to disposition-based theories of content is a normative theory of 
content—on his view, a responsibility-based theory of content in particular. 
Why is this kind of theory more viable in the face of the kinds of cases I’ve been 
discussing? Such a theory seems resistant to the kinds of hard cases involving partial grasp of one’s 
own concepts. In the kinds of cases motivating the turn to deference, for example, it is plausible that 
the agent possessing a concept they incompletely understand is nevertheless responsible to a 
standard of conformity with a pattern of use corresponding to the dispositions of a master of the 
                                                           
30 Greenberg (Unpublished MS) is also concerned with the first two points concerning deference. Greenberg 
makes the case concerning constitutive explanations and the aims of giving a unified theory of content in 
“Troubles with Content I” and “Troubles with Content II” in Burgess and Sherman (2014). Given my main 
aims in this paper, I do not aim to fully capture the details or scope of Greenberg’s arguments, though my 
debt to them in explaining the normative advantage engendered by anti-individualism should be clear. Those 
who don’t find that the deference strategy warrants the attention I give it may limit their focus to my two 
cases, Carla’s case and the below Torqano case, to make the central point that dispositional theories of 
content face clear obstacles in light of anti-individualism, and that normative theories of content are well-
positioned to avoid those obstacles and to explain anti-individualist cases. 
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concept in question. This can be true whether or not the agent actually exhibits any deferential 
tendencies, beliefs, etc. toward the conceptual master. This way of explaining the sharing of 
concepts between masters and non-masters is not even an option for dispositional theories of 
content, which must rely on the dispositions of each thinker to explain the concepts they possess, or 
else abandon the aim of giving a unified account of concept possession. While conceptual masters 
don’t automatically transmit their dispositions of use to other thinkers, they can play a role in 
setting standards for others’ use. 
A normative, or norm-based, conceptual metasemantics, by contrast, can explain how it is 
that a thinker can possess a concept despite incomplete understanding without resorting to any 
mechanism other than its central content-determining condition of, for example, being responsible 
to a standard unique to a particular concept. An account like this can say that a thinker possesses a 
concept in virtue of being responsible to a standard corresponding to it, and that in the “social 
externalist” cases one thinker is responsible to a standard set by the dispositions of another thinker 
whose use manifests mastery of the concept in question, and that this results in the thinker’s 
possession of the concept. Perhaps, in our case, Carla’s friends and linguistic community members 
set a standard in their usage of ‘vicariously’—a standard to which she is responsible even if she 
does not fully understand the concept or conform to the standard in her own usage. 
Carla’s case involves what is sometimes called social externalism, which is focused on 
cases in which a thinker gains possession of a concept by piggybacking on the conceptual repertoire 
of another thinker. There is a parallel argument to be made on the basis of the kind of cases that 
show that the content of our concepts can vary with respect solely to the non-social external 
environment.  
For another example, consider pre-scientific thinkers on Earth who encounter volcanos. 
These thinkers do not distinguish volcanos from what we might call torqanos, which are like 
volcanos except for the cause of formation and activation. Whereas volcanos, put roughly, erupt in 
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response to pressure from below, torqanos erupt from negative pressure from above. For our pre-
scientific thinkers in an environment like ours, volcanos are perceptually indistinguishable from 
torqanos. Cognitive and practical activity with respect to either would be identical. We may 
nevertheless succeed in possessing and deploying the concept VOLCANO, which has volcanos and 
not torqanos in its extension, rather than the concept TORQANO.  
In parallel with Greenberg’s argument concerning social externalism, we can note that 
disposition-based theories of content will not be capable of accounting for the phenomenon here 
illustrated and that a normative theory of content will not incur any such problem, because the kind 
of fact making a difference in these cases can also make a normative difference. In such a case, we 
may be subject to a normative standard set in part by the actual entities and properties in our 
immediate environment, though we may be ignorant of that standard-setting element, and so 
partially ignorant of the content-determining standard. 31 
How could this work, concretely, for some thinker or group of thinkers? We may set out in 
our use of a concept to satisfy the aim of referring to something in our specific environment, or, if 
we wish to avoid semantically loaded aims, we may say that we aim to demonstratively apply our 
concept only in the case of local occurrences the property of being of the same kind of creature 
giving rise to a particular perceptual state—namely, in our case, the property of being a dog. If 
that’s so, then there will be better or worse ways of using the concept depending on what our 
immediate environment is actually like. The kind of reasons emerging in a case like this are 
objective in the sense that the thinker may be ignorant of which concrete activities ought to be 
performed in their light. They also go beyond merely instrumental reasons, as they result in part 
                                                           
31 Lassiter (2007) offers an interesting attempt to square anti-individualism with mentalism about natural 
language. Though I agree with him that reliance on a linguistic community is not a viable strategy for 
maintaining anti-individualism, I don’t believe he has provided a coherent way of avoiding reliance on a 
community while accounting for robust anti-individualism. His discussion of deference interacts in 
interesting ways with mine, though, especially given that his notion of deference has to be broader than 
deference between individuals and broader than deference to anything actual, I do not have the space to 
discuss it here.  
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from, and serve to help constitute, the possession of an intellectual and cognitive framework by the 
thinker. It is part and parcel of having a conceptual mode of cognition that there be a point or aim to 
the deployment of its elements. There is a point to my deployment of the concept I express with 
“volcano”, and this point can be characterized partly in representational or environment-relational 
terms. That point of this conceptual deployment and the intellectual and personal goods that go 
along with it are frustrated if I my applicative usage tends to pattern with the presence some other 
kind of physical structure than the volcanos, actually in my immediate environment, which are 
relevant to my standard-setting aim. 
The point this story illustrates is just that there are plausible stories to tell about the 
dependence of facts about how we ought to use our concepts on things of which we may be 
ignorant, and in particular on facts about which things with which natures we actually interact with. 
This is in sharp contrast with internal properties like our dispositions in cases of ignorance—if I 
don’t know whether it is volcanos or perceptually indistinguishable (for me) torqanos in my 
immediate environment, then I will be equally disposed to apply the concept to both. Similarly for 
any inferential or conceptual role associated with my concept: if I do not know of any 
distinguishing features between volcanos and torqanos, then my inferential dispositions governing 
the concept will not distinguish between these two possible interpretations of my concept.32 
As should be clear, deference arises in the discussion of social externalism cases because 
those cases explicitly involve conceptual masters who could potentially play their own secondary 
explanatory role for a theory of content. In our torqano case, there simply are no masters to exploit 
                                                           
32 Here it is worth reminding oneself that there is significant disagreement over whether, in cases like this 
one, there can be some element of the content that will turn out to distinguish between these two possible 
extensions. This is one reason why the debate over whether such terms are covertly indexical or descriptive, 
or whether there is some extra intension that plays a relevant semantic role in such cases—a la the two-
dimensional semantics program developed by Chalmers (2006a, b) and Jackson (1998, 2010)— is important. 
Running my own argument through cases like this may rely on substantive assumptions about these issues.  
Rabin (Unpublished MS) gives reason to believe that the two-dimensionalist attempt to preserve 
individualism in these cases fails, as the relevant intensions must, roughly as I contend, be construed meta-
linguistically. 
  
25 
in this way. But recall that one aspect of Greenberg’s case against the deference strategy for 
dispositional theories of content is the point that deference is not an essential element even of the 
relevant social externalism cases. In Carla’s case, it is not obvious that Carla’s conceptual repertoire 
or linguistic meanings depend on her actually deferring to others in her usage. A related point is 
that in any case in which it is compelling that an individual thinker’s ignorance of her own concept 
occurs on the background of conceptual masters in the social environment, we can consider what 
would happen were those masters (or their mastery) to disappear from the scene entirely.33 If the 
individual’s conceptual repertoire is preserved, then the masters, and whatever relations might hold 
between them and our individual thinker, cannot play any essential role in determining the thinker’s 
conceptual repertoire. In that case, dispositional theories of content will have no obvious resource to 
explain what could be determining the content of the thinker’s concepts—the individual might 
believe that fibromyalgia is a condition of the bone, for example, in which case her reflective 
dispositions for applying her concept will reflect systematic error. And while she may well have the 
aim of identifying a particular condition in her own body, which she may have correctly diagnosed 
as fibromyalgia, this aim will not be an element of the content of the concept itself, though it can 
help to constitute the normative situation with respect to her own concept.34 
Thus, while deference looms large in the discussion of anti-individualism, this is not 
because it would provide an adequate solution to the problems posed by externalist cases. 
Dispositional theories of content look to deference because without it, they are straightforwardly 
incapable of accommodating incomplete understanding of or fundamental error concerning one’s 
own concepts. If deference to conceptual masters is an essential element of externalist cases, then 
                                                           
33 As Greenberg makes clear, there are many actual concepts for which there are, at times, no masters in the 
actual world. Thus, we don’t need to use hypothetical thought experiments like the case of Carla in relation 
to various mastery situations to make the present point. 
34 In this way, a normative theory of content can explain why exemplars are systematically important for 
explaining conceptual competence, even while such exemplars in no way form an element of the nature or 
content of the concept itself. 
  
26 
there are always someone’s dispositions to cite which may be adequate to determining the correct 
content. If deference is not essential to such cases, then the condition cited by dispositional theories 
of content is simply absent.  
Though it is important to evaluate deference as a strategy, the more fundamental problem 
concerning such theories of content is that their explanans, which is effectively a form of conceptual 
mastery, is often not present at all for a given concept in cases in which it is nevertheless highly 
compelling that an individual possesses that particular concept. A normative theory of content will 
not only have no problem unifying conceptual repertoires across individuals, it has no problem 
explaining how it could be that its explanans could obtain in cases of conceptual ignorance or 
mistake. Thus, the fundamental difficulty that “externalist” cases of all kinds pose for dispositional 
theories of content do not pose any corresponding difficulty for a normative theory of content. 
One final point worth noting is that the lessons here do not seem to rest on any particular 
kind of understanding of the nature of dispositions. This is in contrast to the kinds of problems for 
dispositionalism identified by Kripke. His objection concerning finitude in particular may well rest 
on an impoverished conception of what dispositions could be like. Our lessons from anti-
individualism, however, will apply to any kind of dispositionalism on which dispositions are a kind 
of internal property of an agent—whatever sort of property that may be, and whatever kinds of 
psychological mechanisms they may involve. This is another reason why I contend that the 
appropriate path to a normative theory of content cites anti-individualism, rather than a priori 
objections to dispositionalism concerning normativity or finitude.35  
                                                           
35 The lessons here do not rest on any particular kind of understanding of the nature of dispositions. This is in 
contrast to the problems for dispositionalism identified by Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language. His objection concerning finitude may well rest on an impoverished conception of what 
dispositions could be. Our lessons from anti-individualism, however, will apply to any kind of 
dispositionalism on which dispositions are an internal property of an agent—whatever sort of property that 
may be, and whatever kinds of psychological mechanisms they may involve. This is one reason why I 
contend that the appropriate path to a normative theory of content cites anti-individualism, rather than a priori 
objections to dispositionalism concerning normativity or finitude. Kripke’s “problem of error” has a much 
more complicated relationship to my own concerns than does the problem of finitude, which I do not endorse 
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To summarize somewhat, returning to some of the more casual formulations used in 
Section 1, it seems that dispositionalist understandings of the use relevant to determining meaning 
and content won’t work. Dispositions equally fit multiple assignments of meanings and contents. 
Use, conceived in relation to actual activity, does not tell us how to uniquely assign a meaning to 
an expression.36  
A normative use theory of meaning might say this: what makes it the case that a word has 
its particular meaning is some fact about how it ought to be used, some fact about what sort of use 
is proper. So, it might say that what makes it the case that ‘dog’ has a meaning which includes the 
furry creature laying on my feet is that, in some sense, it would be proper for me to apply the word 
to her.  
 A norm-based metasemantics, generally speaking, cites facts about how one ought to use 
an expression. It tells us that facts like these constitute facts about the meanings of my words and 
the contents of my thoughts. It tells us what it takes for me to be capable of deploying words with 
particular meanings, and for me to be capable of using particular concepts.37 When a content-
individuating norm, its canonical pattern of use, is the norm that actually applies to some 
representation for an agent, that representation expresses the content which corresponds with that 
norm.  
Some philosophers would simply use the term “correctness conditions” to refer to 
satisfaction or truth conditions, arguing that there is an automatic inference available from meaning 
to normativity via correctness conditions. But we cannot assume that facts about satisfaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
as an in principle obstacle for dispositionalist theories of content. The anti-individualist argument for a 
normative theory of content does not charge any such in principle incompatibility—rather, it cites the facts 
on the ground concerning concept possession and contents that particular kinds of theories run into 
difficulties in trying to explain.  
36 Again, I might more clearly have said “Dispositions to token a term do not provide an adequate 
supervenience base for a particular assignment of meaning.”  
37 In the case of concepts, which is largely my focus, it is perhaps the common view that concepts have their 
concepts intrinsically. On that view, a normative theory of content is a theory of concept possession. 
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conditions are intrinsically or analytically normative in this way. I emphasize that my theory of 
content is a theoretical claim about the metaphysical explanation of content, not a Kripkean claim 
that meaning claims, or content claims, entail normative claims concerning correctness 
conditions.38  
As some of the recent literature would put it, the norms of a norm-based metasemantics are 
content-determining norms, rather than content-engendered norms.39 This metasemantic theory 
does not claim that meaning facts give rise to normative facts. It claims that normative facts explain 
the nature of meaning facts. It also does not rely on a claim, like Kripke’s, that normative claims 
follow analytically or a priori from semantic claims.40  
It is worth noting that the availability of a construal of truth-conditions and satisfaction-
conditions as correctness conditions shows that a normativist like me has potentially available to 
her theory a range of normative facts with an exact match, so to speak, with the core truth-theoretic 
semantic explananda. That is, there is always a possible fact corresponding to facts of the form ‘A’ 
has the As in its extension, of the form ‘A’ ought to be applied to all and only the As.41 Normative 
facts like these provide the basis for a possible explanation of conditions of satisfaction attaching to 
particular concepts and expressions of mine. 
In light of the problems surveyed here for non-normative, disposition-based theories of 
content (and extendable to a wide range of theories, from actual-use-based theories to theories 
concerning internal conceptions, functional profiles, or beliefs), classified under the headings of 
                                                           
38 Probably the most prominent recent defender of the allegedly analytic meaning-correctness-normativity 
inferences is Daniel Whiting, especially in Whiting (2009). I do not his discussion to frame and precisify my 
own because I disagree with too much in his formulation of the claims involved.  
39 See especially Glüer and Wikforss (2009).  
40 A point to be developed in subsequent chapters is the fact this, in my view, renders many of the leading 
anti-normativist arguments in the recent literature inapplicable to a norm-based metasemantics. To my mind, 
this is perhaps the best reason for exploring this alternative picture of the normativity of meaning more fully. 
41 This is not the place to defend the claim, not uncommon, that such norms obtain invariably. Agreement on 
the existence of such norms does not depend on the belief that they are explained by meaning and content or 
that meaning and content are explained by them.  
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incomplete understanding, anti-individualism, or underdetermination, there is good reason to 
believe that proper use can do a better job of accounting for content. It is plausible that there are 
distinctive norms which obtain invariably with the possession of a particular concept or 
competence with a particular meaning. Such norms are also fully capable of depending on the 
external environment in the way anti-individualism suggests the ultimate grounds of content facts 
must be. In our example, it is plausible that we ought to apply our concept to dogs, while our 
counterparts ought to apply their concepts to thwogs. If this obtains more generally, norms do not 
have the problems of fit exhibited by dispositions. The fact that I have only considered a finite 
number of cases in no way falsifies a claim about what I ought to do in general in future cases. The 
fact that I have applied a concept to cats in no way implies that I ought to have done so. The 
objections and cases showing the inadequacy of dispositions do not apply to a normative 
alternative.  
 
IV. CAN NORMS EXPLAIN THE OBJECTIVITY OF CONTENT? CAN 
NORMS EXPLAIN CONTENT? 
 
My aim in this introductory chapter was to show how a norm-based metasemantics has the 
promise of evading the underdetermination problem and accounting for anti-individualistic data. 
With the above considerations, I am not attempting to provide a decisive argument for a normative 
theory of content.42 Doing so on this basis would require a more thoroughgoing and technical 
defense of anti-individualism itself, which is beside the main point of my investigation. I believe 
that anti-individualism is correct and that no good arguments have been given to doubt or 
reinterpret the compelling data concerning concept possession I have previewed here, but I do not 
expect ardent individualists to be convinced.  
                                                           
42 Part of the more complete argument from Kripkean considerations involves the fact that on a norm-based 
view, we also abandon strict rule-following requirements on meaning. Cf. Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss (2009). 
This issue is the focus of Chapter 3. 
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Nevertheless, if one source of skepticism concerning the viability of anti-individualism is 
the elusiveness of an adequate metasemantic theory, then the arguments to come might quell some 
of these doubts. In the end, my hope is, indeed, to provide the basis for a metasemantic foundation 
for anti-individualism, such that we are one step closer to understanding the constitutive 
explanation of intentional facts more generally. If I’m right that we are to explain intentional facts 
by citing, in part, normative facts, then we will have, in a way, reduced two mysterious, 
philosophically challenging categories to one. As we will see in subsequent chapters, the peculiar 
difficulties and unexpected fruits of this approach are a great source of its interest. 
My goal here was to explain how it is that a normative theory of content generally seems to 
be a way of avoiding and resolving the underdetermination problems, on the one hand, and how, on 
the other, anti-individualism more seems to require that we use normative ingredients in our 
explanation of content-bearing relations. The central project of the dissertation is to take this data 
seriously, to assume that anti-individualism motivates a normative theory of content, and to 
consider what kinds of constraints this motivation places on our metasemantics. What kinds of 
norms must or can the content-determining norms be? What sort of behavior do they prescribe or 
proscribe? What are their grounds? Can these norms be used to explain the possession of contents 
which are non-ideal or bad in various respects? Is the resulting theory, however we answer these 
further questions, a viable theory of content, or, in the end, will we be forced to choose between 
anti-individualism and a satisfactory metasemantic theory?  
As I’ll be arguing, the norm-based theory of content emerging from the need to explain 
anti-individualism is, once properly developed, not only viable and, as a normative theory of 
content, more plausible than non-normative alternatives, but more plausible than existing 
normative theories of content as well. 
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Chapter 2: Gibbard’s Normativity of Content 
 
The primary aim of this Chapter is to begin to identify the constraints placed on a norm-based 
metasemantics by the motivation from anti-individualism. I direct my arguments against a 
prominent recent example of a normative account of meaning and content, defended by Allan 
Gibbard, with, I contend, subjectivist implications. Gibbard maintains that meaning facts are 
constituted by the non-normative, dispositional properties of agents, and argues that meaning 
claims are claims concerning the subjective norms of rationality governing a symbol. I argue that 
the problems motivating a normative theory of content would tell just as well against a normative 
approach if its normative elements still depend on how things are in these ways with individual 
subjects. The content of meaning-determining norms must be permitted to depend in part on facts 
external to the agents to whom they apply. I also argue that adverting to social norms, rather than 
merely individualistic norms, does not salvage a normative theory of content that is nevertheless 
subjectivist in its reliance on norms whose natures are given by facts about a subject or collection 
of subjects. Thus, the motivation from the range of anti-individualistic case data, properly 
understood, ultimately requires a norm-based metasemantic theory that is both non-individualistic 
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and more generally not subjectivist. I finally argue that the resulting approach, giving objective 
normative facts a role in the metaphysical explanation of meaning and content, is not necessarily 
suspect from a naturalist’s perspective. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 According to Kripke’s Wittgenstein, meaning facts entail normative facts—facts 
concerning, in short, the proper use of expressions. 1 In his view, this sets up an explanatory 
demand which theories of meaning and content are ill-suited to meet. Many philosophers have 
endorsed these claims. Fewer have explored the possibility that normative facts themselves provide 
the elements of the correct theory of meaning or theory of content. A normative theory of meaning 
or content explains what it is for a symbol to have its content in terms of the norms governing the 
use of that symbol. Normative ingredients—facts and properties concerning what one ought, 
should, or has reason to do or think—will thus be part of the metaphysical explanation of the 
nature of semantic or intentional properties or facts. If such a theory can be worked out, it has the 
promise of meeting straightforwardly Kripke’s explanatory demand; it can explain how normative 
facts have an invariant relationship to intentional facts—because they serve, in part, to constitute 
them.  
In this Chapter, I develop the idea that meaning and content facts can be constitutively 
explained in terms of normative facts by considering specific kinds of proposal for filling in nature 
of and theoretical role for normative factors. I proceed somewhat more generally than the norm-
based conceptual metasemantics articulated in Chapter One to paint a more complete picture of the 
terrain surrounding the normativity of meaning and content so that we can properly appreciate the 
alternatives to my own favored account.  
                                                      
1 Kripke (1982), interpreting Wittgenstein (1953). 
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A normative use theory of meaning or content, as I will label and discuss it for this 
Chapter, for the purposes of more direct engagement with Gibbard’s ideas, cites facts about how 
one ought to use an expression in explaining meaning or content. It tells us that facts like these 
constitute facts about the meanings of my words or the contents of my thoughts. It tells us what it 
takes for me to be capable of deploying words with particular meanings, and for me to be capable 
of using particular concepts.2 We can, as a first stab, define the following normative theory of 
content: 
 
Normative Theory of Content (NTC): What it is for representation r to have content c 
in the psychology of agent A is for it to be the case that A ought to use r as in 
accordance with the canonical pattern definitive of c.3  
 
I use the term canonical pattern of use as a general term for content-individuating 
dispositions, rules, inferences, etc., with neutrality about which of these, if any, truly individuate 
contents. Each conceptual content, we may suppose for this discussion, is associated with some 
norm or rule of inference or application. NTC claims that when a content-individuating norm, its 
canonical pattern, is the norm that actually applies to some representation for an agent, that 
representation expresses the content which is individuated by that norm.  
I argued in Chapter One that underdetermination of content, including the problems 
exhibited in anti-individualism, by non-normative facts about subjects—most centrally, their 
dispositions—can motivate a normative theory of content. A normative theory of content does not 
                                                      
2 In the case of concepts, which is largely my focus, it is perhaps the common view that concepts have their 
concepts intrinsically. On that view, a normative theory of content is a theory of concept possession. 
3 I formulate NTC with a certain level of generality over representations and neutrality about how we are to 
understand concepts. For those to whom this formulation thus rings strange, it can be formulated also as 
follows: What it is for A to possess concept C is for her to be subject to norms distinctive of C. Another 
downside of this formulation is that the in spelling out the norms, we will have to be careful about when to 
assume that C is C, with its particular content and when not. Assuming mental symbols and an independent 
content assignment allows us to neglect these issues. 
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need to rely on these features of subjects to determine content. Norms can be determined by facts 
external to agents, who can also be ignorant of particular norms that apply to their thought and 
behavior. As such, the subject-independent factors that must aid in the determination of meaning 
are capable of explaining the norms which I contend explain meaning and content facts.  
Allan Gibbard also endorses an normative account of meaning and content.4 He provides 
motivation closely related to these underdetermination problems. In Section 2, I explain the 
relevant features of his account. Like its non-normative rivals, it ties meaning and content closely 
to certain features of subjects, like their dispositions and other psychological states. Gibbard’s 
account adds to this standard picture of what meaning facts consist in the idea that the concepts of 
meaning and content are normative concepts, specifically concerning the subjective oughts of 
rationality. I argue in Section 3 that even if the other forms of subjective dependence were 
abandoned, this elaboration of the normative elements in a normative theory of content is subject to 
its own underdetermination problem. If a normative theory of content is to be motivated by the 
failure of subjective features to fully determine content, it must cast off its ties to the non-
normative properties of subjects. Its normative factors cannot similarly depend on subjective 
features. 
In short, I argue that underdetermination does motivate a normative theory of content, in 
agreement with Gibbard—but I argue that it motivates a non-subjectivist (in a sense to be 
explained) normative theory of the nature of intentional properties. While, to facilitate direct 
engagement with Gibbard’s claims, I talk at this level of abstraction in this Chapter, it should be 
noted that my own arguments concern primarily metasemantics for concepts, rather than intentional 
states in general, perceptual states, or linguistic competence. In Section 4 I explain the requisite 
kind of normative theory in more detail. In Section 5 I defend it against the charge that it is 
problematic from the perspective of a naturalist about meaning and content. I close by noting that, 
                                                      
4 Gibbard (2012). 
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properly understood, the moral for normative theories of content carries over to Brandom’s 
Inferentialism, despite the appearance of advantage from his reliance on social norms rather than 
individualistic properties. 
1.1: Non-Normative Underdetermination of Content  
Let us review some of our claims from Chapter One: In light of the underdetermination of 
intentional or semantic facts by non-normative, individualistic factors, there is good reason to 
believe that proper use can do a better job of accounting for meaning than can our dispositions. It is 
plausible that there are distinctive norms which obtain invariably with the possession of a particular 
concept or competence with a particular meaning. Such norms are also fully capable of depending 
on the external environment in the way anti-individualism suggests the ultimate grounds of content 
facts must be. In one of our examples, it is plausible that we ought to apply our concept to dogs, 
while our counterparts ought to apply their concepts to thwogs. If this obtains more generally, 
norms do not have the problems of fit exhibited by dispositions. 5  The fact that I have only 
considered a finite number of cases in no way falsifies a claim about what I ought to do in general 
in future cases. The fact that I am disposed to apply a concept to cats in no way implies that I ought 
to have done so. The objections and cases showing the inadequacy of dispositions do not apply to a 
normative alternative.  
The major interest here is to show how a normative theory of content has the promise of 
evading the underdetermination problem and accounting for anti-individualist insights. Two 
questions guide the remainder of the discussion: (1) How should we understand the oughts 
involved in a norm-based metasemantics, and (2) What is their relationship to the psychology of 
the thinker? I argue that Gibbard’s answers to these two questions lead him to fall into the trap 
provoking underdetermination in the first place—viewing meaning as dependent on an individual’s 
                                                      
5 If one would argue that conceptual contents are individuated with respect to certain rules of reasoning about 
their subject matter (an epistemic profile or sense), it is, if anything, more plausible that norms of use 
corresponding to these rules actually obtain. 
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non-normative psychological properties. Gibbard elaborates one natural way of getting more 
precise about the nature of content-determining norms, in terms of subjective oughts of rationality. 
This proposal falls, I contend, along the same lines as dispositions. We will need norms whose 
nature or content can depend on facts external to the thinker’s perspective. 
With the above considerations, I am not attempting to provide a decisive argument for a 
normative theory of content.6 My goal is to explain how it is that a normative theory of content 
seems to be a way of avoiding and resolving the underdetermination problem. This sets the stage 
for the overall investigation into the right kind of normative theory of content and permits a direct 
engagement with Gibbard’s claims about the normativity of meaning and content. While I will, in 
Section 4, expand on the resources of a normative theory of content, the argument of this paper 
should be taken to be conditional: assuming that a normative approach is correct, and granting its 
responsiveness to Kripke and anti-individualism, how could the theory be developed? Since my 
main goal is to argue against certain ways of understanding content-determining norms, I do not 
devote more space to arguing for a normative view. I turn now to Gibbard’s subjectivist elaboration 
of these norms.  
 
II. GIBBARD’S METATHEORY OF MEANING 
2.1: Gibbard on Kripke and Naturalism about Meaning 
Gibbard develops and defends one of the most mature normative accounts of meaning and 
mental content to date, contending that meaning claims and concepts are “fully definable in 
normative and naturalistic terms”7. What is most distinctive about his approach is that normativity 
enters into the picture as part of what he calls the “metatheory” of meaning. Normativity does not, 
as Gibbard sees it, enter into the constitutive explanation of what makes it the case that words and 
                                                      
6 Part of the more complete argument from Kripkean considerations involves the fact that on a norm-based 
view, we also abandon strict rule-following requirements on meaning. Cf. Glüer and Wikforss (2009).  
7 Gibbard (2012), p. 12 
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thoughts have their meanings and contents. Rather, his view is that the correct theory of semantic 
concepts and claims will understand them as normative concepts and claims—that is, for Gibbard, 
expressivistically, in terms of the planning states of mind they express.  
This is by contrast with what Gibbard calls a “substantive” theory of meaning and content, 
which makes a claim about the correct constitutive explanation of meaning facts.8 As we’ve seen, 
this more standard sort of account of meaning facts would say what it is for an expression to have a 
particular meaning. About this latter issue, Gibbard maintains an individualistic dispositionalism. 
For Gibbard, a thinker’s dispositions are what facts about the meanings of her expressions “consist 
in”; in accepting this substantive theory, as with accepting first-order claims of meaning like “‘dog’ 
means DOG,” one thinks a normative thought—a thought about what one ought to do, a state 
consisting in one’s having a particular complex plan for use of ‘dog’. 
As Gibbard sees the situation, Kripke’s sceptic challenges us to identify a property of an 
individual that constitutes her meaning one thing rather than another. 9 Taking up a version of 
Kripke’s mathematical example, Gibbard presents us with the case of Ursula the math student to 
illustrate the task at hand and the difficulty in finding a satisfactory answer.  
“Ursula, imagine, is a young, German-speaking girl who is just gaining 
familiarity with the plus sign ‘+’. When queried with numbers with 
numbers under 50, she tends to reply with the sum, but for bigger numbers 
she just looks confused and answers randomly if at all.” (p. 42) 
 
                                                      
8  Gibbard talks most directly about substantive theories of meaning addressing the constitution of the 
property of meaning such-and-such. The reformulation in terms of facts of meaning is harmless for my 
purposes, though it may be easier for some to appreciate why Gibbard, as an expressivist, will deny that his 
normativity of meaning theses make any claims about semantic or normative properties. This is not the place 
to trace out delicate issues about the notions of fact available to Gibbard’s theory.  
9 A clarification Gibbard makes immediately is to separate the matter of what a person means from what her 
words mean. The proper target of Kripke’s worries, Gibbard rightly thinks, is the latter phenomenon.  
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Our question is what might make it the case that Ursula’s ‘+’ sign means addition, or 
PLUS, rather than something else. Kripke’s sceptic suggests that Ursula’s ‘+’ can be interpreted just 
as well as meaning quaddition, or QUUS. The result of quaddition is the sum for numbers all of 
which are below 50, say, and 5 otherwise.  
 The convenience of having Ursula be a student becomes clear when one tries out the 
dispositionalist response. According to this response, Ursula’s ‘+’ means addition because she is 
disposed to respond to questions of the form, “what is __ + __?” with the sum of the two numbers 
given in the question. But, Ursula is as an early student, there will be some number, 50 we’re 
supposing, beyond which Ursula simply seems confused, or doesn’t know how to proceed. In this 
case, Ursula’s dispositions are compatible both with the hypothesis that her ‘+’ means addition and 
with the hypothesis that her ‘+’ means quaddition (underdetermination). On these grounds, a 
simple dispositionalism falters.  
Above, I used similar cases to illustrate the underdetermination problem and the potential 
for a normative theory of meaning to resolve it. Gibbard is especially concerned to show, with 
Kripke’s example, how his normative account of meaning is to be distinguished from more usual 
theories of meaning. He sets up two characters, Jerry and Tyler 10 , who endorse different 
substantive theories of meaning, in Gibbard’s terminology. Substantive theories of meaning offer 
accounts of the nature of the properties of having particular meanings.  
Jerry maintains that meaning properties supervene on an individual’s dispositions, with the 
proviso that simplicity can make a difference in determining which meaning is the best fit for a 
given disposition. Tyler, by contrast, holds that it is the dispositions of the speaker’s or thinker’s 
entire community that determine the meanings of an individual’s expressions, also making room 
for considerations like simplicity to make a difference in fitting meanings to dispositions. These 
                                                      
10 These characters are acknowledged to be related in some way to Jerry Fodor and Tyler Burge, though not 
to be representative of their actual views.  
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two theories of meaning will make the same prediction about Ursula’s ‘+’ sign, if the case were 
filled out in certain ways, but would make the prediction on different grounds.  
“We ask Jerry whether by ‘+’, Ursula means addition or a strange function we call 
“quaddition”, which gives sums for numbers under 50, and always gives the answer 5 with bigger 
numbers. He says she means addition. Addition and quaddition fit her dispositions equally closely, 
since they diverge only in the realm where Ursula’s answers are random anyway. Addition, though, 
is the simpler function of the two—and indeed it turns out that as Jerry has characterized simplicity 
mathematically, he is right. So the best fit to Ursula’s dispositions is the sum. 
Tyler the meaning communitarian agrees that by ‘+’, Ursula means addition, but he offers 
a different account of why that is. Ursula is learning the use of ‘+’ from people in her community, 
and in her community at large they use the sign in a systematic way even for quite large numbers. 
They almost always respond with the sum.” (pp. 42-43) 
Gibbard presents Jerry’s and Tyler’s accounts, emphasizing that both Jerry and Tyler fully 
understand the naturalistic properties at issue in one another’s theories. To Gibbard’s mind, this is a 
puzzling situation. As he asks, “What is there for them to disagree about? What is at issue between 
Jerry and Tyler, with their competing theories of what meaning consists in?” This is the question to 
which Gibbard’s theory provides an answer: “Their disagreement is normative. Jerry and Tyler 
disagree on the normative standards that settle which sentences, in a person’s own language, the 
person ought to accept. Jerry’s standards heed only what’s in the head, whereas Tyler’s are 
responsive as well to the rest of the community.” (p. 44) 
 
2.2: Gibbard’s Normative Metatheory 
 
Gibbard does not attempt to offer a competitor to the theories offered by Jerry and Tyler. 
Rather, his theory is about such substantive theories, in Gibbard’s terminology: theories of what 
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meaning consists in. Having seen the relation of Gibbard’s view to this Kripkean case and two 
theories addressing it, we can state more fully what kind of theory Gibbard offers.  
Gibbard’s theory is, in his terms, a normative metatheory of meaning, claiming that the 
concepts of meaning and the concepts of concepts and content are normative. This unusual take on 
the normativity of meaning is, for Gibbard, partly a consequence of his view that what is distinctive 
or special about normativity in general is to be found in normative meanings, thoughts, and 
concepts, rather than in any special normative subject matter or normative properties. For Gibbard, 
a claim of the normativity of meaning can only be understood as a thesis that the meanings, 
thoughts, and concepts involved in meaning thought and talk, are special in the way that normative 
meanings, thoughts, and concepts in general are.  
There are therefore three central components of Gibbard’s view. First, there is the claim 
that the concepts of meaning and content are normative concepts. This is his way of understanding 
how there could be mutual entailment relations between meaning ascriptions and normative 
thoughts.11 This is thanks in part to the second component, the expressivist claim that normative 
meanings and concepts are to be understood in relation to planning states of mind.12 According to 
this view, to think a normative thought—a thought about what I ought to do—just is to have a 
complicated sort of plan for various hypothetical circumstances.13 Ultimately, then, Gibbard claims 
that to think meaning thoughts is also just to be in some such complicated state of planning how to 
                                                      
11 For Gibbard, of course, it is crucial that entailment relations are between things like ascriptions and states 
of mind, rather than between the facts involved.  
12 How to understand Gibbard’s expressivism is not straightforward. He addresses the question in Chapter 10, 
in which he says “The tie of oughts to action is conceptual,” (p. 228) and “Ought entails Do!” (p. 229). The 
reader should also note that Gibbard calls expressivism a substantive theory of concepts which could be 
characterized conceptually and normatively in terms of these ties to action. For my part, I regiment Gibbard’s 
view to avoid distraction from our main concern.  
13  There are many ways of understanding expressivism’s core claim. Since it brings out what is most 
important for my purposes, I stick with this claim about the state of mind one is in when one thinks a 
normative thought or sincerely avows a sentence with normative terms. 
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use the expression at issue. Third are Gibbard’s specific proposals for what normative claims are 
entailed by meaning claims.  
As with his expressivism in metaethics in relation to substantive ethical theory, the 
resulting theory about meaning is intended to be neutral as to the substantive theory of meaning.14 
It is in this way that Gibbard’s theory is intended as a “metatheory” of meaning. As Gibbard 
especially likes to put it, it is an account of “what is at issue” (p. 46) in claims of meaning and 
content. When we disagree about normative matters, this consists roughly in our having different 
plans; when we disagree about meaning matters, this consists in our disagreeing about normative 
matters, and so too in our having different plans.  
However Gibbard wishes to cast his own theory, he does provide a positive account of the 
normative claims, “oughts”, as Gibbard refers to them, that he alleges are analytically equivalent 
with particular meaning claims. Which particular oughts they are varies with each particular 
meaning or content we might attribute. On Gibbard’s view, our concepts of each content are given 
by a certain package of particular oughts; in attributing a content to a thinker or expression we 
attribute this package of oughts to her use of the expression or concept. Whatever particular oughts 
these are, those relevant to meaning claims and attributions the subjective oughts of rationality.15  
The distinction between subjective and objective oughts is commonly utilized to 
distinguish between what is rational for an agent, as assessed purely with respect to her own state 
of information, and what she might otherwise ought to believe, infer, and so on. The distinction is 
designed to capture something commonplace about our ordinary ought-claims. For example, if I 
breach a contract because I was told by a seeminlgy reliable source that I had been released from 
                                                      
14 I suspect that Gibbard makes the not unusual assumption that in specifying the nature of a concept, one 
might as well be saying what it is to possess a concept. This would explain why for him expressivism could 
seem to be both a normative-conceptual claim and also a substantive possession condition claim. Again, 
pursuing this issue directly is too far from the main points. 
15 Gibbard uses “oughts” to talk of normative claims because he follows A.C. Ewing in taking the concept 
OUGHT to be the primitive normative concept. See Gibbard (2012) pp. 10-15, 53-55. As such, it is the 
concept to which his expressivist account of normative concepts is primarily directed.  
 45 
my contractual obligations, we can already tell that, whether or not this was true, there is a sense in 
which it is not the case that I ought to have performed my contractual duties. This is the subjective 
ought. If the information I’d received was false, and the contract remained valid, then in a sense I 
certainly still ought to have fulfilled my contractual obligations. That is the objective sense. As 
Ralph Wedgwood explains,  
“in the objective senses of the term, the way in which an agent “ought” to act 
or to think at a given time may be determined by facts that neither the agent 
nor any of his friends or advisers either knows or is even in a position to 
know; in the subjective senses, the way in which the agent “ought” to act or 
to think depends in some way on the informational state that the agent is in at 
the conversationally salient time.”16 
 
 According to Gibbard, “The basic normative precepts that ground a subjective ought are 
subjectively applicable—applicable in light of information the agent has. The basic precepts that 
govern objective oughts are not.”17 This formulation is primarily about what information it takes 
for the oughts to apply. Subjective oughts, as Gibbard defines them, are also necessarily accessible 
to the thinking perspective of the agent to which they apply: “an ideal agent must be able to 
recognize what they tell her to do.”18 As Hill describes this aspect of Gibbard’s view, “the idea here 
seems to be that the norms that govern the use of expressions must be such that I am able to know 
whether or not I am conforming to them.”19 As Williamson interprets Gibbard, subjective oughts 
concern an agent’s appropriate response to accessible evidence.20  
                                                      
16 Wedgwood (2017), Ch. 5.  
17 Gibbard (2012), p. 76 
18 p. 118 
19 Hill (2013). 
20 Williamson (2018). 
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These subjective oughts are important to the development of Gibbard’s view. As he sees it, 
if he focused on objective oughts, and particularly on the objective oughts of correctness and truth, 
his position on Kripke’s problem would be untenable. This is because, as Gibbard sees it, the 
inference from semantic correctness conditions to objective oughts is valid. For example, we can 
infer from the meaning of “Snow is white” to the claim that one ought (objectively) to accept that 
snow is white just in case snow is white. As Gibbard sees it, this licenses our inferring a normative 
claim from the naturalistic circumstance that snow is white. As such, he can no longer claim to 
address Kripke’s problems by emphasizing that the normative claims involved in meaning claims 
do not follow from any naturalistic claims. This is why he builds his account around subjective 
oughts, which he believes do not follow from naturalistic claims, and argues at length (Ch. 4) that 
objective oughts are only “degenerately normative”, and definable in terms of subjective ones.  
Most of the book is devoted to developing this position and elaborating particular 
proposals for the normative entailments (and the resulting practical, planning commitments) of 
claims involving semantic concepts. Gibbard claims, for example, that to claim that my word 
“something” means SOMETHING is to attribute certain oughts to its possible uses: namely, those 
concerning the validity of existential generalization. Similarly, to claim that another’s word is 
synonymous with my “something” will be to invoke the same oughts, only about another agent and 
somewhat more complicated. Gibbard claims that what actually makes it the case or constitutes my 
meaning SOMETHING, or another’s meaning SOMETHING, will be a purely non-normative, 
matter.21  
                                                      
21  Gibbard’s metatheory has implications for both the identification of concepts (semantically) and for 
characterizing when they are the meanings of particular expressions. This is how to make sense of the fact 
that Gibbard illustrates the general idea of the normativity of meaning with very particular normative-
semantic connections, but then develops his general theory of concepts like MEANING, SYNONYMY, and 
REFERENCE. That general theory is an account of what normative element is in common between all of the 
many particular semantic claims we make of these various kinds.  
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How, then, to take the problem exhibited in Kripke’s case, and what exactly is the relation 
of Gibbard’s theory to that problem? Many have taken the problem to lie in the unsatisfiability of 
the task laid out: to identify some naturalistic fact about the thinker that constitutes her meaning 
one thing rather than another. According to Gibbard, the lesson is just that (the concept of) 
meaning is normative—as such, naturalistic facts may constitute but will not entail analytically any 
meaning facts.  
Specifically, philosophers taking up Kripke’s slogan that meaning is normative commonly 
contend that meaning’s normativity rules out theories like Jerry’s and Tyler’s. Gibbard thinks that 
meaning’s normativity rules out neither Jerry’s nor Tyler’s substantive theories of meaning. 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein, for Gibbard, highlights the non-analytic character of such substantive 
theories22, which Gibbard’s metatheory is designed to explain.  
Gibbard tells us what is at issue between Jerry and Tyler—something normative—in their 
disagreement about Ursula. What such cases illustrate, according to Gibbard, is that such issues 
cannot be settled analytically by the naturalistic facts cited in Jerry’s and Tyler’s theories. This is 
why there is a persistent problem about cases like Ursula’s—there is always an analytical gap 
between such naturalistic facts and facts of meaning. If Gibbard is right in claiming that meaning 
concepts are normative concepts, this is a special case of the analytical is-ought gap highlighted by 
Moore’s open question argument.23 Gibbard’s normativity of meaning explains our disagreement 
about which naturalistic property constitutes meaning. 
If this is the only stance towards cases like Ursula’s taken by Gibbard, however, how 
interesting or well-motivated is Gibbard’s metatheory? If it only tells us that there is a normative 
open question between naturalistic facts and meaning facts, then it doesn’t actually seem to help us 
                                                      
22 A simple way to put the idea, perhaps uncharitably, is that Gibbard contends that the lesson from Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein is that there is no correct naturalistic analysis of meaning concepts. One would be hard pressed, 
however, to find such a view being offered as the target of Kripke’s arguments.  
23 See, of course, Moore (1903) and the vast ensuing literature on the “Open Question Argument”. 
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to satisfy the task set by Kripke’s sceptic—the task of providing a satisfactory theory of meaning 
and content.  
Next, I will explain Gibbard’s main argument for his own view, which is a form of the 
underdetermination argument, directed at Paul Horwich’s naturalistic Use Theory of Meaning. I 
will briefly explain why it is puzzling how a mere metatheory like Gibbard’s could actually solve 
the problem he poses for Horwich’s theory. A normative theory of meaning like mine, however, 
poses a clear alternative to a theory like Horwich’s, with different explanatory resources 
concerning the constitution of meaning. I explain how such a substantive view could benefit from 
Gibbard’s argument with a little more explanation. What remains of Gibbard’s distinctive picture is 
his reliance on the subjective oughts of rationality. I argue that even if Gibbard’s view were to be 
taken substantive, this reliance renders his norms an unsuitable supervenience base for facts of 
meaning and content. 
 
III. GIBBARD’S UNDERDETERMINATION PROBLEM 
3.1: Gibbard’s Argument Against Naturalistic ‘Alternatives’ 
Gibbard offers two main motivations for his distinctive claims about meaning. First is that 
if meaning is normative, that could allow us to explain why there is an invariable means-ought 
connection, as Gibbard claims there is. Gibbard’s explanation is that such connections are analytic, 
as ought concepts are involved in meaning claims. Second is the failure of naturalistic alternatives.  
 With respect to the first motivation, not everyone credits an invariable connection between 
claims or facts of meaning and normative claims or facts.24 Even granting such a connection, 
analyticity is by no means the only explanation available. For example, my own view, which takes 
normativity to be part of the essence of meaning—part of the nature of meaning facts and 
                                                      
24 See for example, the recent work of Hattiangadi (2006, 2007), Hattiangadi and Bykvist (2007), and Glüer-
Pagin and Wikforss (2009).  
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properties—has an explanation of its own: the connection between meaning and normativity is a 
necessary relationship between facts, because facts of meaning are constituted by normative facts.25  
Regarding the second motivation, which will be our main concern, I will make two points: 
first, just as it was unclear if Gibbard’s metatheory actually resolves Kripke’s worries, it is unclear 
if it provides an actual alternative to naturalistic theories with competing, and improved, 
explanatory resources. I will briefly argue that if a normative theory of meaning is to be motivated 
by the inadequacy of naturalistic theories, it must also be a substantive theory of meaning. Second, 
I will argue that Gibbard’s positive proposals for the normative ties to meaning, if taken instead as 
part of a substantive theory, suffers from its own underdetermination problem. 
In order to substantiate his claim that his normativity of meaning is motivated by the 
failure of naturalistic alternatives, Gibbard discusses at length the naturalistic use theory of 
meaning (“UTM”) defended by Paul Horwich. 26  Horwich’s theory is non-standard in many 
important and interesting ways, but it is natural for Gibbard to use it to motivate his own view, as 
many of Horwich’s theoretical presuppositions are taken over by Gibbard.27 In fact, Gibbard’s 
metatheory of meaning is in important respects just Horwich’s UTM “taken normative”. I will now 
briefly explain Gibbard’s argument against Horwich’s UTM in order to set up my argument that 
Gibbard’s view does not provide a genuine alternative to it and, more centrally, my argument that 
Gibbard’s own view falls prey to a similar objection. 
 The sort of cases presented in Chapter One seem to show that various naturalistic theories 
of meaning fail because they make the wrong predictions about particular cases, or specify facts 
                                                      
25  Additionally, the ability of the fact that some truth is analytic to offer either a metaphysical or 
epistemological explanation remains in doubt. See Williamson (2007, Chs. 3 and 4) for a recent critique of 
the explanatory promise of analyticity in both of these respects.  
26 Horwich (1998), (2005), (2009). 
27 Some of these are very important for understanding Gibbard’s picture, though I ignore them here. For 
example, Horwich’s strategy of accounting for meaning via synonymy and deflation informs the presentation 
of the ‘mass’ case, and colors the positive proposals Gibbard offers later. I translate these positive proposals, 
when necessary, into direct claims of meaning constitution. 
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that fail to make a determinate prediction. In similar vein, Gibbard argues that naturalistic theories 
like Horwich’s specify conditions that cannot single out a unique meaning. Horwich’s view is a 
sophisticated dispositionalism about meaning, like that of Gibbard’s character Jerry. While Gibbard 
maintained that Jerry’s theory was perfectly compatible with his own, when he turns to Horwich’s 
theory he argues that it problematically underdetermines meanings in a particular case. 
 Horwich’s UTM, in simplified form, holds that what makes it the case that a word has a 
particular meaning are certain idealized laws governing its usage. The state of an agent governed 
by the law is that of accepting particular sentences or sentence-forms underived. Which law is 
actually in place is a matter of the agent’s dispositions, suitably idealized. For theoretical terms like 
‘mass’, Horwich holds that their meanings are fixed by our underived acceptance of a particular 
Carnap conditional.  
Horwich supposes that there is a set of properties users of theoretical terms believe are 
satisfied by the theoretical entity referred to. But meaning can’t require outright acceptance that 
something does have these properties, since I might use the term with its meaning to deny that the 
entity exists, for example. A Carnap conditional says that if anything has those properties, the 
posited entity does.28 It is this sentence the underived acceptance of which Horwich contends is 
constitutive of its meaning. 29  In this way, Horwich’s view relies on a dispositional face of 
analyticity and requires that users’ dispositions reflect their terms’ meaning-defining truths. As we 
will see, Gibbard’s normative view relies on a prescriptive form of analyticity and requires that a 
term’s meaning-defining sentences be subjectively rational for the agent expressing that meaning to 
accept.   
                                                      
28 In the interest of space, I skip explanation of the Ramsay sentence antecedent of the Carnap conditional. 
See Gibbard (2012): p. 105. 
29 This formulation represents Horwich’s collapse of the distinction I have been assuming, between the 
constitution of a meaning and the constitution of the relation between a symbol and its meaning.  
 51 
Gibbard focuses on the term ‘mass’ for a Newtonian physicist. The question Gibbard poses 
(following Field in his use of this case30) is what meaning we post-Newtonian thinkers should 
assign to the Newtonian’s word ‘mass’.31 The problem is that none of the physical quantities we 
now countenance satisfy all of the central Newtonian claims involving ‘mass’. Our two quantities, 
relativistic and proper mass, each satisfy a different and inexhaustive set of those central claims. 
But both Gibbard and Horwich maintain that what determines a term’s meaning is some sort of 
privileged status for the thinker of a particular set of claims involving the term. The natural 
question for Gibbard to ask, then, is whether any of those central claims actually have a special 
claim to determining the meaning of Newtonian ‘mass’.  
Putting things simply, Gibbard argues that the Newtonian’s Horwichian dispositions for 
the use of ‘mass’ do not settle which of the two incompatible meanings to assign to it. Since all of 
the central Carnap sentences involving ‘mass’ would seem to be accepted underived by the devout 
Newtonian, they are equally good candidates for sets of sentences the acceptance of which would, 
for Horwich, determine its meaning. This is the basis for Gibbard’s general argument that 
naturalistic theories suffer from an underdetermination (or indeterminacy) problem.32 
 Gibbard develops this objection to Horwich’s UTM at length because he contends that the 
failure of such naturalistic “alternatives” motivates a shift to his own view. What is odd is that 
Gibbard explicitly disavowed the idea that his view, as a mere metatheory of meaning, is in conflict 
                                                      
30 Field (1973). 
31 It is not obvious that one must assign a meaning of her own to another in order to interpret her in 
accordance with a theory of meaning. However, the assumptions Gibbard makes in order to assume this 
come from Horwich—it would be too much to decide here whether these assumptions are correct or even 
interpretively correct of Horwich. Horwich may also not be bothered by the indeterminacy, as is pointed out 
in Evers (2015). 
32 Of course, externalists or anti-individualists will think we need not have gotten so esoteric, the problem 
being with the very idea that certain beliefs or dispositions for use of a term are essential to its meaning (what 
it does) in the first place. Gibbard wishes to retain that aspect of Horwich’s view, in normative form. We will 
return to this shortly, but see Williamson (2018) for a more direct argument against Gibbard from this 
externalistic perspective.  
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with non-normative theories like Horwich’s. When Gibbard presented us with the theories of Tyler 
and Jerry, he claimed that either could be correct, and that his account only tells us what Tyler and 
Jerry are disagreeing over. Gibbard’s normativity of meaning is not the sort that tells us about the 
nature of meaning—about what makes it the case that a particular meaning is expressed. Rather, it 
elaborates a normative (and expressivistic) analysis of meaning concepts. 
This resurfaces explicitly here in one statement of the desires import of his criticism of 
Horwich: “Meanings explain usage, but if the causal-explanatory demands on meanings leave slack 
in determining what terms mean, perhaps the oughts of the matter remove some of the slack… 
Perhaps, at root, we differ on the oughts of the matter, the empirical conditions under which [the 
Newtonian] ought to accept or reject the various sentences she formulates” (p. 110). But who is 
differing here? The problem is not one of a failure to derive meaning facts analytically from 
naturalistic facts, as he thought it was with Kripke. There Gibbard’s self-directed task was to 
explain our disagreement. At issue now, though, is just one naturalistic account which fails to make 
a determinate prediction. 
How, then, can Gibbard use this problem to motivate his own view? His complaint against 
Horwich’s UTM as a representative of naturalistic theories is that it suffers from problems with 
idealization and underdetermination. But he says that “meanings are constituted by natural 
properties which we can designate in naturalistic terms” (p. 140).  
Gibbard’s theory is not formulated to be a foundational theory of content, with constitutive 
ambition. Instead, as befits Gibbard’s expressivist take on normative thoughts, it formulates itself 
as a theory about what is involved in thinking thoughts about meaning and content. These thoughts 
are eventually explained in terms of planning states of mind. As with expressivism about normative 
thoughts, it is not intended to be a theory of what constitutes the facts and properties at issue.  
Gibbard thus seems robbed of the ability to fulfill a central ambition of philosophical 
accounts of semantic properties and relations: telling us about the nature of such properties and 
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relations. It makes a claim, to be sure, about our states of mind when we have thoughts about these 
properties and relations. But this is not yet to do metaphysics of meaning. If he only tells us what 
sorts of planning states of mind are involved in endorsing a theory of the nature of semantic 
properties and relations, his theory doesn’t itself make a claim about their nature.  
This is unremarkable, given Gibbard’s known perspective on normative matters. But it 
makes mysterious how Gibbard’s position could be motivated by the failure of naturalistic 
substantive theories (setting aside the fact that he thinks such a theory is correct). How can norms 
“take up the slack” in the naturalistic conditions cited in Horwich’s UTM? Gibbard’s normative 
conditions do not play the metaphysical role that these naturalistic conditions play in Horwich’s 
theory. 
One could abandon the non-metaphysical cast of Gibbard’s metatheory of meaning. One 
could also cast off his preservation of a simple dispositionalism. In those respects, it becomes more 
like my NTC. This re-framed theory would qualify as a genuine substantive theory of content, of a 
normative variety. Such a theory could indeed provide the explanations Gibbard needs his theory to 
make—it could say that what explains the meaning of a term are the norms governing it, allowing 
it to “take up the slack” in Horwich’s theory. It could say that the norms governing a term are part 
of the explanation of the nature of semantic properties, thus offering a genuine competitor to 
Horwich’s theory. It is easy to see how this substantive alternative to Gibbard’s expressivist 
metatheory of meaning can benefit from his argument against naturalistic alternatives. Let me 
explain this in more detail, since doing so will thereby explain how my own view can help to 
resolve problems like the one Gibbard uncovers in Horwich’s theory.33  
As a wholly non-normative theory, citing our dispositions of use (concerning the underived 
acceptance of certain sentence-types), Horwich’s theory is based on facts about our activity. To 
                                                      
33 I do not mean here to endorse Gibbard’s argument. I especially have doubts about the demands he places 
on Horwich’s theory—nevertheless, I think it important to show that if his objection succeeds, a normative 
theory of content has different, and more adequate, explanatory resources than Horwich’s. 
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judge which dispositions to attribute to particular agents, Horwich’s theory does some degree of 
idealization from our actual and hypothetical performances. Gibbard argues that the sort of 
idealization available to a non-normative theory of meaning and content is not enough to privilege 
one sentence-type over another. In particular, Gibbard argues that a Newtonian’s use of ‘mass’ can 
be characterized by a disposition to accept underived two different sentences-types. Without 
bringing in considerations of which sentence-type the Newtonian ought to accept, Horwich’s view 
does not offer a unique, determinate prediction of a meaning.  
On my view (or on a modified, substantive version of Gibbard’s view), we could say that 
which of these sentences is central to determining its meaning is which one she ought to accept. 
Horwich’s theory, the simple argument from the failure of this alternative would go, does not 
provide grounds for a determinate meaning attribution, though it should, and my theory does. A 
normative theory of meaning would have us attribute a meaning to ‘mass’ which would have it that 
she ought to accept the sentence-form that she actually ought to accept. ‘Mass’ has this meaning 
because, on this view, what it is for ‘mass’ to have this particular meaning for an agent is for its use 
to be subject to norms distinctive of this meaning. Since meaning, in this sense, involves normative 
facts beyond the dispositional facts about the agent, our theory can explain why ‘mass’ has the 
meaning that it does, despite the failure of Horwich’s theory to do so determinately.34 It can do so 
in part because normative facts can depend on facts beyond such agent-centered facts, for instance 
on the world and the goals of inquiry.  
If we modify Gibbard’s view as suggested, the positive proposals he makes about 
specifically which normative claims are analytically entailed by semantic claims would remain. 
And Gibbard does have his own positive story to tell, about simple cases like DOG and the more 
complex case of Newtonian ‘mass’. We must therefore ask how plausible these positive proposals 
                                                      
34 A normativist view could be compatible with Horwich’s anti-relationalism about meaning facts.  
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are. As it turns out, his positive proposals suffer from critical problems very closely related to those 
motivating a normative theory of content in the first place. 
One problem with Gibbard’s use of an argument from the failure of alternatives was that he 
maintains that a dispositional theory of the sort he argues against must ultimately be correct. This 
makes it hard to understand how Gibbard’s commitments could be made consistent. 35  More 
importantly, though, it highlights the subjectivist (in a sense to be developed) presuppositions of 
Gibbard’s framework. Next, I will return to the underdetermination problem, in order to explain 
what is problematic about the subjectivist approach in general. This element of Gibbard’s 
framework remains, even if his dispositionalism is cast off.  
 
3.2: Gibbard’s Subjectivism: Underdetermination Bites Back 
Gibbard faults Horwich’s dispositionalistic account for failing to predict determinate 
contents. One might challenge Gibbard’s argument, perhaps by denying that Horwich must assign a 
determinate content36, or by denying that this assignment must predict synonymy with one of our 
notions of mass.37 But his argument is not unrelated to the arguments found in Section 1 of this 
paper. Dispositions underdetermine meanings and contents. Therefore, a theory of content citing 
such dispositions, even complex and specific ones, will only provide an indeterminate verdict about 
at least some contents, and for that reason seem to fail. 
In section 1, I focused on our ordinary concept DOG. This concept’s content is not 
uniquely picked out by our dispositions to apply it. Such dispositions, like our actual use, are finite 
and subject to error. They therefore will not suffice to determine the extension of DOG rather than 
                                                      
35 Evers (2015) also notes how strange it is that one of Gibbard’s two major arguments for his view begins by 
criticizing the sort of naturalistic substantive theory he seems to endorse. 
36 Smith (2015) challenges the claim that, in the mathematical case of the derivative often used to argue for 
the independence of our concepts from our conceptions, there is clearly one content that any adequate theory 
of content should predict. While I might agree, and even about Newton’s ‘mass’ case, I focus on the case of 
our concept of dogs in part for the plausibility of a determinate content. 
37 Presumably, Horwich wouldn’t deny this, if Gibbard gets his reliance on synonymy claims correct. 
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SHMOG, or some other concept having at least as good a fit with our dispositions. All of this, of 
course, implies that matching dispositions are not necessary for possession of the concept either. 
Aside from these Kripkean sources of objections to dispositionalistic accounts, there is another sort 
of underdetermination at play in concepts like this: underdetermination by conception. After 
explaining this, I will show how the insight carries over to the subjective oughts in Gibbard’s 
account. 
Gibbard is not as committal as one would like him to be about the subjective oughts that he 
alleges determine the content of our concept DOG. However, he claims that we can treat 
experiential concepts like this on the same model as theoretical terms. “We have, in effect, a folk 
theory of how dogs figure in certain kinds of experiences, in the sorts of experiences we 
confidently take as paradigmatic experiences of “dogs”.” Our being subject to subjective oughts 
prescribing the acceptance of this theory are, for Gibbard, meaning-determining. This meaning-
determination by normative facts was motivated by Gibbard’s criticism of Horwich’s idea that 
accepting such a theory, attached to our use of the word “dog”, determines its meaning. Can 
Gibbard’s subjective oughts do any better? Is it necessary for someone with our concept DOG to be 
subjectively required to accept this theory, and is being so required truly sufficient to distinguish 
our actual concept’s content from others?  
Gibbard’s basic elaboration of what we attribute when we attribute this concept are oughts 
about use purely with respect to one’s phenomenological state. These oughts will correspond with a 
possible disposition to conform—to apply the concept to things appropriately related to that 
phenomenological state. They will also correspond with a conception which, if correct, would 
validate the inferences making up the package of oughts attributed. Let’s just call this the 
phenomenological conception. 
Let’s suppose that we are in a time when the theory of dogs has not much taken off. At 
most, ordinary users have a conception of the typical observational profile of dogs—they have four 
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legs, they are furry, they emit certain sounds, etc. 38  This conception underlies the concept’s 
deployment. Let’s suppose that a conception is a set of beliefs about the concept, or about its 
content.39 Such beliefs, will, like the dispositions might generate, be insufficient to determine the 
extension of the concept. As reviewed in Section 1, holding our beliefs constant, a modal variation 
in the environment can vary the content of the concept at issue. Had, for instance, our ‘dogs’ really, 
all along, been robot dog-doppelgangers from an alien civilization, our concept would pick out 
these creatures instead. But our beliefs, save the concept at issue, would be the same. Something 
external to the phenomenological conception must be at work in the determination of the content of 
this concept40, just as something external to our dispositions must be.41  
Likewise, what is rational for us to believe on the basis of our phenomenological state is 
insufficient to distinguish them.42 For both my and the robot-responsive counterpart, the conception 
of we associate with “dog” licenses the same experience-based inferences. Nothing within our 
psychology, including facts about what is rational for us to think on the basis of our experience, 
differs between us. Nevertheless, my actual concept DOG applies only to certain creatures, and my 
counterpart’s only to certain others. I focus on a phenomenal conception, given Gibbard’s position, 
but the point would generalize beyond phenomenology. The point is that purely subjective oughts 
                                                      
38 This might form the basis for a Lockean concept, or a stereotype associated with a concept. Further 
discussion of these conceptions of concepts is too far beside the point of the paper, though the reader familiar 
with this history of the theory of concepts will no doubt appreciate the connections.  
39 If space permitted, much more should be said to explain how beliefs could play this role. This connects up 
as well with the debate about nativism about concepts. For a very useful discussion, and an attempt to explain 
a belief-based psychological process of coining new concepts, see Strevens (2012). His view represents an 
example of the sort of advance over Gibbard I have in mind, as illustrated by his title, “Theoretical Terms 
without Analytical Truths”, with the latter seen as competence conditions. 
40 While the point and argument I am making are slightly different from Putnam’s, one will recognize the 
affinity with his example of all the cats on earth turning out to be from Mars. See Putnam (1970, 1973, 
1975), Kripke (1972), and Burge (1979, 1982, 1986) for the development of this sort of case against the 
necessity and sufficiency of our internal conceptions for content determination. 
41 All along, of course, I have been ignoring the problem of how to specify exactly what our dispositions are. 
If they were individuated with respect to the object of their application, this latter problem would have to be 
reformulated. However, the point about conceptions stands.  
42 Putnam (1975) aptly made a similar point with the case of our concepts ELM and BEECH.  
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of the sort Gibbard focuses on, relating to the psychological procedures explaining use43, are 
insufficient to account for this.  
Of course, once again it is clear, as it was with dispositions, that whatever subjective 
oughts would be sufficient to distinguish these concepts, they are not necessary for possessing 
them. Williamson (2018), focusing on Gibbard’s claims about when two terms are synonymous 
across languages, argues compellingly that there are circumstances in which, where one’s 
evidential situation differs in certain ways from someone using a word expressing the same 
concept, the inferences one subjectively ought to make can vary significantly. I may, in full 
rationality, for example, come to doubt the reliability of the way in which I learned to use the term. 
This does not change its meaning, but would make it rational for me to not infer in accordance with 
the canonical pattern of use of the concept actually expressed.44  
As one might put the result, conditions individuated by internal features of subjects—
dispositions, beliefs, and conceptions—are not competence requirements on our use of a particular 
concept with its distinctive content. The path required to address Gibbard here is somewhat 
unusual, as anti-individualists have primarily focused on the lack of belief requirements on concept 
possession.45 Mark Greenberg, in summarizing the basic insight spurring the sort of examples I’ve 
been discussing, says that “In effect, the point [Putnam, Burge, Kripke, and others] draw from 
Quine is that there is no sentence that a thinker must accept, or belief that a thinker must hold, in 
                                                      
43 Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss (2009) argue convincingly that a view combining in this way a rule-based 
explanation of content with a normative one falls prey to dilemma of “regress and idleness”, after Quine’s 
complaint about convention and meaning. 
44 Lest the reader worry that subjective rationality requirements are being taken too strongly here, Gibbard 
clarifies that meaning-determining oughts should hold “a priori and under any intelligible supposition” for 
those expressing the meaning or possessing a concept. 
45 Progress on this path toward a normative view has been made chiefly by Greenberg. His argument, put 
forward in Greenberg (2014a), that dispositionalistic theories of meaning and content do not provide 
constitutive accounts if they make use of deference to overcome anti-individualist critiques, is, to my mind, a 
crucial step in understanding just how naturalistic theories falter in the face of anti-individualism. See his 
(2014b) for an argument, also important to my aims, that theorists of meaning and content should seek 
constitutive, and not just grounding, accounts of the phenomena.  
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order to be able to use a word with its ordinary meaning or to have a thought involving a particular 
concept.”46 As Burge himself has formulated the hold-over idea about linguistic meaning from 
positivism which we ought to reject, “understanding sufficient for carrying on responsible 
ratiocination—which is identified with understanding ordinary linguistic meaning—necessarily 
requires recognition of truth.”47 The cases Burge marshals against this perspective suggest that 
“nearly anything can be the topic of nonstandard theorizing”. 48  What requires emphasis here, 
against Gibbard, is that such non-standard theorizing can be perfectly rational. 
Gibbard notices the problems with our dispositions, but the lack of attention to the related 
problem with conceptions leads him to think that his subjective oughts evade the general problem 
with treating internally-determined states as determiners of content. I’ll note once again that this 
does not undermine the idea that there is something informative to say about the nature or 
individuation of these concepts and their content. It may well be, for example, that robothood’s 
ruling out doghood is central to our actual concept of a dog, or that the fundamental reference rule 
for the concept indeed respects the restriction on inclusion in its extension to mammals.49  
The problem is clearly not that an individual lacks a belief or disposition had by other 
members of her community.50 The point is that whatever beliefs and dispositions of use are actually 
guaranteed to be found with any user—even extending to the entire community of users—of our 
                                                      
46 Greenberg (2014a), p. 148. 
47  Burge (1986) p. 257. Michael Devitt (2006) and elsewhere argues at length against a cognitive or 
propositional requirement on linguistic competence of various sorts. 
48 p. 264. 
49 Rey (1983) inveighs against the failure to appreciate this in the psychological literature on concepts, in 
which one frequently finds, including in his target, Smith and Medin (1981), an inference from the lack of a 
particular competence condition to a corresponding absence of a fact about the content itself. 
50 Though Gibbard seems to believe, with many others, that the community can rescue subject-centered 
views, including from Kripke’s objections and normativity concerns. For a contrasting view that should have 
been in Gibbard’s field of vision, see Blackburn (1984). 
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concepts are insufficient to determine their content. While this is more difficult to bear out in 
Gibbard’s simple mathematical case, the lesson clearer with more empirical concepts like DOG.51  
 This is a critical piece of anti-individualism in the philosophy of mind. This lesson, 
deriving in part from both Kripkes (from Kripke’s Wittgenstein and from Naming and Necessity), 
has been missed in the development of Gibbard’s view. Again, given his relatively minimal 
interests in pursuing Kripke’s Wittgenstein—extracting a normativity thesis, distinguishing 
substantive theories of meaning from the metatheory of meaning—this is not surprising. However, 
for those of us who embrace these anti-subjectivist lessons, Gibbard’s envisioned theory is just as 
unpalatable as Horwich’s. Contrary to some of Gibbard’s claims about the dispensability of a 
dispositionalist substantive theory, it is a main ingredient in his theory of synonymy attributions 
and interpretation. More importantly, the morals against cognitive and dispositional requirements 
on concept possession also defeat Gibbard’s subjective-ought-based normative competence 
requirements, in the same sort of way.52  
 These subject-based requirements place Gibbard’s view under the heading of what I will 
term Content Subjectivism.  
 
Content Subjectivism: Facts about the expression of content, by a linguistic 
expression or a mental symbol, depend on and are determined by the internal 
properties of agents (including communities of agents).  
 
 Section 1 featured examples effectively generalizing in this section to suggest the falsity of 
Content Subjectivism. Gibbard motivates his own view based upon his unusual understanding of 
                                                      
51 Another case that could have driven (and has, for some) the lessons I’ve been rehearsing is Burge’s (1979) 
arthritis case. I stick with our dog concept for continuity, and to avoid having to spend more time addressing 
the deference maneuver. See fn. 59 for citations of critical work on this case. 
52 One could tell the story here, as Williamson (2018) does, as a failure on Gibbard’s part to appreciate what 
was really wrong with verificationism. He calls Gibbard’s theory a “subtle form of logical empiricism.” 
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the lessons to draw from some of these examples. Still, as a normative theory about meaning and 
content, it enjoyed the promise of doing better than various subject-oriented proposals about 
meaning. This was the point of Gibbard’s criticisms of Horwich’s UTM. His own positive view, 
unfortunately, is subjectivist in much the same way. Like Horwich, Gibbard claims that the facts 
determining meaning and content are facts about subjects—either dispositional facts, or, at best, 
subjective oughts that are reflected rather directly in the agent’s psychology. 
My own view proposes the same advance over a non-normative view like Horwich’s that 
Gibbard seeks: it does not regard acceptance of any sentence as wholly determinative of meaning. 
But just as no sentence’s acceptance is strictly necessary to nor determinative of a particular 
meaning, the subjective rationality of accepting a sentence is neither necessary for nor wholly 
determinative of a particular meaning. On my view, however, we remain able to maintain that 
whenever an agent has minimal competence with a meaning or concept, there are certain things she 
ought to accept or reject, depending on the meaning or content. These norms just can’t be the 
internally-determined subjective oughts of Gibbard’s theory. They sometimes depend in part on the 
nature of the individual’s environment. In a way, then, my view provides a way of maintaining a 
normative variety of analyticity—we needn’t reject the idea that with a meaning or concept comes 
certain prescriptions on its use, so long as we don’t require that such prescriptions be reflected in 
what is subjectively rational for every user. 
The reader may worry that I make the by-now notorious error of conflating expressivism 
directly with subjectivism. 53  Gibbard is subjectivist about content, however, in the sense I’ve 
developed, only because of the reliance on dispositions and subjective oughts of rationality. But 
there actually is a quick and easy argument for yet another form of subjective requirement in 
Gibbard’s view, from his expressivist understanding of meaning attributions.  
                                                      
53 Blackburn (2006) discusses this widespread conflation and criticizes in depth even very sophisticated 
arguments that expressivism has subjectivist implications.  
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Consider what Gibbard must claim about our awareness of our own concepts. Such 
awareness will have to involve the sort of plans Gibbard claims constitute a thought about how one 
ought to think, distinctive to the concept in question. To think of my own thought that its content 
includes the concept DOG is (1) to think it subjectively rational for me to infer along its distinctive 
canonical pattern and therefore (2) to plan to conform to this specific canonical pattern in my own 
thinking. Gibbard’s failure to recognize the distance between content individuation and possession 
conditions again comes back to haunt him. I may not be aware of, and thus may not have a plan to 
conform to, the individuating pattern of my own concept’s content. This does not preclude either 
my having this concept (with this content) or my having knowledge that I have this concept (with 
this content). 
 One might also object that Gibbard could deny that this sort of underdetermination is a 
problem for a theory of content like his. However, his complaint against Horwich’s view was 
precisely that there were more than one content assignment that were equally well-predicted by 
Horwich’s theory of content. While I have argued from different positive claims, since Gibbard’s 
positive proposal differs from Horwich’s, the complaint is the same. Thus, if Gibbard denies that 
this sort of problem provides us with a compelling reason to reject a theory of content, he saps 
himself of the most compelling argument he offers for a normative alternative to naturalistic 
theories of content. 
 Gibbard’s normative metatheory of content ties itself to commitments about the 
subjectively normative and the naturalistic requirements on concept possession. Such requirements 
are fairly simple reflections of the canonical normative pattern Gibbard contends individuate 
concepts and meanings. One major line of argument for a normative theory of meaning and mental 
content, which I’ve traced in Section 1 and developed in this section, has the lack of such 
requirements as a starting point. If none of these naturalistic or subjective requirements on concept 
possession are truly necessary or sufficient, how could a theory of meaning and content still be 
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constructed? Perhaps, the thought goes, the only truly necessary and sufficient conditions for 
concept possession are normative—a matter of the norms or patterns individuative of a concept 
normatively governing an individual’s thinking. This line of argument has, to be sure, received far 
less attention in the literature than the simpler arguments stemming from Kripke—for example, the 
allegedly analytical inferences from meaning to correctness conditions to normative facts. But as I 
have emphasized and Gibbard has acknowledged, the path to the most plausible normativity of 
meaning and content does not have to take its cues from Kripke’s Wittgenstein.  
 
IV. A SUBSTANTIVE, NON-SUBJECTIVIST  
NORMATIVE THEORY OF CONTENT 
 
 Section 3 took issue with Gibbard’s metatheoretical bent and argued that 
underdetermination worries apply just as well to a normative theory of content, if its normative 
determiners of content are understood to be dependent on a thinker’s dispositions or recognition, or 
exhausted by internally-determined subjective norms having to do with an agent’s evidential 
situation. 54  In this section, I explain how a normative theory of content or a normative 
metasemantics can avoid this dependence. Following this section, I close with a section on how 
naturalism about content fares if a normative theory of content of the sort I have explained is 
correct.  
 Above, I defined a Normative Theory of Content as follows: 
 
Normative Theory of Content: What it is for a representation r to have content c 
in the psychology of agent A is for it to be the case that A ought to use r as in 
accordance with the canonical pattern definitive of c.  
                                                      
54 I remind the reader that interpreting Gibbard’s intended notion of subjective norms is not a simple matter, 
as we are not given very much guidance in the text. I argue against Gibbard’s view only insofar as I’ve 
correctly interpreted his notion of subjective norms. The fact that Williamson interprets Gibbard in the way I 
do provides some secondary evidence that my interpretation is not uncharitable.  
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Gibbard’s view about content was characterized chiefly by two elements: NTC (or a 
‘metatheoretical’ version of it), plus the claim that we should understand the condition that “A 
ought to use r as in accordance with the canonical pattern definitive of c” in terms of subjective 
oughts prescribing acceptance of Carnap sentences.   
 I argued in previous sections that we ought to embrace NTC as a theory of content, not just 
a metatheoretical claim. NTC says what it is for a symbol to have its content—this is a substantive 
claim, in Gibbard’s terminology, about what content facts consist in. In my terms, it provides a 
constitutive explanation of the nature of facts about content. In this way, it provides a genuine 
alternative to problematic naturalistic theories and can benefit from arguments against them.  
  I also argued that relying on subjective oughts runs such a theory into its own 
underdetermination problems. To avoid these underdetermination problems, we must deny that the 
relevant oughts are to be understood in the subjectivist ways Gibbard’s text encourages. Our NTC 
will have to claim that how an agent ought to use her representations can go beyond what is 
accessible to her, just as it can go beyond what she is disposed to do. This is the only way that NTC 
will be able to accommodate the fact that facts independent of and inaccessible to the psychology 
of an agent make a difference to which contents she expresses and what concepts she possesses. 
NTC must be not only anti-individualistic but also non-subjectivist, and it can. Objective norms do 
not depend on any agent’s recognizing them, they are not necessarily reflected in her dispositions, 
and they are not limited in their sensitivity to what is accessible to an agent’s deliberation. Various 
forms of subjective dependence or limitation are at issue here, but they are all present in Gibbard’s 
elaboration of his theory, and all must be rejected if NTC is to be plausible and well-motivated.  
 Mark Greenberg elaborates a normative theory of content that he calls the “responsibility 
view”.55 He invokes the idea of being responsible to a standard for use, rather than its simply being 
                                                      
55 Greenberg (2014a, 2014b). 
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the case that one ought to use a symbol in certain ways and not others. The notion of responsibility 
has the nice feature for our purposes that it does not encourage a subjectivist interpretation, 
whereas a very natural way of understanding ought claims with respect to thought is subjectively, 
in light of the evidence available to the agent. I am clearly responsible, though, for doing and not 
doing all sorts of things, some of which I may not know about. A provision of my delivery 
agreement with the New York Times is that I cannot cancel by e-mail. Instead, I must call a 
specific phone number if I want to cancel my subscription. When I made my first attempts to 
cancel my subscription, I had never seen this provision of my agreement. Nevertheless, I was 
responsible for calling to cancel my subscription. In the objective sense, it was clearly the case that, 
to cancel, I ought to call rather than e-mail.56  
 The notion of responsibility has certain features that I wish to avoid, so I use the more 
generic notion of its being the case that one ought to use a symbol in accordance with a certain rule 
or pattern. But the related notion of responsibility serves to illustrate what sort of norms are more 
objective than Gibbard’s theory of content allows. Even some norms that have their source in my 
aims or purposes can require objective determination. For example, if I have the aim of cooking a 
good meal for my family members, which foods would be best to feed them is something I may not 
at present be in a position to know. Objective facts about the food and my family members help to 
settle the matter. The ultimate fact about what specifically I ought to prepare for my family, then, is 
an objective ought, in the senses we’ve discussed, even though it may be the case that had I not 
planned to cook tonight, these oughts would not have obtained. Thus, there is nothing incompatible 
about the following two claims (1) content-determining norms are objective norms, and (2) 
content-determining norms have their ultimate source in facts about agents. This is because the 
explanation of particular norms, directing specific acts, requires not only a grounding in some more 
                                                      
56 This goes beyond mere instrumental norms in my opinion, but the norm is objective in the senses at issue 
even if it is merely instrumental. 
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fundamental normative fact or principle, but also some facts about how the world is. I am not 
claiming that meaning-determining norms do not owe their ultimate normative grounding to facts 
about agents, only that this would not clearly be in tension with my arguments. 
 Though this Chapter has focused its arguments on the subjective oughts of rationality, due 
to Gibbard’s particular claims about the norms relevant to meaning and content, it is worth noting 
explicitly that the arguments generalize to any specification of the norms relevant to meaning and 
content according to which the norms are determined narrowly by individualistic or subjectivist 
factors. While Gibbard’s theory focuses on subjective norms, Brandom’s Inferentialism about 
meaning, for example, focuses on norms of inference determined socially, partly because of larger 
metaethical and methodological commitments.57 On his view, to understand discursive, content-
determining practices, we need to examine and cite not the property of being normatively binding 
for an agent directly, but the patterns of the agent and her interlocutors’ taking it to be binding.  
 Here is Brandom’s description of his Inferentialist program: 
“At the very center of this account is its rationalism: the pride of place it 
gives to specifically inferential articulation, to playing a role in practices of 
giving and asking for reasons. It provides the answer I offer to the question 
how to demarcate the distinctive realm of the conceptual. Specifically 
linguistic practice is picked out (and recognized as discursive) by its 
incorporation of inferential-and-assertional practices: attributing and 
undertaking commitments to the propriety of making certain moves and 
occupying certain positions whose contents are determined by their places in 
those practices.”58  
                                                      
57 Brandom (1994, 2000). See fn. 59 for Brandom’s analogue of Gibbard’s “mere metatheory”. 
58 Brandom (2000), pp. 22-23. Brandom’s view is difficult to capture simply. 
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If such practices or rules are determined socially, such that the content-determining 
verdicts must be reflected in the psychology of some actual set of thinkers, then Inferentialism will 
not be capable of accommodating the way in which content can be determined by facts beyond the 
reach of subjects’ awareness, despite its use of norms and despite those norms themselves being 
non-individualistically determined. Though the point is nearly trivial, if we advert to a normative 
theory of content in order to accommodate the kinds of cases motivating anti-individualism and 
anti-subjectivism, we cannot rely in constructing our theory on norms that are determined 
subjectively. Our habits of giving and asking for reasons may be constant across variation in 
environment. Like Gibbard, Brandom’s prior metaethical and methodological commitments lead 
him to deflate his norms into something given by agents in their discursive and cognitive lives.59   
 Which norms actually do determine content, and what is their source? My neutral 
definition of a canonical pattern implies, on NTC, a corresponding neutrality about just which 
norms would explain particular meanings or concepts. NTC claims that it is the match between the 
norms applying to a symbol’s use and a particular meaning or content that is responsible for fixing 
that meaning or content. 60  For simplicity, we can start with the referentialist assumption that 
contents are extensionally (or intensionally, but let’s forget that for now) individuated. This is not a 
wholly implausible way to individuate the content of a concept like DOG.61 If it is correct, NTC 
                                                      
59 Brandom’s theory is complicated by the fact that it is primarily a theory of the practice of attributing 
content, not a constitutive explanation of content properties, facts, or relations. See Brandom (1994), p. xiii 
and pp. 287-88 on this “phenomenalist” or “pragmatist” approach. Shapiro (2004), who describes Brandom 
as claiming that “an expression’s or state’s contentfulness consists in its use or occurrence being governed by 
inferential norms,” criticizes Brandom’s mixed ambitions much as I criticize Gibbard’s “mere metatheory”. 
60 I’ve also focused on a part-first approach to the theory of meaning and content, rather than first accounting 
for the contents of whole-beliefs or whole-utterance-types. This has certain downsides in this context. 
Wedgwood (2007) has a thorough proposal for how a normative view can treat both, connecting belief with 
norms of truth and concepts with norms of reasoning.  
61 Fodor and Pylyshyn (2014), for example, argue that the only semantic properties of concepts are their 
referential properties.  
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that an expression has a particular content when it ought to be applied to the entities within its 
extension. 
 Most theorists of content, however, would not be satisfied with this bare referentialist 
individuation of contents. Most theorists would individuate concepts also on the basis of their 
sense, or based on certain norms of reasoning that they prescribe or license. Indeed, it is plausible 
that some concepts, like logical concepts are individuated purely by certain rules of inference. If 
that is correct, NTC would say that when a concept ought to be used in accordance with, for 
example, the standard rules of disjunction introduction and elimination, then it is the concept OR.  
 One might object: doesn’t Gibbard have this sort of view, and didn’t I effectively argue 
against NTC’s embracing norms of reasoning? My argument against Gibbard was not against the 
use of norms of reasoning in a theory of content. It was against the exclusive use of norms of 
reasoning, understood as the subjective norms of rationality. There may be, and I think there are, 
plenty of facts about how I ought and ought not to reason that are not subjectively and internally 
determined in the way Gibbard’s subjective norms are. It might well be the case, for example, that I 
ought to hold onto one of the two central claims involving Newtonian mass, and not the other, even 
though I may have no access to or belief in this fact, and reason accordingly. In this way, NTC has 
no issue with norms of reasoning themselves. In fact, I suspect that the most plausible view about 
the individuation of conceptual contents and linguistic meanings will cite a certain epistemic 
profile, involving norms of reasoning. To avoid the problems I have emphasized, we need only 
avoid the strong claim that such a profile will necessarily be realized in the psychology or evidence 
of the thinker.  
Regarding the source of content-determining norms, an adequate treatment of the issue is 
far beyond the scope of a single paper, let alone this one. But it will be helpful to make a few quick 
points about this. First, evaluating the evidence that content norms are posterior to content facts; 
Second, disputing the legitimacy of the requirement that a theory of content cannot cite facts which 
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rely on a system’s having representational functions or aims; Third, a proposal using 
representational aims and a prior subject matter to fix the content of concepts.  
First, one might balk at the idea that the norms essential to meaning facts are prior to them. 
Especially if one is taken with Kripkean arguments, one might claim that meaning claims entail 
correctness claims, which are normative claims, and that this reflects the fact that meaning grounds 
correctness facts.62 However, this argument can be resisted, as I indicated in Section 1. More 
importantly, especially if we don’t accept that the entailment is analytic, it does not provide 
compelling reason to believe that the normative facts involved in the argument are posterior to the 
semantic or intentional facts. The availability of an argument or entailment from one sort of fact to 
another does not imply that this priority reflects their relative metaphysical fundamentality. After 
all, if my view is correct, there is still a necessary relationship between these kinds of facts.  
Second, one may find it implausible that, were we to assume that the a system like my 
conceptual system does not have semantic properties, there would be any norms to find. But there 
is no need to assume that my conceptual system is devoid of semantic properties in giving an 
account of their nature. This is especially so if one understands concepts as mental representations 
which are semantically individuated in the first place. On that view, it is natural to regard the task 
of a theory of content as determining which contents our concepts have. One could also deny that 
even a constitutive account like mine must be reductive in the sense that it cites only facts which 
are more fundamental than the facts explained.63 We could, for instance, say that we know that our 
conceptual system has normative and semantic properties, and our modest ambition is to explain 
one in terms of the other. 
                                                      
62 One might also argue that this proposal interacts fatally with other Kripkean lessons, as Glüer-Pagin and 
Wikforss (2009) do. I intend to address their argument at length in a dissertation chapter. 
63 Wedgwood (2007) provides a normative theory of the intentional and a theory of normativity based in part 
on the distinctive intentional properties of normative thoughts. As such, both of these constitutive accounts 
are not reductive in this sense.  
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Part of my interest in this topic is to see if the project of providing a constitutive 
explanation of content facts in more fundamental terms can be salvaged if we make use of 
normative facts in our explanation. Many theorists of content are concerned to maintain various 
forms of naturalism. Making NTC plausible to my interlocutors thus requires some explanation of 
how content-determining norms arise. 
My third point is to gesture at a proposal for such an explanation. To stick with our 
conceptual system, it is not implausible that, for many concepts, their referential content is 
furnished in part by perception. Developing competence with the concept DOG, for example, 
typically involves repeated exposure to examples. If a thinker’s use of concepts like this is 
prompted by perception, it may well be that the concept is given its subject matter before its non-
referential content is determined.64 For a bare referentialist, our coining this concept for ourselves, 
for use in thought, with this subject matter, exhausts its content. We may then cite evolutionary 
functions and other aims of the perceptual system in order to explain the source of its norms. On 
that step, I must limit the discussion to that possibility. But supposing a subject matter is fixed, and 
supposing, naturally, that one is disposed to use the concept in certain ways and not in others, a 
natural further assumption is that one has general epistemic and intellectual goals or ends. Having 
the end of getting things right with respect to this subject matter—of having true beliefs about the 
dogs, coming to understand their essential nature, engaging in appropriate or optimal reasoning 
about them—may suffice to fix how we ought to go on reasoning with the concept.  
How do one’s dispositions matter at all, on my view? It is exactly because our goals are 
epistemic, and the norm is for one way of going on reasoning with and applying the concept. Our 
initial dispositions make various ways of moving forward better or worse paths of inquiry toward 
the achievement of intellectual goods. They may, for some thinkers, be so entrenched as to make it 
                                                      
64  Thanks to Mark Greenberg for encouraging me not to think that this possibility was beyond serious 
defense. 
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much less likely that they ought to go on in a totally different way. This is, in my view, how the 
ultimate explanation of the relevance of our dispositions of thought to the attribution of content, on 
a normative view like NTC. At this stage, it is the most minimal of sketches. But it shows that there 
is a promising line of explanation to be explored. The fact that NTC may in itself leave content-
determining norms unexplained is not a problem: if such an explanation is even required, an 
illuminating one can be given.  
 Before discussing the relationship of NTC to naturalism, I will address one final worry 
about favoring my own view over Gibbard’s subjective-norm metatheory. Why did Gibbard go for 
subjective oughts in the first place? What is the cost of favoring objective oughts, as I do? Gibbard 
did argue that objective norms can be reduced to certain truths concerning hypothetical subjective 
norms. This is not the place to engage those arguments. But it is important to note that Gibbard’s 
motivation for providing that reduction was to discredit the inferences one might make from 
correctness or truth conditions to certain objective norms. This seemed important to Gibbard 
because he worried that such inferences might be analytic, and he is committed to the assumption 
that no oughts are analytically entailed by any non-normative facts. We, however, did not make 
this assumption. More importantly, there seems to be no reason to believe that this inference would 
have to be analytic. Many have argued that there are ways of explaining particular norms favoring 
truth without any analytic source in semantical concepts.65 We therefore have not been given any 
compelling reason to believe that NTC must cite subjective oughts, especially considering that we 
are not construing NTC as an analytical claim. NTC does not claim that objective oughts fall 
analytically out of meaning claims, only that objective oughts are essentially involved in making 
the meaning facts what they are. 
                                                      
65 It is a puzzle that Gibbard’s theory is ultimately all about these analytic inferences from semantic concepts 
to normative claims (or vice versa), but that he is so worried early on about analytic inferences to objective 
oughts, seemingly also from semantical concepts.  
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 Gibbard claimed that his subjective oughts did not follow analytically from any naturalistic 
facts. Preserving such non-analyticity was important to his Moorean take on the problems with 
naturalizing both meaning and normativity. The problem, as he saw it, is that no naturalistic 
analytic definition of normative or semantic terms in wholly naturalistic terms is correct. The 
solution for a naturalist, Gibbard thought, was to become an expressivist about normativity and a 
normativist about meaning, using oughts with no claim to an analytic connection with naturalistic 
facts. My NTC is not an analytical metatheory, as Gibbard’s expressivism might have required, and 
utilizes fully objective oughts in its determination of content. Given that naturalism is such a 
central motivation for Gibbard, I must address the worry that, in going non-subjectivist and fully 
substantive, my normative theory is not acceptable to a good metaphysical naturalist like Gibbard.  
 
V. NORMS AND NATURALISM 
 Two kinds of naturalism will occupy this final section. The first is the more familiar sort of 
naturalism, metaphysical or ontological naturalism of the sort that most clearly motivates 
philosophers like Gibbard to search for an account of meaning in natural terms. The second, which 
I’ll call scientific naturalism, is the project of providing philosophical accounts of that are 
sufficiently integrated with, informed by, or justifying of the empirical sciences. I argue that my 
view does not represent a retreat on either score from subjectivist (and anti-realist) theories of 
meaning and content like Gibbard’s. 
 Metaphysical naturalism is the claim that the only entities, properties, facts, etc. that exist 
are those which feature in mature empirical sciences. The claim directs philosophers interrogating a 
particular domain to the task of accounting for the facts, properties, and entities of that domain in 
terms of the facts, properties, and entities of a domain that is wholly naturalistic in character. 
Dispositional properties, and facts concerning tokening events, discussed in section 1, are 
paradigmatic examples of properties and facts that have been taken to be wholly naturalistic in 
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character in the theory of meaning and content. Gibbard’s normative theory, as a mere metatheory, 
was designed to leave room specifically for dispositional properties to underlie facts about meaning 
and content. His view thereby preserves the metaphysical naturalist’s ambition to explain the 
nature of meaning and content—what facts of meaning and content consist in—in naturalistic 
terms.  
 My Normative Theory of Content, by contrast, places normative facts directly in the role of 
constitutively explaining facts of meaning and content. Normative facts are taken to be 
paradigmatic examples of facts that are not themselves naturalistic in character. Does my view 
therefore require that we abandon the hope of naturalizing meaning and content? 
 An account of one phenomena in terms of normative facts does not require a denial of 
metaphysical naturalism, except insofar as one believes that normative facts cannot themselves be 
understood naturalistically. But many philosophers who have attempted to provide metaphysical 
explanations of normative facts have been committed naturalists. One prominent example is Peter 
Railton, who argues that certain facts about what we would, given full information and idealized 
capacities, want our actual selves to want, might serve as a first-stage naturalistic account of 
normative facts. A deeper stage, he contends, might well be carried out entirely in terms of the 
sorts of facts about the natural world and ourselves that these facts about our hypothetical desires 
are explained by.66 Railton’s view has been influential and is plausibly complex. But any view 
about the metaphysics of normative facts similarly citing wholly naturalistic facts would illustrate 
the point.  
A point worth noting is that even those who deny that normative facts can be understood in 
naturalistic terms tend to agree that normative facts supervene on naturalistic facts. That is, they 
agree with the reductive naturalist that there is no variation across possibilities in the normative 
facts without corresponding variation in the naturalistic facts, and that general necessary and 
                                                      
66 Railton (1986). 
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sufficient conditions likely can be given for the normative facts (though perhaps such conditions 
will be hopelessly complex or disjunctive). 67  Those who would consider such supervenience 
uninteresting if it does not license reduction should be consolable by the following fact: if a 
normative theory of content is promising or likely to be true, we will have reduced the number of 
domains of fact posing major challenges to global naturalism by one. Further, non-naturalism is far 
more plausible in the normative domain than it is in the semantic realm. If we learn that semantic 
facts are partly constituted by normative facts, then we will have, at a minimum, gained an 
understanding of why naturalistic reduction of semantic facts has proven so challenging.  
One version of metaphysical naturalism is the causal closure of the physical: the claim that 
all physical events are caused only by other physical events. Many philosophers think that semantic 
properties explain physical events. According to my view, wouldn’t that mean that normative facts 
cause these physical events? The simple response to this worry is that I can easily accept that 
content-determining normative facts supervene on (perhaps extremely disjunctive) natural facts, 
and these latter facts may well have causal powers. Substantiating the complaint further would 
require a more in-depth examination of the typical causal profile of intentional properties. While I 
strongly suspect that these causal profiles will be about as heterogenous as my view would require 
them to be, for now it is enough to point out that my view is compatible in principle with causal 
powers of intentional properties.68 
Special worries over metaphysical naturalism concerning a normative theory of content can 
for all these reasons seem unmotivated. The concerned naturalist would need to shift her concern to 
how plausible naturalism about normativity fares, with a fruitful philosophical account of 
semantical facts in hand. This is an achievement, even for the hard-nosed metaphysical naturalist. 
                                                      
67 I am inclined to accept this sort of view. See Wedgwood (2007) for explanation. 
68 I address this challenge because I regard the assumption that semantic and intentional properties have 
causal profiles as common. I have doubts about taking this too strongly. 
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For our purposes, what’s important is that such a naturalist has no automatic argument from 
metaphysical naturalism or causal closure to the conclusion that a normative theory of content must 
be false.  
If the prospects for metaphysical naturalism are unsettled, would a normative theory of 
content undermine the obvious fact that fruitful empirical work can be done on the semantical 
domain, with respect to both mental and linguistic representations? In one way, the worry seems 
easy to address: even the non-naturalist about normativity is likely to retain a commitment to 
supervenience. In that case, there would seem to be no in principle obstacle to studying the domain 
of semantical facts by studying the naturalistic facts running along with semantical ones. Even the 
most ambitious reductionist does not expect that the sciences of a particular domain of facts or 
entities is studying the facts comprising her envisioned reduction base.  
There is a more pressing challenge, though. One could argue that the cognitive sciences 
tend to study the individualistic properties of the thinking subject and her immediate environment. 
Linguists tend to study these individualistic properties, supplemented by the study of the social 
practices underlying language’s social dimensions. My own Normative Theory of Content, 
particularly given my arguments against Gibbard’s subjectivist view, requires that the norms 
fundamentally underlying semantical facts not wholly depend on these sorts of properties. My 
Normative Theory of Content is motivated by the fact that semantical properties themselves seem 
to defy explanation by these properties of subjects alone.  
This does not provide a major objection to my view, but again it leads to a deeper problem. 
These sciences are mainly concerned to identify facts with relevance to the behavior of individuals 
and societies. As such, they are not to be blamed, whatever the correct philosophical account of 
semantic properties might be, for focusing on the properties of subjects with causal relevance to 
their linguistic and cognitive behaviors. Further, if their interests were to justify an attempt to 
account more globally for the individuation of our semantical properties (as they plausibly do), the 
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conditions identified in the first place as making a subject-independent difference to the 
determination of content are naturalistic. The objects actually in one’s environment, facts about 
one’s social or evolutionary history, etc. are all fitting subjects for the cognitive sciences to 
embrace in identifying the determinants of content. A Normative Theory of Content provides an 
account of what it is for a representation to have its particular content, and has the potential to 
explain why there are such diverse grounds for semantical facts.69  
Still, an ultimately defensible philosophical account of the semantical domains that are 
actually studied by empirical sciences will need to make good on its commitment to being able, in 
principle, to identify how it is that individuals do become subject to the wide variety of particular 
norms that will be relevant to the explanation of particular contents. If the naturalistic, sometimes 
subjective facts studied by the sciences explain content by grounding norms for use in accordance 
with particular patterns, we must be able to understand how the norms are engendered. 
The first point to make is that there may not be any general story to tell about how it is that 
an individual becomes subject to the norms that explain her contents. Just as the individuating 
patterns for each content can vary widely, the norms NTC predicts explain the expression of each 
content will vary widely. Very likely, if these norms are so heterogeneous, so too will be the 
conditions one must be under in order for them to bear on one’s use. This is consonant with norms 
more generally—particular norms on an agent can govern her behavior for a wide variety of 
reasons.  
One might have made a promise, been told to conform by a legitimate authority, be part of 
a community in which members are reasonably expected to conform. More objectively in the above 
senses, norms can be triggered by, say, the proximity of another in great need, the emotional 
dispositions of a friend or partner, or an unread provisions of a contract one has signed. This leads 
                                                      
69 Such grounds are plausibly involved in making one subject to the norms I contend are constitutive of one’s 
semantical properties, as Mark Greenberg has argued with respect to the responsibilities relevant to his own 
normative theory of content.  
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to the second point I would like to make, which is that coming to be subject to robustly objective 
norms (norms whose content is not required to be appreciated, conformed to, part of a social 
practice, accessible to the agent’s deliberation, etc. in order to bear on an agent) is not at all 
mysterious or obviously problematic. Certain things are things that we ought to do or ought not to 
do, even if we do not realize it, and even if no one does.  
In the case of our representations, there are plenty of facts about us that are recognizable 
sources of norms. These sources can indeed provide us with norms whose ultimate content depends 
in part on how things are with our social environment, and even how things are with, for example, 
physical or mathematical reality. This is not the occasion to provide anything like a full account of 
the source and nature of these allegedly content-determining norms, though I sketched the 
beginnings of a proposal in Section 4. 
Therefore, neither the metaphysical nor the methodological naturalist can reject the 
Normative Theory of Content out of hand because it provides a constitutive explanation of content 
directly in normative, not natural, terms. Neither its reliance on normative facts nor its reliance on a 
substantial degree of independence of content from non-normative, non-intentional psychological 
properties pose problems with the empirical sciences of the mind, nor for the ultimate naturalistic 
reduction of semantical facts and properties. As such, I take the case to have been made that a non-
subjectivist Normative Theory of Content like mine has a genuine motivation in anti-individualism 
and anti-subjectivism about content determination, and that it is substantially more promising than 
a normative view like Gibbard’s, which retains the dispositionalist reliance on purely subjective 
determiners of content.  
 
 
 
 78 
REFERENCES 
Beckermann, Ansgar and McLaughlin, Brian P. (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of the  
Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blackburn, Simon (1984). ‘The Individual Strikes Back’. Synthese 58(3), Essays on Wittgenstein’s  
 Later Philosophy: 281-301. 
Boghossian, Paul (1989). ‘The Rule-Following Considerations’. Mind 98: 507-49. 
Brandom, Robert (1994). Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive  
Commitment. Harvard University Press. 
______(2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press. 
Burge, Tyler (1979). ‘Individualism and the Mental’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121. 
_____(1982). ‘Two Thought Experiments Reviewed’. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:  
284-293. 
_____(1986). “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind”. The Journal of Philosophy 83: 697- 
720. 
Burgess, Alexi and Sherman, Brett (2014). Metasemantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bykvist, Krister and Hattiangadi, Anandi (2007). ‘Does Thought Imply Ought?’. Analysis 67(296):  
277-285. 
Evers, Daan (2015). ‘Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity’. Theoria 81: 82-86. 
Field, Hartry (1973). ‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference’. The Journal of  
Philosophy 70(14): 462-481. 
Fodor, Jerry A. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (2014). Minds Without Meanings. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT  
Press. 
Gibbard, Allan (1994). ‘Meaning and Normativity’. Philosophical Issues 5, Truth and  
Rationality, Enrique Vellanueva, ed. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.  
_____(2012). Meaning and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 79 
Glüer, Kathrin and Wikforss, Åsa (2009). ‘Against Content Normativity’. Mind 118(469): 31-70. 
Greenberg, Mark (2014a). ‘Troubles for Content I’, in Burgess and Sherman (eds.)  
Metasemantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
_____(2014b). ‘Troubles for Content II’, in Burgess and Sherman (eds.) Metasemantics.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hattiangadi, Anandi (2006). ‘Is Meaning Normative?’. Mind & Language 21(2): 220-240. 
_____(2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 
Hill, Christopher (2013). ‘Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity’. Notre Dame  
Philosophical Reviews, 2013.07.20 
Horwich, Paul (1998). Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_____(2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_____(2010). ‘Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning’, in Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. 
_____(1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard  
University Press. 
Miller, Alexander and Wright, Crispin (2002). Rule-following and Meaning. Chesham:  
Acumen Publishing.  
Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Dover. 
Putnam, Hilary (1970). ‘Is Semantics Possible?’. Metaphilosophy 1(3): 187-201. 
_____(1973). ‘Meaning and Reference’. Journal of Philosophy 70(19): 699-711. 
_____(1975). ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:  
131-193. 
Railton, Peter (1986). ‘Moral Realism’. Philosophical Review 95(2): 163-207. 
 80 
Rey, Georges (1983). ‘Concepts and Stereotypes’. Cognition 15: 237-262. 
Shapiro, Lionel (2004). ‘Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning’. Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research 68: 141-160. 
Smith, Edward and Medin, Douglas (1981). Categories and Concepts. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard  
University Press. 
Smith, Sheldon (2015). ‘Incomplete Understanding of Concepts: The Case of the Derivative’.  
Mind 145(496): 1163-1199. 
Soames, Scott (1997). ‘Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule- 
Following Paradox’, in Kazmi, Ali (ed.) Meaning and Reference, Canadian Journal of  
Philosophy Suppl. Vol. 23: 211-49. 
_____(1998). ‘Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox’.  
Philosophical Perspectives 12: 313-48. 
Strevens, Michael (2012). ‘Theoretical Terms without Analytic Truths’. Philosophical Studies  
160: 167-190. 
Wedgwood, Ralph (2007). The Nature of Normativity. New York: Oxford University Press. 
_____(2009). ‘The Normativity of the Intentional’, in Beckermann, Ansgar and McLaughlin, Brian  
P. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. (Oxford University Press). 
_____(2017). The Value of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, Timothy (2018). ‘Gibbard on Meaning and Normativity’. Inquiry 61(7): 731-741. 
_____(2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations New  
York: MacMillan. 
 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Rules Without Regress? 
 
 
 
 Foundational theories of mental content seek to identify the conditions under which a 
mental representation expresses, in the mind of a particular thinker, a particular concept. 1 
Normativists endorse the following general sort of foundational theory of mental content: A mental 
representation r expresses concept C for agent S just in case S ought to use r in conformity with 
some particular pattern of use associated with C. In response to Normativist theories of content, 
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Åsa Wikforss propose a dilemma, alleging that Normativism either entails 
a vicious regress or falls prey to a charge of idleness. In this paper, I respond to this argument. I 
argue that Normativism can avoid the commitments that generate the regress and does not propose 
the sort of explanation required to charge that its explanation has been shown to be problematically 
idle. The regress-generating commitment to be avoided is, roughly, that tokened, contentful mental 
states are the product of rule-following. The explanatory task Normativists should disavow is that 
of explaining how it is that beliefs and other contentful mental states are produced. I argue that 
Normativism, properly understood as a theory of content, does not provide this kind of 
psychological explanation, and therefore does not entail that such explanations are to be given in 
                                                      
1 For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that it is appropriate to speak of mental representations as if 
they are vehicles of thought amenable to an account of what it is in virtue of which they express the concepts 
or contents they do.  
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terms of rule-following. If this is correct, Normativism is not the proper target of the dilemma 
offered by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss. Understanding why one might construe Normativism in the 
way Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss must, and how, properly understood, it avoids their dilemma, can 
help us to appreciate the attractiveness of a genuinely normative theory of content and the 
importance of paying careful attention to the sort of normativity involved in norm-based theories of 
content. 
I. WHAT IS A THEORY OF CONTENT? 
 
Foundational theories of mental content, minimally, seek to identify the conditions under 
which a type of mental representation expresses, in the mind of a particular thinker, a particular 
concept. This is the mental analogue of a foundational theory of meaning for a natural language. 
Such theories seek to explain why it is that the expressions of a natural language have the meanings 
that they have for a given language user (in her idiolect) or community (in its public or shared 
language). Such explanations constitute a metasemantic, rather than semantic, theory. Foundational 
theories of content can seek to do more than simply to identify the conditions under which a mental 
representation has its content. They may also seek to provide, by specifying these conditions, a 
constitutive explanation of the relation between a thinker, her representations, and their contents. 
More strongly, they may be interested in a reduction of such relations, or, more weakly, in 
understanding the metaphysical grounds of their obtaining. For the purposes of this paper, we will 
assume only the minimal task of identifying the conditions under which a mental representation 
expresses a particular content for a particular thinker, also known as the determiners of content. We 
will leave unanswered the question of which more ambitious metaphysical projects a foundational 
theory of content might serve. 
Foundational theories of content do not automatically provide any account of the nature of 
contents. Perhaps the contents of concepts are sets of individuals, properties, functions, or any of 
those under a mode of presentation. But a foundational theory of content only explains why in 
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general a content is the content of a particular representation, not what that content itself is. With 
these clarifications in mind, I will usually omit both “foundational” and “mental” from 
“foundational theory of mental content”, leaving only “theory of content”, for brevity.2  
Two prominent examples of theories of content are Conceptual Role Theories and 
Covariation Theories. A Conceptual Role Theory claims that what determines the content of a 
mental representation is the functional role it plays in one’s thinking.3 Such theories are best suited 
to accounting for the contents of logical expressions or concepts. For example, it is natural to think 
that what makes it the case that the logical concept AND has the content that it has is that a thinker 
is disposed to transition from mental states of the form A AND B to states either of the form A or B, 
and from the pair of the latter states to the former. This seems like an intuitive explanation for why 
we believe that the concept in question should be considered the logical concept of conjunction.  
Covariation Theories, better suited to natural kind concepts, and most natural under the assumption 
that contents just are properties or individuals, claim that what determines a representation’s 
content is its covariation or law-like association with that content.4  
 
II. NORMATIVE THEORIES OF CONTENT 
 
Normativists endorse the following general sort of foundational theory of mental content: 
A mental representation r expresses concept C for agent S just in case S ought to use r in 
conformity with some canonical pattern of use for concept C. By “canonical pattern of use”, I 
mean any sort of conceptual role or pattern of use thought to be essential to the concept C, for 
                                                      
2 As the reader may notice, I am taking some pains to avoid using the term “concept” in this discussion. 
Different philosophers and psychologists have such different things in mind when they use “concept” that I 
prefer to speak of representations and their contents at the level of thought. Some people mean by “concept” 
representations, others mean contents, and yet others mean something else expressed by representations but 
not exhausted by their contents. Hopefully my use is clear enough. 
3 See Greenberg and Harman (2006) for elaboration, Peacocke (1992) for a classic development a defense, or 
Brandom (1994, 2000, 2013) for his normative variant. 
4 Fodor’s Asymmetric Dependency Theory is an exemplar. See especially Fodor (1987, 1990, 1998).  
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example transitioning from being in a belief state involving C to being in a belief state involving 
some other concept B, as in moving from a belief state involving the concept BACHELOR to a 
belief state involving the concepts UNMARRIED and MALE, or, for example, associating, under 
normal or ideal circumstances, or through the operation of a law-like regularity, the tokening of the 
concept CAT with the presence of cats. A Normativist, then, for example, might have it that a 
thinker’s mental representation r expresses the concept BACHELOR just in case she ought to 
transition from belief states involving it to belief states involving the concepts UNMARRIED and 
MALE, or, that a thinker’s mental representation r expresses the concept CAT just in case its 
tokens ought to be associated, under normal or ideal circumstances, or through the operation of a 
law-like regularity, the presence of cats. These examples provide illustrations of the fact that 
Normativism, depending on what the relevant canonical patterns of use are taken generally to be, 
can take the form of a normative version of either a Conceptual Role Theory or a Covariation 
Theory.5  
 While ideas given the label “the normativity of meaning” and “the normativity of content” 
have enjoyed varying degrees of prominence and attention in recent decades, the Normativist’s 
idea of providing a foundational theory of content with normative ingredients has been relatively 
unexplored.6 Very recently, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Åsa Wikforss have offered arguments to the 
effect that Normativism could not possibly be true. This is part of the larger-scale attack on ideas 
going under the label “the normativity of meaning” and “the normativity of content” conducted 
chiefly by Glüer-Pagin, Wikforss, and Anandi Hattiangadi. In my very brief explanation, just 
above, of the sort of more concrete theory a normativist might give, I mentioned things it might be 
                                                      
5 I treat these two sort of theories as genuine competitors to one another to provide the reader with adequate 
orientation to my topic. However, I sympathize with the thought that covariation theories are a sort of special 
case of conceptual role theory. See, for example, Greenberg and Harman (2006) and Greenberg (2005). 
6 Allan Gibbard (2003, 2012) is perhaps the most prominent recent defender of a sort of normative theory of 
content. Since he understands his theory as a theory of statements or thoughts about meaning and content, 
and understands such statements and thoughts expressivistically, I do not regard his view as a genuine theory 
of content, in my sense. 
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the case that we ought to do with our beliefs. In similar fashion and for similar reasons, in many 
formulations Normativist views advert to some claims about the norms which essentially, in some 
sense, apply to our beliefs.  
If there is a type of mental state the regulation of which is important for determining which 
concepts we express, it is commonly assumed to be belief.7 As such, Glüer-Pagin, Wikforss, and 
Hattiangadi have all also offered arguments against the idea that there are any such norms essential 
to beliefs.8 To begin with, however, I will leave the issue of the normativity of belief aside, and 
focus on a recent argument provided by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss directly against the Normativist 
idea itself—the idea that the contents of one’s mental representations are determined by facts about 
what one ought to do with them. This argument was presented initially in their much-cited 
“Against Content Normativity” (2009a) and bolstered in their Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
entry entitled “The Normativity of Meaning and Content” (2009b). While their arguments against 
the normativity of belief have been vigorously criticized (see fn. 8), their main argument against 
Normativism has, as far as I can tell, received no critical attention. 
 This argument is called, after an argument of Quine’s against a foundational role for 
linguistic conventions, the “dilemma of regress and idleness”. According to this argument, either 
the normativist is committed to claims which, taken together, entail a vicious regress, or the 
normativist provides an “idle label” for contentful mental representations. In either case, the 
thought goes, we should not believe the Normativist’s claim. I will explain the argument in detail 
shortly.  
 First, to aid the reader in appreciating the way in which I will resist the argument from 
regress and idleness, I will briefly explain the kind of problem to which I take Normativism to 
                                                      
7 Gibbard (2003), Boghossian (2003). 
8 See especially Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss (2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2015a, 2015b), Hattiangadi (2006, 2007), 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007), and the responses to their other arguments provided mainly in Whiting 
(2007, 2009, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c), and Steglich-Petersen (2010, 2013), for starters. 
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provide a putative solution. To provide an easy way for the reader to see what I have in mind by 
this problem and its Normativist solution, I will restrict myself to an extremely simplified and brief 
discussion of the sort of ideas, likely to be familiar to the reader, on focus in Kripke’s famous book 
on Wittgenstein.9  
Kripke, on behalf of the Wittgenstein of his understanding, rules out all dispositionalist 
views of meaning and, along with them, dispositionalist views of content determination. According 
to such dispositionalist views, the contents of my mental representations are determined by how I 
am disposed to use them—for example, by the fact that I am disposed to token my r mental 
representation in the presence of cats, it is determined that r expresses the concept CAT. According 
to Kripke, the possibility of error requires that there be room for me to have the ability to use the 
CAT concept even if I am disposed to token the mental representation expressing it in such a way 
that my disposition is really the disposition to token it in the presence of cats or infantile mountain 
lions, for example, or, alternatively, in the presence of cats except for those cats which are black 
and encountered at night.  
 Normativism has the potential to explain why we have the concepts we have, even when 
our dispositions may not be such as to represent a tendency to conform to our concepts’ exact 
canonical patterns of use, but rather some deviant pattern exhibiting our tendency to err. Kripke’s 
own reaction was to claim that meaning is normative, and, then, to pursue a skeptical alternative to 
what he called “semantic realism”. If semantic realism maintains that the determiners of content are 
exhausted by the dispositions of the individual thinker (leaving aside certain other sorts of 
individualistic proposals rejected by Kripke), then Kripke may have given sufficient reason to 
reject it. However, Normativism can be an equally realistic alternative to that restrictive sort of 
semantic realism. It can be the case that a thinker ought to use a mental representation in a certain 
way even if she is not disposed actually to use it in that exact way. Thanks to this fact, the 
                                                      
9 Kripke (1982). 
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Normativist has a ready fix for failures of individuals to conform to the canonical patterns of use of 
their concepts. A theory of content can still be constructed, by making use of a normative 
condition, which accounts adequately for the concepts we take ourselves actually to have in the 
face of our ability to deviate in our deployment of a concept from its canonical pattern of use.10  
 In introducing the normativity of mental content that they will be discussing, Glüer-Pagin 
and Wikforss cite Kripke’s claim that, concerning a meaningful symbol or contentful mental state, 
“whatever in fact I (am disposed to) do, there is a unique thing that I should do.”11 They further 
clarify that, “along with almost everyone else in this discussion, [they] take the relevant 
normativity to be prescriptive in nature. Prescriptions, we take it, involve genuine ‘oughts’; their 
very point is to guide our performances.”12  
They then introduce the notion, crucial to their overall argument, of a performance’s being 
governed by a norm: “Naturally, the relevant norms would seem to be those ‘governing’ our 
performances, norms that we, as their subjects, ought to live up to.” 13  As they use the term 
‘govern’, then, it is, for the Normativist and her opponents, a fitting way of describing the relation 
norms bear, on the Normativist’s view, to an agent’s use of a representational item. A norm 
governs a type of performance when, so to speak, it applies to the performance. This is exactly the 
                                                      
10 My reasoning here echoes the detailed and ingenious arguments given by Allan Gibbard in his (2012) in 
favor of the normativity of content, drawn from take on Kripke’s discussion of dispositions and normativity. 
The parallel between Gibbard and myself breaks down when I stress that Normativism can provide a realistic 
theory of content, contrary to what Kripke may have supposed, citing subject-independent norms. While I 
cannot dwell on this here, I think that anti-individualism about the mental and the data concerning incomplete 
understanding of one’s own concepts provide the best motivation for a normative theory of content—hence, 
that the relevant kind of normativity will have to be both realistic and, in certain senses objective, by contrast 
with the normativity relied upon by Gibbard and others in their normative theories of meaning and content. 
Rather than dwell on this here, I briefly review the core Kripkean points motivating a turn to normativity to 
frame the discussion. See Greenberg (Unpublished MS, 2013a, 2013b) for his argument from incomplete 
understanding to a “responsibility-based” normative theory of content. 
11 p. 31, citing Kripke (1982), p. 24. 
12 p. 32. 
13 ibid. 
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sort of notion of normativity that is compatible with robust tendencies to err in one’s performances. 
The governing norm says what ought to be done, not what is or tends to be done.  
 Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss discuss two versions of the normativity of mental content. 
According to what they call “CE Normativism”, “it is essential to content that certain ‘oughts’ can 
be derived from it”. According to what they call “CD Normativism”, “content is determined by 
norms in the first place”.14 CD Normativism is just what we have been calling “Normativism”. It is 
the normativity of mental content, taken as a foundational theory of content, or, a theory of content 
determination.  
 Opening their argument against CD Normativism, the dilemma of regress and idleness, 
Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss specify what their opponent believes by citing a prominent defender of a 
kind of Normativism: “CD Normativism has it that, as Gibbard once put it, “what I’m thinking is a 
matter of the rules I am following in my thinking”. There is content because there are CD norms 
that govern thinking.”15 The shift in terminology is noteworthy. In the sense of ‘govern’ stipulated 
just above, their non-quoting characterization—“there is content because there are CD norms that 
govern thinking” is quite congenial to Normativism as both they and I have explained it. However, 
in the way one naturally understands it, the quote from Gibbard claims something different. The 
claim that “what I’m thinking is a matter of the rules I am following in my thinking” is not the 
same as the claim that what I’m thinking is a matter of the rules governing my thinking. The latter 
statement, in the sense appropriately given to ‘govern’, claims that what I’m thinking is a matter of 
what I ought to do with the elements of my thought.16 As Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss emphasize, 
this is the core of Normativism.  
 
                                                      
14 p. 31. 
15 p. 52, in part quoting Gibbard (2003), p. 86. 
16 The reader will have noticed the gap between the subject matter of a theory of content and the matter under 
discussion now, namely what one is currently thinking. 
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III. THE DILEMMA: REGRESS 
 
 Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss begin their argument against CD Normativism by asking, “What 
does being ‘governed’ by a rule R in one’s reasoning require?” They claim that what’s at issue here 
is an explanation of the “performances” in question—thoughts or episodes of reasoning—by 
reference to a rule R. They construe this to mean that the agent S “accepts a commitment” to 
conform to R in such performances, and that this is the motivation for why S reasons as she does.  
Taking practical reasoning as a model for “rule-following,” they claim that S must have a “pro-
attitude” toward R-conforming performances. With this, they contend, a regress is up and running: 
 
“An instance of such reasoning would, therefore, minimally involve something like the 
following practical inference: 
 
 (P1) I want to believe what is in accordance with R. 
 (P2) To believe that p is in accordance with R. 
 (C)  I want to believe that p. 
 
The trouble is that such an inference necessarily involves another belief, in this case the 
belief that to believe that p is in accordance with R.” 
 
This belief, they claim, will have to be explained in the same way, citing another rule, which 
will similarly be explained by this pattern of reasoning. “Thus,” they conclude, “belief formation 
motivated by rules turn out to be impossible; a vicious regress ensues.”17 
Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss point out that this argument isn’t directed against Normativism 
directly, but only against it as a view which endorses “the idea that rule-governed performances 
can be explained in terms of the subject’s attitudes in combination with the idea that belief 
                                                      
17 pp. 55-6. 
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formation is in general rule-governed.” They then discuss how one might understand differently 
the way in which behavior can be explained by a rule. But what is striking about this is that they 
are quite right that their argument is directed against a very specific package of claims, but it is 
only the claim that belief is in general the product of rule-following, and not the claim that belief is 
in general rule-governed, that provides the argument with traction. As they rightly defined the 
notion of rule-governance, it has to do with the norms in place for an agent’s performances, not 
with the rules causally regulating an agent’s performances.  
 Here is a rough formulation of the regress side of the argument: 
 
1) Suppose I have belief B. 
2) For belief B to have its content, it must be explained by a rule. (CD Normativism) 
3) For rule-explanation, rather than mere rule-conformity, belief B must have been 
done on the basis of an acceptance of the rule. (Ordinary Conception of Rule-
Following) 
4) For this to be the case, I will have to have desired to believe in general what is in 
accordance with some rule R, and have had the further belief that the belief B is in 
accordance with R. (Structure of Practical Reasoning) 
5) But this further belief will need, then, to be explained by a rule (2), and so be done 
on the basis of its acceptance (3). 
6) This requires (4) that I have a further belief that this belief is in accordance with 
the rule.  
7) And so on… 
  
It is the rejection of (3) which Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss contend places the Normativist onto the 
idleness side of the dilemma.  
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 As they see it, if the Normativist does not provide an account of when rules are followed, 
by contrast with mere conformity, then her explanation of content is incomplete. It is worth noting 
that such a distinction is made even by the crude dispositionalist, who would claim that it is one 
thing for one’s actions to fit a rule and quite another to be disposed to act so as to conform to it.  
According to Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss, the Normativist must offer some such distinction, or else 
her view does not satisfy a required explanatory task.  
 Must we understand rule-following as essentially involving an agent’s taking an attitude 
toward the rule and reasoning from it to particular performances? Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss 
mention some of the inspiration for pursuing alternative ways of understanding rule-following. 
They cite Wittgenstein’s reflection on regresses of rules like theirs that “What this shews is that 
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we 
call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases.”18 While it is tempting to follow 
Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss in thinking that the central issue here is how to understand rule-
following, we do not yet have any reason to believe that Normativism entails (2), the other crucial 
premise in the argument for a regress. Without (2), accepting the offered conception of rule-
following will not generate this regress. 
 One could understand the temptation to believe that (2) expresses the central commitment 
of CD Normativism. As Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss sometimes put it, the Normativist’s distinctive 
sort of explanation of contentful states is in terms of rules. But Normativism offers an explanation 
of which contents types of mental representations express. A theory of content like Normativism 
does not explain which particular beliefs a thinker has. The construal of Normativism as entailing 
(2) can be made precise. For example:  
 
A) Essential to content are the rules governing one’s thinking. 
                                                      
18 pp. 35-36, quoting Wittgenstein, PI 201-202.  
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B) To govern thinking is to explain what is thought. 
C) To explain what is thought is to explain why one tokens a particular mental 
representation. 
D) Therefore, Essential to content are the norms explaining why one tokens particular 
mental states.  
 
(A) is undoubtedly the central claim of Normativism. (B) is the error implicit in Glüer-Pain and 
Wikforss’ argument. In their own sense of ‘govern’, (B) isn’t true. And of course, Normativism 
does say that governing rules, in the normative sense, explain content. But it does not say that 
governing rules explain what is thought, in the sense captured in (C).  
Gibbard, for one, seems to maintain in his own version of Normativism a close connection 
between content and rules, as noted. This connection has provoked considerable discussion about 
whether a regress of rules is lurking.19 Further, Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss are right that some 
Normativists have reacted to this possibility by trying to treat rule-following in a more minimal 
way.20 They add to the concern over a lurking regress this important challenge to the Normativist: 
maintain the core commitment of explaining content in terms of norms without reducing such 
                                                      
19  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to acknowledge more explicitly that prominent 
defenders of Normativism and rule-based theories of content worry about the lurking regress and, further, 
tend to present their own treatments in ways that can be construed as alternative accounts of explanation by 
rules. This includes McDowell (1984), Blackburn (1984), and Ginsborg (2011), among others, though the 
case is complicated by the fact that many of these writers are attempting to explicate and assess the 
contributions of Wittgenstein or Kripke. Still, the standard fixation on rules and potential regress is why 
much of my interest concerns the idleness side of the dilemma, as Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss are right to 
wonder what happens to Normativism if it can avoid the regress. I address below, mainly in Sections 5 and 6, 
reasons defenders and critics might have to hold that Normativism must accept the regress-generating 
commitments. As the reviewer notes, a reasonable commitment to the possibility of following any genuine 
norm applying to an agent’s behavior implies neither that she must follow the norm in any given instance nor 
that she must be capable of applying it at once to every instance of conforming behavior. 
20 Brandom also at times writes as if he is concerned about the same sort of regress issue and takes the 
“implicit” understanding of rule-following as a way out. However, his point is that such worries show that 
not all normative matters can be understood in terms of rule-following, not that rule-following constitutes the 
relevant kind of normativity and requires a deflationary construal. See, for example, Brandom (1994), pp. 20-
1, where he discusses Sellars’s and Wittgenstein’s insights that some normative governance must not be 
construed in as being explicit or deliberate, even if rule-following turns out to be explicit or deliberate. 
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norms norms to an idle label. The question for the Normativist will thus be whether or not evading 
their particular regress of explanation by rules comes at this high price. 
 
IV. THE DILEMMA: IDLENESS 
 
Why must Normativists take the required stance as to how a contentful belief state was 
produced? Normativism offers an account of why a belief has the content that it has, not an account 
of how the belief itself came about. Is there some reason why the Normativist must also offer such 
an account?  
Perhaps some guidance can be found in the idleness side of Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss’s 
dilemma. The initial idea they have is that the Normativist will reject premise (3) of their argument 
in order avoid the regress. They take this to go hand-in-hand with understanding the agent as only 
implicitly following the relevant rule. They argue that this route for the Normativist entails a lethal 
sort of theoretical idleness. 
 They begin this argument by noting Boghossian’s claim in response to a regress of rules, 
that rule-following does not have to be understood in terms of doing so explicitly or deliberately.21 
Drawing from Quine’s original argument concerning the regress and idleness of linguistic 
convention, they contend that making CD norms anything other than deliberate and explicit risks, 
as Quine says of implicit linguistic conventions, “depriving the latter of any explanatory force and 
reducing it to an idle label.” They add that “This risk is dramatically higher for the CD Normativist. 
                                                      
21 The remark of Boghossian’s noted by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss in setting up their idleness charge is taken 
from Boghossian (1996), which is not concerned with Normativism, but rather with analyticity and rule-
following. While it is reasonable that cases like Boghossian’s provide fodder for Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss’ 
criticism, it is not obvious that the more minimal accounts of rule-following offered in response to more 
general regress concerns evince the assumption that Normativism itself requires such an alternative to avoid 
the kind of regress at issue in their dilemma. My discussion aims to show the upshot of placing normativity 
rather than rules at the foundation. 
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After all, CD Normativism has to back off yet another step; it not only reckons with necessarily 
implicit rules, but with rules you cannot even intend to follow.”22 
 This is a remarkably strong claim. On this horn of the dilemma, the Normativist is at the 
very least rejecting claim (3). Without claim (3), there is no reason to think that we cannot intend to 
follow the CD Normativist’s rules for use. The idleness side of the dilemma cannot gain critical 
support from its alternative. The Normativist is free to simply accept the relevant sort of idleness. 
Surely, Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss are right to claim that it would be bizarre for the Normativist’s 
theory to make crucial use of rules that could not be followed. But there is no reason, on the 
idleness side of the dilemma, to think that they could not be followed. All we’ve seen from the 
regress argument is that it cannot be maintained that such rules are necessarily followed 
intentionally every time a belief is produced via a rule and also that every belief must be explained 
by the this same sort of production by rule, on pain of regress. The objection to Normativism on the 
idleness side of the dilemma therefore cannot amount to the charge that her norms are rules that 
could not be followed intentionally. Without claim (3), there is just no argument that the 
Normativist’s rules could not be followed intentionally. 
 However, the Normativist seems to be able to reject (2) outright. She can deny that if a 
belief has content, it must itself be explained by a rule. Normativism is a claim about what makes it 
the case that a given belief has its content (or it is a claim that could be extended to such questions 
as the theory of content takes shape in application to psychological states like belief). It is not a 
claim about what explains a thinker’s beliefs, in the sense of explaining what brought her beliefs 
about. (2) is not entailed by virtue of the sort of question Normativism attempts to answer. Glüer-
Pagin and Wikforss may, alternatively, take (2) to derive from the particular way in which 
Normativism explains content, by virtue of the rules governing the agent’s representations. 
However, (2), as a claim about an agent’s thinking being explanatorily regulated by a rule, does 
                                                      
22 pp. 59-60. 
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not follow from the Normativist’s claim about governing rules, as Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss have 
defined their sense of ‘governing’. If by ‘governing’, we now mean to indicate rule-governance in 
the sense that thought is explanatorily regulated by certain rules—that I make use of certain rules in 
coming to have certain thoughts—then it is simply no essential part of Normativism to make this 
claim. The Normativist offers a theory of content, not a theory of the production or causal 
regulation or inferential procedures necessarily involved in the psychological process of thinking.  
 
V. DOES NORMATIVISM REQUIRE PSYCHOLOGICAL  
EXPLANATION BY RULES? 
 
 One reason Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss may take the Normativist to be committed to (2), 
other than a possible shift in the sense of ‘govern’, is that they characterize CD Normativism as 
making crucial use of a certain sort of argument. Their case against the normativity of content has 
the following overall shape: they identify an argument for CE Normativism, relying on the 
normativity of belief, and criticize the argument and the resulting position; in the process of doing 
so, they criticize the idea that the rules of rationality are constitutive of belief, partly because, on 
their view, beliefs stand in internal relations characterized by such rules—according to them, this 
means that these rules will have to both describe the actual tendencies of thinkers and instruct them 
how to think. Concluding that a rule cannot coherently perform both of these tasks, they move on 
to criticizing CD Normativism. In setting up the discussion in this way, one must take care not to 
inflate the commitments of the view under discussion in attending to particular arguments in 
support of it. 
 The argument against CD Normativism is, after all, an argument against precisely the 
descriptive idea of rules involved in the regulation of belief. As they acknowledge in a footnote, 
nothing in their argument depends on “the assumption that these rules involve ‘oughts’, i.e., are 
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prescriptive in character.”23 According to CD Normativism, though, this is the relevant sort of rule 
for the determination of content, and no claim is made about any other. This is why their argument 
falls flat. It is directed against a view that content is determined by rules an agent uses in her 
thinking, rules to which, as they say, the agent accepts a commitment. However, the Normativist 
contends that it is her being committed, by virtue of the norms applying to her, that determines the 
contents of her thoughts, independently of whether or not such commitment is accepted or used in 
her thinking.  
In the same footnote, Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss claim that “CD rules are supposed to guide 
our reasoning”, and this is why it does not matter to them if the rules are prescriptive in nature.  But, 
as they and we have defined Normativism, it is essential to the theory that the relevant rules are 
genuine prescriptions, and matters not at all what their deliberative role in anyone’s psychology 
might be. The Normativist’s rules are not held to guide the agent in the production of all of her 
contentful mental states, as would be required for the dilemma against it to have any bite. 
We saw that Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss characterized CD Normativism just as we 
characterized Normativism, as centered around genuine norms or ‘oughts’ or prescriptions. For the 
purposes of their dilemma of regress and idleness, the commitments of Normativism are taken to 
be much stronger. Once the argument is finished, however, their initial understanding of the view 
seems to return, as they wonder about “the validity or force of CD rules. In virtue of what do they 
govern reasoning? In particular, are they, in some sense, of our own making?”24 The question of 
validity is a question about the application of the rule, or the bearing of the norm, or the truth of the 
ought-statement. A rule’s validity is not a matter of whether I make use of it. So, it seems that 
when they pursue this very interesting question about Normativism, Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss 
                                                      
23 p. 53, fn. 48. 
24 p. 54, fn. 50. 
 97 
return to the more accurate and, now, more convenient characterization, and return to the agreed-
upon sense of ‘govern’.  
We are close to an important issue in meta-ethics: what is the relation between the facts 
about what I ought to do and facts about what I take the answer to be? This is roughly the question 
of the attitude-dependence of normative facts. The question of validity might well, if normative 
facts are strongly attitude-dependent, or if the bearing of a rule depends entirely on whether or not I 
make use of it, turn out to be the question of the role of the rule in my own psychology.  
The relationship between issues in metaethics and the normativity of meaning and content 
is an extremely interesting topic. But we do not have to sort out the attitude-dependence of 
normative facts in order to adjudicate the argument offered by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss. Even if it 
is true that for a norm to apply to me I must take a certain stance of acceptance towards what it 
prescribes, this does not entail that any act done in accordance with the norm be performed as the 
result of my taking such a stance. Yet that, and more, is required to generate a regress. To generate 
the identified regress, it has to be required that, for at least some action, (i) it must have been 
performed as the result of my taking a stance towards a norm, and (ii) that the belief that the action 
is prescribed by the norm must also have been performed as the result of my taking a stance 
towards a norm.  
Naturally, these two steps are accomplished at once when Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss add to 
Normativism the claim that the production of every contentful mental state is to be explained as the 
product of rule-following. The threatened regress is a regress of explanation, and it requires a 
strong assumption like this to get running. As I have stressed, though, this strong assumption is not 
an essential commitment of the Normativist.25 
                                                      
25 Relying on Gibbard and Brandom in developing the Normativist target is, for exactly this reason, sub-
optimal—though it must be noted that Gibbard takes great pains to clarify that the theory of content he 
ultimately develops is actually a “mere metatheory,” rather than a constitutive explanation of the nature of 
content or content-bearing relations, given his prior metaethics. Thus, Gibbard’s full story is not in fact a 
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It might be thought that what I recommend is that the Normativist simply embrace the 
idleness side of the dilemma. The Normativist must of course deny the very strong explanatory role 
for rules that generates the regress. The thrust of the purportedly problematic accusation on that 
side of the dilemma is that the Normativist thereby reduces rule-following to an idle label. In 
disavowing the explanatory role generating the regress, however, the Normativist rejects premise 
(2), not premise (3), which makes explicit a certain understanding of rule-following. The 
Normativist does not have to “go implicit” to avoid the regress. She has only to remind us that her 
view does not have the explanatory commitment embodied in (2), taken in the way that it must be 
taken in order to generate a regress. Her view proposes a metaphysical explanation of the relations 
between our mental representations and their contents, not a psychological explanation of the 
production of any beliefs.  
Perhaps more accurately understood, then, I have argued that the Normativist does not fall 
prey to the dilemma at all. Since her view does not offer the relevant kind of explanation, she could 
accept or deny premise (3)’s attitudinal understanding of rule-following without either entailing a 
regress or opening herself to a charge of explanatory idleness. Since she does not propose a 
universal psychological explanation of belief-states, there is nothing in the Normativist’s account to 
be idle in the way alleged. It simply does not offer the sort of explanation that could face such a 
charge. 
VI. GUIDANCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF MEANING 
 
 In the previous section, I argued that the Normativist is not committed to the claims that 
generate the regress, and is not proposing the sort of explanation of belief states that would open 
her account to a charge of idleness. In this section, I discuss the way in which Glüer-Pagin and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
development of CD Normativism, despite how his view has been taken and the way in which his early work 
on this topic shaped the discussion, for example in Boghossian (2003). Boghossian is not waylaid by any 
formulation of the normative claim in terms of rules, as he classifies these early claims, correctly, as merely 
part of Gibbard’s preferred way of arguing for the normativity of content. 
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Wikforss could be misconstruing another aspect of the Normativist view in claiming that 
Normativists say that content-determining norms are “supposed to guide our belief formation”. One 
might object to the distance I allege between the theory of content and psychological explanation 
that a theory of content must explicate our knowledge of content, just as a theory of meaning ought 
to explicate our knowledge of meaning. If that is so, it seems hard to deny that Normativism does 
entail something about the cognitive state of a thinker when she is in the process of producing a 
belief. Following my discussion of guidance, I will show that Normativism does not entail any such 
thing, once we are clear on what knowledge of content is. 
 According to Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss, Normativism claims that certain norms are 
“supposed to guide our belief formation”. Something’s guiding our belief formation, on their 
understanding, amounts to our using it in our reasoning. The statement that according to 
Normativism, norms are supposed to guide our belief formation exhibits some of the same 
problems as their previous use of the word ‘govern’. On one natural reading, they mean that 
Normativism claims that certain norms do guide our belief formation. If Normativism claims that, 
the dilemma can get some traction.  
 But on that way of reading the claim, Normativism has no such commitment. If 
Normativists say that certain norms are supposed to guide belief formation, it is only in the sense in 
which any fact about what we ought to do, or what reasons we have, ought to guide our behavior. 
That is, we ought to act in conformity with the norm. Perhaps we even ought to act on the reasons 
that some norm specifies. But this is just what results from the fact that Normativism is committed 
to the bearing of certain norms on our contentful mental representations.  
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 A bit more perspicuously, here are two formulations of the claim that Normativism has it 
that certain norms are supposed to guide belief formation, roughly illustrating the contrast I’ve just 
made between two sorts of interpretations26: 
 
NON-NORMATIVE GUIDANCE REQUIREMENT:  
According to Normativism, certain norms guide belief formation. 
 
NORMATIVE GUIDANCE REQUIREMENT: 
According to Normativism, certain norms ought to guide belief formation. 
 
 The Non-Normative Guidance Requirement is the sort of “requirement” involved in any 
constitutive account of a phenomenon which identifies necessary conditions for it. For example, a 
constitutive account of water in terms of H20 contains this sort of requirement that any sample of 
water contains H20. However, the requirement in the Non-Normative Guidance Requirement does 
not capture the necessary condition alleged by Normativism. The Normative Guidance 
Requirement does capture it. Normativism requires, in the above sense, that for any contentful 
mental representation, certain norms ought to guide its deployment. The Non-Normative Guidance 
requirement simply strips out the normative element of Normativism. Doing so, as we have seen, 
does not make the requirements on an agent’s psychology weaker, but rather makes them 
remarkably stronger—strong enough to generate a regress. Normativism does not just take 
something about the way our belief formation works and turn it into a theory of content. It takes 
something normative, something about the way our belief formation ought to work, and turn it into 
a theory of content. While such views are by far the exception so far as traditional metaphysical 
theories of this kind are concerned, one simply cannot ignore the normativity of the theoretical base 
of such a theory and expect to retain what is plausible and distinctive about it.  
                                                      
26 Both of these formulations only specify possible implications of Normativism, as it is in the first place a 
theory of content and says nothing directly one way or another about belief formation or individuation. 
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 My claim is that the dilemma of regress and idleness articulated by Glüer-Pagin and 
Wikforss trades on an ambiguity about the sense in which Normativism claims that certain norms 
are “supposed to guide” our thinking. What Normativism does claim is that there are certain norms 
in force whenever there is content. What it does not claim is that we are actually guided by such 
norms whenever we engage in contentful thought.   
So much for Normativism’s claim that certain norms are supposed to guide belief 
formation. Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss’ argument might also draw on some ideas about what the 
Normativist, or any other theorist of content, must take knowledge of meaning or knowledge of 
content to be.  
Does Normativism offer an account of knowledge of meaning, or knowledge of content? 
The answer to this question is in one sense yes, and in another sense no. We could mean two things 
by knowledge of content. First, we could mean something as minimal as concept possession, or 
about the minimal competence involved in possessing a concept. In that sense, Normativism does 
offer an account of knowledge of content. But it does not say anything about either what goes on 
when we exercise that competence, nor about whether or not any substantive knowledge is 
involved in concept possession at all, or what such knowledge would even be. As such, 
Normativism is wholly compatible with not only, most relevantly, an extremely minimal idea of 
what is involved in tokening mental representations, but also with our not knowing anything at all 
about the contents we express or the concepts we possess.  
The latter should be obvious independently, since the Normativist provides a theory of 
content, not in the sense of a theory of the nature of contents, but in the sense of a specification of 
the conditions under which a representation expresses a particular content.  
If we mean something more substantive by knowledge of content, then the Normativist 
simply does not offer an account of what we know when we understand a particular content. Nor 
does she make any claim about our knowledge of the conditions under which our concepts express 
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particular contents. Those conditions are the truly normative element of the theory. And while the 
theory tells us that we must be in those conditions, it does not require our knowing that we are in 
such conditions.  
To make things precise and clear, once again, here is a sketch of the reasoning I have just 
been addressing: 
 
E) Normativism offers a theory of content citing norms or rules. 
F) Therefore, if Normativism is true, then we know these norms or rules when we possess 
the concept; this knowledge forms the basis of our competence. 
G) Therefore, in exercising our conceptual competence, we produce beliefs on the basis of 
our understanding of a rule. 
 
As I’ve argued, (F) should not be concluded from (E). Such an inference relies on a false 
presupposition about the relationship between concept possession and knowledge of possession-
enabling conditions or knowledge of the concept itself. The lack of such a strong connection is one 
thing motivating Normativism in the first place. As such, to presuppose in this way that we must 
have such robust understanding of the rules associated with a concept in order to possess it begs the 
question against the anti-individualistic Normativist. 
In this section, I have shown that Normativism is not committed to the claim that 
contentful mental representations are guided by a norm; at most, it claims that contentful mental 
representations ought to be guided by a norm. Directly, it only claims that there is a genuine norm 
which sets a standard for the mental representation’s use. I have also shown that Normativism is 
not committed to a thinker’s having knowledge of her content-determining norms. As such, it also 
is not compelled to claim that such knowledge is operative in all uses of a mental representation.  
All of this was yet more clarification of the nature and aims of Normativism. Normativism 
is a theory of content. The conditions on content it identifies are normative, in that they involve 
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what ought to be done with a representation. It does not purport to offer a psychological 
explanation of belief formation; it is not even required to identify conditions of which competent 
thinkers are aware. Thinkers may be wholly ignorant of the norms governing the contents of their 
mental states (that’s so even on the sense of ‘govern’ used by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss in 
constructing their dilemma). Normativism, therefore, does not generate any regress of explanation 
or regress of motivations. It does not even offer the relevant sort of explanation. As such, it cannot 
be criticized on the grounds that its offered explanation is idle. Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss rightly 
criticize a certain sort of view about how beliefs must be formed; but that is the must of necessity, 
not the must of obligation. Concerning such a normative must, they miss the mark.  
 
VII. DEBTS AND ASSURANCES 
 
In motivating a normative theory of content as I have, and in evading the dilemma of 
regress and idleness, I have incurred various debts and commitments on behalf of Normativism. 
Some of the more minor ones were just canvassed in my summarizing the way in which 
Normativism evades the dilemma of regress and idleness. In this final section, I will discuss what 
more must be done by the Normativist to avoid collapse into the sort of theory that would fall prey 
to Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss’ dilemma, and to secure a place as a serious contender in the theory of 
content. 
First, in avoiding the commitment to rule-governance, in the sense in which a regress 
threatens, the Normativist relies on the claim that rules or norms can apply to a thinker without her 
actually using them in the regulation of her thinking. This is hardly a controversial claim. However, 
it does seem that it might be false if such norms were attitude-dependent. At least, the rules 
applying to the thinker’s thought would have to be related in the required way to her attitudes. But 
even if such rules must be related in whatever way is required by attitude-dependence to the 
thinker’s attitudes, this still would not mean that they would need to be put to use in her 
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performances. And without that as a consequence, even attitude-dependence of a very strong sort 
would not obviously generate the sort of regress identified by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss. More, 
however, must be said to make this clear.27  
Second, there is some sense in which Normativists must indeed hold that certain norms or 
rules are “supposed to guide” a thinker’s thinking. We can’t understand this to mean that 
Normativists claim that certain norms do (always) guide a thinker in what she thinks (since 
guidance involves the sort of appreciation that threatens a regress). But in providing a theory of 
content, it does claim that there is a necessary connection between a mental representation having a 
particular content for a thinker and the obtaining of certain normative facts about her use of that 
representation. Such facts might specify how she ought to use it. But they might specify how she 
may use it, how she has reason do use it, or what reasons she has for its use. How a normative 
theory of content ought to fill itself out further, beyond the generic characterization on which I’ve 
defended it here, is a complicated question, depending in part on the differences between these 
                                                      
27  Glüer and Wikforss revised their Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, “The Normativity of 
Meaning and Content,” in 2018, partly in a way that indicates some awareness that their argument may 
ultimately rely on resolving these issues in certain ways. Unfortunately, the way they shore up their argument 
in light of this fact reveals that they still do not believe that the question of how contents are determined is 
separate from the question of how beliefs are psychologically regulated, nor that their argument depends on 
illicitly wedding the two: “Even if guidance normativism [a version of CD Normativism that requires rule-
following] would ultimately not be able to sustain a substantive difference between following a content 
determining rule and mere accordance with it, one might still hold on to the claim that there are contentful 
intentional states only if the rules of rationality are in force for them. Such force might require acceptance, 
but not (general) guidance, or it might be completely independent of the attitudes of thinkers. Insofar as 
acceptance itself is intentional, however, CD Normativism might prove viable only if the force of the 
relevant rules or norms is construed as completely independent of the attitudes of thinkers. Some relevant 
ideas as to how such rule following might be understood were already discussed above…” The key mistake 
here, in the sentence beginning with “Insofar as…”, is, as I’ve argued, the failure to appreciate the 
assumptions needed to get their regress running for the normativist—assumptions which go well beyond the 
assumption that acceptance is intentional, another claim which is independent of normativism as well as 
suspect. A rule’s (more aptly, a norm’s) being in force does not in fact constitute its being accepted. Thus, 
Glüer and Wikforss still do not address the possibility that genuine normative facts or properties might 
determine content independently of any view about rule-following or rule-acceptance, which is surprising 
given that they now seem to make room for a normative theory of content whose norms are independent of 
the attitudes of thinkers to at least some degree. A normative theory of content determination is not 
committed to claiming that norms are completely independent of the attitudes of thinkers, nor is it committed 
to the claim that norms are entirely dependent on the attitudes of thinkers. Nothing Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss 
argue has shown that the normativist must adopt one or the other of these extreme views about the relation 
between normativity and acceptance which they, rightly, find unsatisfying.  
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different sorts of normative facts. Most importantly, what a metaphysical theory making use of 
normative ingredients, like Normativism, must say about how someone should be reasoning (i.e., 
“is supposed to be guided by a norm”) is left unsettled, as far as we’ve seen. Perhaps someone 
could, despite my initial objections, substantiate a normative version of the regress argument 
against Normativism, depending on how this issue is resolved. How do normative facts offered in 
the Normativist’s explanation of content relate to proper reasoning about what to do or think?28 
Third, independently of the question of how much attitude-dependence would push 
Normativism back toward a regress, we must face the fact that the motivation I presented for 
Normativism does seem to require that there are genuine norms on our thinking that we do not yet 
recognize. Such norms are supposed to forge the proper connection between an individual and 
concepts about which she is ignorant or mistaken. But these norms, since they must be in force 
prior to content if Normativism is correct, cry out for explanation. How could there be norms for 
use of our symbols independent of both content, and what norms we endorse or adopt for their 
use?29 
Fourth, it is undeniable that there are non-normative preconditions on possession of 
particular concepts. To take a simple example, it is overwhelmingly intuitive that in order to 
                                                      
28  Glüer and Wikforss also argue against the normativity of belief as a way of arguing against CE 
Normativity. Their rich arguments do not seem to rely on taking the commitments of their interlocutors too 
strongly. Two things about that discussion are worth noting here. First, CD Normativism as I’m defending it  
does not automatically claim or rely for its motivation on a thesis about any truth-norm being constitutive of 
the attitude of belief. Second, in the end, even some of these arguments may come down to a more general 
skepticism about rule-following. Their “no-guidance argument” holds that the truth-norm cannot guide belief 
formation, given that one will have already come to a belief that p or not on the way to assessing whether one 
ought to believe that p. Thus, they claim, the peculiar content of this norm renders it unable to guide belief 
formation. However, after being pressed by Steglich-Petersen (2010, 2013) by ways in which adopting such 
norms rather than alternatives like believe p iff it would be pleasant to do so does seem to influence behavior, 
they (2015a) seem to demand that Steglich-Petersen adequately explain rule-following to avoid being 
question-begging. So, even there, they seem to regard the debate as ultimately being about rule-following, 
rather than the peculiarities of any normative principles or claims. 
29 This is likely the key reason why the focus on subject-derived norms of the kinds invoked by Brandom 
(1994, 2000, 2013) and Gibbard (2003, 2013) seems warranted aside from purely ad hominem reasons. 
However, given the metaethical views both import to the theory of content, one ought not to rule out 
antecedent to argument that there is a less subject-dependent way of grounding genuine content-determining 
norms. 
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possess the concept FOUR I must believe that four is a number (or perhaps that I must have 
disposition to employ the concept as if I had this belief, or that I have a corresponding 
metalinguistic or metaconceptual belief about my representation). Does the Normativist about 
content determination have to deny that these are genuine preconditions on concept possession? 
After all, it would seem that her general theory of content contains primarily normative ingredients, 
and is designed precisely to avoid any general commitment to such cognitive or dispositional 
requirements on concept possession. However, given that non-normative facts can undeniably 
make a difference to the normative facts, it is in principle quite possible that many of the standard 
non-normative conditions cited in explaining content can, even if Normativism is correct, help to 
explain content. To explain this from the Normativist’s point of view, we might, for example, 
invoke a sort of ought-implies-can principle in order to maintain that certain non-normative 
preconditions are in place because they are crucial for securing the thinker’s relevant cognitive 
abilities. How this could fit into the general sort of normative theory of content sketched and 
defended above is not obvious. To the extent that the Normativist theory invokes specific cognitive 
purposes, it will run up against the charge that it is not a genuinely normative theory of content, 
because it does not cite norms which are categorical and interest-independent.30 While I think this 
charge is misplaced, it deserves sustained response. Further, the above strategy raises another of 
similar importance: the relevance to the normativity of content of the ought-implies-can principle. 
This principle has been invoked in several recent arguments against the normativity of content31, so 
                                                      
30  I have in mind the constraints placed on normative theories of meaning and content, or normative 
entailments of the facts of meaning and content, by Hattiangadi (2007). Hattiangadi designs these constraints 
to explain why it is that, according to Kripke’s argument, it seems that the normativity of meaning and 
content is a threat to naturalism. I’ve made no claim that the normativity of content is or must be a threat to 
naturalism, thus I am free, even on Hattiangadi’s framework, to invoke a wider variety of norms. 
31 Especially in evaluating truth norms for belief. See Boghossian (2003), Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007), 
and Glüer and Wikforss (2009a) for arguments invoking something like the ought-implies-can principle to 
rule out forms of the truth norm for belief. 
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getting clear on its dialectical significance is a necessary step in defending the normativity of 
content independently of the precondition issue. 
Each of these avenues for further work is important and interesting whether or not one 
believes that content is a normative matter. The recent debate over the normativity of meaning and 
content has turned remarkably insular, shaped by a very few influential participants and mutual 
agreement over the motivations for and the commitments of a view taking meaning and content 
normative. This is not surprising given the positions actually taken by leading Normativists. My 
aim is to emphasize motivations that have not yet been taken seriously enough, commitments about 
the explanatory role of norms which might be cast aside, and the underappreciated complexity of 
the normative subject matter of the debate. Normativism ought to be a serious contender in its own 
right in the theory of meaning and content, beyond the specific framework set out by Kripke’s 
discussion of Wittgenstein, which had its own peculiar aims and point of view.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Boghossian, Paul 1996. ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’. Nous, 30, pp. 360-91. 
______ 2003. ‘The Normativity of Content’. Philosophical Issues, 13, pp. 31-45. 
Blackburn, Simon 1984. ‘The Individual Strikes Back’. Synthese, 58(3), pp. 281-301. 
Brandom, Robert 1994. Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.  
Harvard University Press. 
______ 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press. 
______ 2013. ‘Global Anti-Representationalism?’ in Price (ed.), Expressivism, Pragmatism, and  
Representationalism. 
Bykvist, Krister and Hattiangadi, Anandi 2007. ‘Does Thought Imply Ought?’. Analysis, 67, pp.  
277-285. 
Fodor, Jerry 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.  
MIT/Bradford Press. 
______ 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT/Bradford Press. 
______ 1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Clarendon Press. 
Gibbard, Allan 2003. ‘Thoughts and Norms’. Philosophical Issues, 13, pp. 83-98. 
______ 2012. Meaning and Normativity. Oxford University Press. 
Ginsborg, Hannah 2011. ‘Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules’. The Journal of  
Philosophy, 108(5), 227-254. 
Glüer, Kathrin and Åsa Wikforss 2009a: ‘Against Content Normativity’. Mind, 118, pp. 31–70 
______ 2009b. ‘The Normativity of Meaning and Content’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
______ 2010. ‘The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich Petersen.’. Mind 119: 757–761. 
______ 2015a. ‘Still No Guidance: Reply to Steglich-Petersen’. Theoria, 81, pp. 272-279. 
______ 2015b. ‘Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument’. Organon, F 22  
 109 
(Supplementary Issue), pp. 63-73. 
Greenberg, Mark (Unpublished MS). ‘Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of  
Thought’.    
______ 2013a. ‘Troubles with Content I’ in Burgess and Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New  
Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. 
______ 2013b. ‘Troubles with Content II’ in Burgess and Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New  
Essays on the Foundations of Meaning.  
Greenberg, Mark and Harman, Gilbert 2006. ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’, in The Oxford  
Handbook of Philosophy of Language.  
Hattiangadi, Anandi 2006. ‘Is Meaning Normative?’. Mind and Language, 21, pp. 220-240. 
______ 2007. Oughts and Thoughts. Oxford University Press. 
Kripke, Saul 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press. 
McDowell, John 1984. ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’. Synthese 58(3), pp. 325-363. 
Peacocke, Christopher 1992. A Study of Concepts. MIT Press. 
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn 2010. ‘The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Glüer and Wikforss.’  
Mind, 119, pp. 749–755. 
______ 2013. ‘The No Guidance Argument’. Theoria, 79, pp. 279–283 
Whiting, Daniel 2007. ‘The Normativity of Meaning Defended’. Analysis, 67, pp. 133-140. 
______ 2009. ‘Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90, pp. 535- 
555. 
______ 2010. ‘Should I Believe the Truth?’. Dialectica, 64(2), pp. 213-224. 
______ 2013a. ‘What is the Normativity of Meaning?’. Inquiry, 59, pp. 219-238. 
______ 2013b. ‘Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief’. Teorema: International Journal of  
Philosophy, 32(3). 
______ 2013c. ‘The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False)’. Philosophy, 8(2). 
 110 
Wright, Crispin 1984. ‘Kripke’s Account of the Argument Against Private Language’. The  
Journal of Philosophy, 81(12), pp. 759-78. 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Slurs and Conceptual Metasemantics 
 
 
 
0. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER 
 
Slur terms cry out for a special kind of semantic theory, one which goes beyond mere reference to a 
particular class of actual and possible individuals. On one attractive approach, slur terms pack in a 
derogatory perspective on the relevant class. Slur terms also express particular concepts, 
contributing to the distinctive nature of beliefs containing them. The badness of the derogatory 
perspective associated with slurs poses an unusual problem for metasemantic theories, particularly 
those attempting to explain the content of concepts. Most clearly, a norm-based metasemantics is 
threatened by the possibility that a concept essentially involves a bad inference or belief about the 
targeted class of individuals. I argue, citing explanatory strategies I call entrenchment and social 
intrusion, that norm-based theories of content have the resources to explain the prevalence of the 
perverse norms needed to explain concepts which are bad, even those which are bad, in certain 
respects, necessarily. Despite these explanations, it remains that for important reasons, and all 
things considered, we ought not to comport with slurs’ canonical patterns of use. I identify a 
principled way of treating this normative situation and the apparent conflict between the needed 
metasemantic norms and other norms without relying on any presupposed notion of the semantic 
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ought. Properly developed, a norm-based metasemantics has robust resources to bring to bear on 
even the most challenging cases. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A philosophy student, Will, doesn’t know much about moral philosophy yet. He’s unclear about 
some basic notions. For example, he doesn’t seem to think that he should infer from the claim that 
Sarah has made a promise to Neda that Sarah has an obligation to fulfill that promise. We hope that 
after some additional exposure and attention, we can teach Will that the notion of a promise isn’t 
just a notion of a certain form of words or a certain overt act, but rather the notion of a kind of 
overt act with a certain moral force. Will possesses the concept PROMISE, though he does not 
recognize what we might think is a central feature of the concept—the fact that its application 
licenses the attribution of an obligation. Will ought to infer that Sarah is OBLIGATED on the basis 
of the claim that she PROMISED. This is so even if Will doesn’t yet recognize that this is so.  
 We might thus try to explain why it is that Will possesses the genuine concept of a 
PROMISE, in common with his fellow students and his instructors, by citing the facts about how 
Will ought to deploy the concept in his repertoire that he expresses with utterances of ‘promise.’  
Because Will has a concept in his repertoire which he ought to use in the ways that are canonical 
for our concept of a promise, we can identify his concept with our concept PROMISE. According to 
this sort of view—a normative theory of content, or a norm-based metasemantics—what explains 
our meanings or conceptual contents are facts about what we ought to do with our words and 
concepts. 
 While we can identify Will’s concept by citing norms that apply to his use, we cannot 
invoke this kind of explanation so easily in every case. Suppose that Will also, having been raised 
in apparent ignorance of a range of important moral and social facts, has the concept MICK as his 
only concept for Irish people. When Will thinks of me as a MICK in attempting to categorize my 
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heritage in conceiving an example he’s going to discuss, he intends merely to place me under a 
category based on my heritage. While doing so in this context is problematic in its own right, the 
more striking mistake here is that Will seems not to realize that ‘mick’ is a slur term and that MICK 
is not simply a concept for categorizing in this way. Thus, if Will gives voice to his thought, my 
immediate correction ought to be of Will’s apparent semantic mistake.1  
 While we could explain how Will came to possess the concept PROMISE because of what 
he ought to do with that concept, we don’t seem able to explain Will’s possession of the concept 
MICK, which he expresses with his use of ‘mick’ and which he does not completely understand, by 
citing what he ought to do with it. Not only does it seem that Will is obligated not to use the slur 
term at all, what seems to distinguish the concept MICK from the concept IRISH PERSON is some 
sort of derogatory perspective or inference, which Will ought not to deploy.  
 In what follows, I make this problem for norm-based metasemantic theories as sharp as 
possible. I explain why a norm-based theory of content, exhibited in our PROMISE case, is 
promising, and why slur meanings and concepts pose a deep problem for this kind of metasemantic 
explanation. Once the problem is as stark as possible, I examine several strategies for responding to 
it. The norm-based metasemantics will have to do more than simply claiming that the facts of 
meaning or content are determined or constituted by what we ought to do in deploying them. I 
contend that standard ways of making the ought involved more specific or restricted are 
unsuccessful as responses to our problem. I argue that any norm-based metasemantics has to take 
account of the fact that it seems that it is not the case that we ought to use slurs in their canonical 
ways. Further, if we can in fact explain some restricted but not artificial sense in which we ought to 
conform to these kinds of usages, we will still need to treat the apparent conflict between these 
metasemantic norms and contrary moral and epistemic norms, since we still ought not to conform 
                                                           
1 As David Kaplan (Unpublished MS) might put the relevant semantic point—very fruitfully for our 
purposes—there is a “rule of use” associated with the term or concept, in addition to its referential or 
extensional role, that Will has not understood.  
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to slur usage, all things considered. That is, we will need to understand why it is that moral and 
epistemic norms do not operate as metasemantic explanans in their own right, simply precluding 
our possession of slur meanings and concepts. Thus, an adequate response will need to deploy 
resources on both the normative and metasemantic sides of the framework. While I show that there 
are principled ways of developing such resources, I also argue that we will have to identify novel 
ways of fleshing out a normative theory of content to do so.   
 
II. CONCEPTUAL METASEMANTICS 
 
A conceptual metasemantics, as I will use the phrase, attempts to explain what it is in virtue of 
which concepts—mental representations at the level of thought—have the particular content that 
they have.2 This is the conceptual analogue of a metasemantics for natural, public language, which 
attempts to explain what it is in virtue of which the expressions of a language have their meanings 
for an individual or community. As I will assume here, a conceptual metasemantics offers a 
constitutive explanation of the relations being explained—an account of what it is for them to 
obtain. 
 It is common for a conceptual metasemantics to cite a particular sort of use of the concept 
in the explanation of its content. I will call the use of any concept which is key to its individuation 
or the explanation of its possession a canonical pattern of use. Such patterns can be understood in 
many different ways. For example, a reference-based semantics3 can be explained by citing 
patterns of application or activation of a concept; an inferential or conceptual role semantics4 can 
                                                           
2 For the most part, I ignore the difference between this way of talking and others in which we would say that 
a conceptual metasemantics attempts to explain what it is in virtue of which concepts are particular concepts, 
where we regard concepts as having their semantic properties essentially. My way of putting things, that is, is 
not intended to assume an ontology on which there are intrinsically non-semantic vehicles for semantic 
content in thought, as on one way of reading talk of mental representations.  
3 Such a semantics is extensional and intensional, as of actual and possible entities. 
4 See Greenberg and Harman’s “Conceptual Role Semantics” (2008) for elaboration. 
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be explained by citing patterns of inference or transition. Since we are focused only on conceptual 
metasemantics, and not semantics, we will not assume that a canonical pattern of use genuinely 
individuates semantic or intentional contents (or, on some terminologies, concepts).5 Rather, the 
pattern is canonical in that it is the pattern of use which the metasemantic account cites in 
explaining why a thinker deploys, for example, the concept OR rather than the concept AND by 
deploying a particular mental representation. On certain views, the canonical pattern of use for the 
concept OR will be the pattern of inference a thinker needs to be disposed to carry out for it to have 
its distinctive content. Such a view is silent as to whether the semantics of the concept is best 
explained in, say, purely referential or functional terms.6  
 What makes one conceptual metasemantics different from another, then, is the relation it 
cites between a thinker and a concept’s canonical pattern of use as explanans. When this relation 
obtains, so says the conceptual metasemantics, the thinker possesses the concept in question. This 
explains why a particular concept in an individual’s repertoire has its particular content. 
 Schematically, a conceptual metasemantics takes the following form: 
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when relation R holds between A, S, and 
the CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for A. 
 
 The main question for any conceptual metasemantics is the nature of relation R, though 
they commonly differ also about the nature, in general, of canonical patterns of use.7 One divide 
                                                           
5 Of course, there is an attractive simplicity in translating semantic accounts fairly directly into canonical 
patterns of use in this sense. The point is just that these are separate tasks and, in principle, the metasemantic 
project can be carried out to some degree independently of the semantic investigation. 
6 This metasemantic approach is in a certain sense use-theoretic. Unlike, for example, Paul Horwich, for 
example in Horwich (2010), I make room for a use-theoretic metasemantics that does not imply a use-
theoretic semantic theory.  
7 Here, I keep the abstract framing to a minimum. Elsewhere I distinguish between Relation Metasemantics 
and Profile Metasemantics, where Relation Metasemantics, roughly, identifies a candidate relation R and 
Profile Metasemantics identifies a general form or content of CPUs. See fns. 8 and 9 for the metatheoretical 
upshot of doing so.  
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among conceptual metasemantics is whether they cite any normative ingredients in the 
specification of relation R. According to what I’ll call a norm-based conceptual metasemantics, R 
is a matter of what a thinker ought to do. A normative conceptual metasemantics may simply say 
that  
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when A ought to deploy S in accordance 
with the CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for A. 
 
 This contrasts with non-normative conceptual metasemantic accounts, which are mainly 
dispositional theories of one sort or another.8 A dispositional conceptual metasemantics may 
simply say that 
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when A is disposed to deploy S in 
accordance with the CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for 
A. 
 
 I will proceed as if these two broad types of theory, though not exclusively in these overly 
simple and underspecified forms, are exhaustive of the possible types of conceptual metasemantics.9 
This will aid in explaining the virtues of a norm-based metasemantics, and in clearly articulating the 
challenge posed by slur concepts. 
                                                           
8 Such theories can diverge substantially as to how they explain and individuate contents and canonical 
patterns of use. I aim to keep these dimensions of variation sharply independent. At the level of discussion of 
metasemantics above, Paul Horwich’s (ibid.) and Jerry Fodor’s conceptual metasemantics, for example, may 
come to the same thing, as they can be interpreted as offering similar accounts of the relation R. They go on to 
differ substantially as to the nature of content and as to the sorts of things that can qualify as a concept’s 
canonical pattern of use. Georges Rey (2009) discusses the possible equivalence of these two theories of 
content. My distinction between metasemantic projects can provide a way of endorsing Rey’s claims about 
Fodor’s and Horwich’s theories in a way that respects their differences.  
9 It is plausible that all non-normative conceptual metasemantics are just versions of the dispositional view, 
diverging mainly as explained in fn. 8.  
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 Next, I will briefly explain why a norm-based metasemantics is attractive in the first place. 
The central attraction is that it is well-positioned to explain the independence of an agent’s semantic 
and conceptual repertoire from facts of a purely individualistic kind.10 Maintaining this kind of 
independence is perhaps especially important in the case of slur terms and concepts.11 I will then 
explain how it is that slur concepts nevertheless pose such a special difficulty for a normative 
metasemantics that explains this independence.12 
 
III. THE NORMATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
Consider the following case: Carla has only ever witnessed uses of the term ‘vicariously’ 
that are neutral with respect to two distinct interpretations. She has often heard the term used in the 
following kind of sentence, uttered in a context in which the referent of “you” is doing something 
the speaker considers exciting and desirable: “Go ahead and do it—I can live vicariously through 
you.” When Carla hears this sentence, she believes that the speaker means something like I can live 
excitingly through you, not something like I can live as you by observing you. As such, Carla is 
prone to false assertions and beliefs using ‘vicariously’ and the concept she expresses with it. When 
she denies that she will live vicariously through Norman today because he won’t be doing anything 
exciting, she is wrong to think that this latter fact precludes her living vicariously through Norman. 
                                                           
10 In favor of simplifying the discussion, I do not dwell on the fact that slur terms can themselves provide an 
important source of motivation for anti-individualism, in light of the relatively clear speaker-independence of 
their semantic contribution.  
11 This is the “derogatory autonomy” exhibited by slur terms, discussed by Jeshion (2013a, 2013b), Hom 
(2008), Bolinger (2015), and others. 
12 I will not directly consider here the question of natural language metasemantics. The linguistic waters are 
muddier, partly due to the attractiveness of a mental-to-linguistic, or mentalistic, explanation. Whether such a 
view is developed in, say, Gricean or conventionalist ways, it is plausible that the most promising norm-
based metasemantics for language cites instrumental norms surrounding communicative acts. This sort of 
view will not be as directly faced with the slur problem, since social practice may be sufficient to ground 
these instrumental norms, and these norms are not as prima facie implausible. With concepts, the normative 
verdict and the difficulty in explaining the norm needed by the metasemantics are stark. 
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Carla’s own usage does not predict the semantic fact that her word ‘vicariously’ and the 
concept she expresses with it have the contents they do. Nevertheless, her word has its standard 
meaning in our language, and she is able to express the same concept we do when uttering 
sentences containing it. This is how she is able to be wrong when she asserts and believes according 
to her own pattern of use. This take on this sort of situation reflects anti-individualism about 
meaning and content—Carla’s specific, determinate meanings and mental contents are beyond what 
her own internal properties, like her dispositions of usage, can explain. As we might also put the 
point, Carla can possess concepts with determinate contents even if she does not fully understand 
them. 
Some theorists of content attempt to show that dispositions are enough to explain situations 
like Carla’s. Theorists of content defending dispositional theories of content in the face of such 
cases invoke a “deference” mechanism. However, deference does not seem necessary in order to 
attribute the right content to Carla’s thoughts, nor does it seem that deference to another’s usage 
actually implies that one’s own dispositions thereby match the unique profile of the concept in 
question. As Mark Greenberg has convincingly argued, deference cannot provide an adequate 
solution to these problems for a dispositional theory of content. Most fundamentally, this is because 
merely tending to defer to another thinker who fully understands a concept does not automatically 
unify one’s dispositions with theirs.13 
Carla’s dispositions won’t, it seems, suffice on their own to explain her possession of the 
relevant concept. Greenberg contends that these problems facing dispositional theories show that 
we need some other kind of theory of content. He argues that the relevant alternative to disposition-
                                                           
13 Greenberg (Unpublished MS) argues that deference is neither central to these kinds of cases nor adequate 
for a solution. Greenberg also argues convincingly that the dispositionalist use of deference abandons the 
prospect of a unified theory of content in “Troubles with Content I” and “Troubles with Content II” in 
Burgess and Sherman (2014). 
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based theories of content is a normative theory of content—on his view, a responsibility-based 
theory of content in particular. 
Why is this kind of theory more viable in the face of cases like Carla’s? Such a theory 
seems resistant to hard cases involving partial grasp of one’s own concepts. In the kinds of cases 
motivating the turn to deference, for example, it is plausible that the agent possessing a concept they 
incompletely understand is nevertheless responsible to a standard of conformity with a pattern of 
use corresponding to the dispositions of masters of the concept in question. This can be true 
whether or not the agent actually exhibits any deferential tendencies, beliefs, etc. toward the 
conceptual master. This way of explaining the sharing of concepts between masters and non-
masters is not an option for dispositional theories of content, which must rely on the dispositions of 
each thinker to explain the concepts they possess, or else abandon the aim of giving a unified 
account of concept possession. While conceptual masters don’t automatically transmit their 
dispositions of use to other thinkers, they can play a role in setting standards for others’ use.  
Perhaps Carla’s friends and linguistic community members set a standard in their usage of 
‘vicariously’ and the concept it expresses—a standard to which she is responsible even if she does 
not fully understand the concept or conform to the standard in her own usage. 
If this is right, then Carla’s case involves a thinker gaining possession of a concept by being 
subject to norms of use established by her community—in this case, community members who fully 
understand the concept in question. The social situation becomes relevant via the way in which 
normative factors playing a role in determining content. There is a parallel argument to be made on 
the basis of cases that show that the content of our concepts can vary with respect solely to the non-
social environment as well. 
As an example, consider pre-scientific thinkers on Earth who encounter volcanos. These 
thinkers do not distinguish volcanos from what we might call torqanos, which are like volcanos 
except for the cause of formation and activation. Whereas volcanos, put roughly, erupt in response 
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to pressure from below, torqanos erupt from negative pressure from above. For our pre-scientific 
thinkers in an environment like ours, volcanos are perceptually indistinguishable from torqanos. 
Cognitive and practical activity with respect to either would be identical. We may nevertheless 
succeed in possessing and deploying the concept VOLCANO, which has volcanos and not torqanos 
in its extension, rather than the concept TORQANO.  
In parallel with the problem in Carla’s case, we can note that disposition-based theories of 
content will not be capable of accounting for this phenomenon and that a norm-based 
metasemantics will not incur any such problem, because the kind of fact making a difference in 
these cases can also make a normative difference. In such a case, we may be subject to a normative 
standard set in part by the actual entities and properties in our immediate environment, though we 
may be ignorant of that standard-setting element, and so partially ignorant of the content-
determining standard.14 
The point this illustrates is that there are plausible stories to tell about the dependence of 
facts about how we ought to use our concepts on things of which we may be ignorant, including 
facts about which things with which natures we actually interact with. This is in sharp contrast with 
properties like our dispositions in cases of ignorance—if I don’t know whether it is volcanos or 
perceptually indistinguishable (for me) torqanos in my immediate environment, then I will be 
equally disposed to apply the concept to both. Similarly for any inferential or conceptual role 
                                                           
14 Lassiter (2007) offers an interesting attempt to square anti-individualism with mentalism about natural 
language. Though I agree with him that reliance on a linguistic community is not a viable strategy for 
maintaining anti-individualism, I don’t believe he has provided a coherent way of avoiding reliance on a 
community while accounting for robust anti-individualism. His discussion of deference interacts in 
interesting ways with mine, though, especially given that his notion of deference has to be broader than 
deference between individuals and broader than deference to anything actual, I do not have the space to 
discuss it here.  
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associated with my concept: if I do not know of any distinguishing features, then my inferential 
dispositions governing the concept will not distinguish between these two possible interpretations.15 
Deference arises in the discussion of concept-sharing cases because those cases explicitly 
involve conceptual masters who could potentially play their own secondary explanatory role for a 
theory of content. In our torqano case, there are no masters to exploit in this way. In Carla’s case, it 
is not obvious that Carla’s conceptual repertoire or linguistic meanings depend on her actually 
deferring to others in her usage. In any case in which it is compelling that an individual thinker’s 
ignorance of her own concept occurs on the background of conceptual masters in the social 
environment, we can consider what would happen were those masters (or their mastery) to 
disappear from the scene.16 If the individual’s conceptual repertoire is preserved, then the masters, 
and whatever relations might hold between them and our individual thinker, cannot play any 
essential role in determining the thinker’s conceptual repertoire. In that case, dispositional theories 
of content will have no obvious resource to explain what could be determining the content of the 
thinker’s concepts. 
Thus, while deference looms large in the discussion of anti-individualism, incomplete 
understanding, and the theory of content, this is not because it would provide an adequate solution. 
Dispositional theories of content look to deference because without it, they are straightforwardly 
unable to accommodate incomplete understanding of or fundamental error concerning one’s own 
concepts. If deference is not essential to such cases, then the condition cited by dispositional 
                                                           
15 Here it is worth reminding oneself that there is significant disagreement over whether, in cases like this 
one, there can be some element of the content that will turn out to distinguish between these two possible 
extensions. This is one reason why the debate over whether such terms are covertly indexical or descriptive, 
or whether (to speak telegraphically) there is some extra intension that plays a relevant semantic role in such 
cases, is important. See Burge (1982) for his initial treatment of this issue in relation to Putnam’s arguments 
in Putnam (1975). 
16 As Greenberg makes clear, though the point is not a new one, there are many actual concepts for which 
there are, at times, no masters in the actual world. Thus, we don’t need to use hypothetical thought 
experiments like the case of Carla in relation to various mastery situations to make the present point. 
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theories of content is simply absent. As it seems in both Carla’s case and in our torqano case, 
deference to masters is not a necessary feature of incomplete understanding. 
The more fundamental problem concerning such theories of content is that their explanans, 
which is effectively a form of conceptual mastery, is often not present at all for a given concept in 
cases in which it is nevertheless highly compelling that an individual possesses the concept. A 
norm-based metasemantics will have no problem unifying conceptual repertoires across individuals, 
and has no problem explaining how its explanans could obtain in cases of conceptual ignorance or 
mistake. Thus, the fundamental difficulty that anti-individualistic cases of all kinds pose for 
dispositional theories of content do not pose any corresponding difficulty for a norm-based 
metasemantics. 
These arguments do not rest on any particular understanding of the nature of dispositions. 
This contrasts with the kinds of problems for dispositionalism identified by Kripke.17 His objection 
concerning finitude in particular may well rest on an impoverished conception of what dispositions 
could be like.18 Our lessons from anti-individualism, however, will apply to any kind of 
dispositionalism on which dispositions are an individualistic property of an agent—whatever sort of 
property that may be, and whatever kinds of psychological mechanisms they may involve. This is 
one reason why I contend (elsewhere) that the appropriate path to a normative theory of content 
cites anti-individualism, rather than a priori objections to dispositionalism concerning normativity 
or finitude.19  
                                                           
17 Kripke (1982). 
18 See Blackburn (1984) and Hattiangadi (2007, Ch. 1) on this point. Warren (forthcoming) offers a recent 
and compelling response to Kripke’s finitude objection. 
19 Kripke’s “problem of error” and his normativity argument have a much more complicated relationship to 
my own concerns and claims than does the problem of finitude, which I do not endorse as an in principle 
obstacle for dispositionalist theories of content. I do not rely on any such argument to motivate a normative 
theory of content, and I am skeptical of the arguments to the effect that some view or other is in principle 
incompatible with error. The anti-individualist argument for a normative theory of content does not charge 
any such in principle or a priori incompatibility—rather, it cites the facts on the ground concerning specific 
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The case that will occupy the rest of this discussion is the fraught class of terms and 
concepts knows as slurs. It is now commonly, though not universally, accepted that the defining use 
of a slur term, and, I contend, the canonical deployment in thought of a slur concept, can include 
whatever qualities generate offence—denigration, subordination, dehumanization, etc.—whether or 
not the speaker or thinker intends to include these qualities or even recognizes that they are part of 
the public meaning of the term or part of the central use of the common concept. An interlocutor 
will rightly object to a person’s use of a slur term or slur concept, whether or not the person 
recognizes whatever feature provides the grounds for the objection. These features intuitively make 
a semantic or conceptual difference, compared with counterpart concepts that do plausibly reflect 
mere reference. 
 To translate this fact into my abstract schema, it is highly compelling that the concept 
expressed by a slur term has a canonical pattern of use which goes beyond mere reference to a 
particular class of individuals. Though the nature of that element is controversial, the point is that it 
is not necessary that an individual user of the concept recognizes this extra element, and her 
dispositions for its use will not be sufficient to distinguish it from a non-slurring counterpart 
concept which does have a canonical pattern of use which is only sensitive to the relevant 
extension.  
The problem I will be addressing is that a norm-based conceptual metasemantics seems 
particularly well-positioned to withstand the problems facing the dispositional account and to 
explain incomplete understanding, but when it comes to slur concepts it seems particularly wrong-
headed, possibly incapable—of necessity—of accommodating the very same kind of data.  
We are interested in the possibility of a knock-down counterexample to a norm-based 
conceptual metasemantics stemming from the highly plausible claims alluded to above, further 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
cases of concept possession and contents that particular kinds of theories have difficulties in trying to 
explain. 
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explained below, about slurs. In short, this is the problem that conformity to the relevant canonical 
patterns of use seems, if anything, impermissible, on a variety of grounds, both moral and epistemic, 
and even sometimes social. Not only that, the kinds of metasemantic norm at issue is itself highly 
implausible—we ought not, and we not ought, to follow the slur’s canonical pattern of use, insofar 
as it involves the slurring perspective. While it is straightforward how a norm-based metasemantics 
might explain possession of VOLCANO or VICARIOUSLY, we cannot so simply or plausibly claim 
that we ought to use slurs in the canonical ways.  
If there are no oughts of the needed sort, a norm-based conceptual metasemantics will be 
incapable of explaining the semantic difference between slurs and their neutral counterpart 
concepts. 
IV. THE SLUR PROBLEM 
 
  Abstractly put, the problem is this: a simple normative metasemantics for our concepts will 
fail if there is a concept which (i) we possess, (ii) its canonical pattern of use includes use or activity 
φ, and (iii) it is not the case that we ought, in the sense required by the metasemantics, to φ.20 Slur 
concepts are uniquely good candidates for a concept meeting these conditions.21  
 For my purposes, it is not necessary for it to be true that we have slur concepts which are 
semantically distinctive from neutral counterpart concepts. This is because my interest is in showing 
that there are strategies a normativist can draw upon to solve the problem slur concepts would 
exemplify. If there are no slur concepts, so much the better for the metasemantics. Slurs are, for us, 
a test case. If slur terms, even on these assumptions, do not vitiate a norm-based conceptual 
                                                           
20 In accordance with standard formulations, I stick with these bald ought-involving statements to formulate 
the normative explanans. In Section VI, I explore ways of being much more delicate about the normative 
element.  
21 I assume that there are distinctively slurring concepts—that there is a need to distinguish, say, the belief 
that James is a fag from the belief that James is a homosexual. If one believes that there are slur terms but no 
slur concepts, and also believes that the same kind of metasemantics should be given for concepts and natural 
language expressions, one could translate many of the claims made here into claims about slurs in public 
language. The interest here is in the kind of norms in play.  
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metasemantics, then plausibly no bad concepts in the relevant sense will be in principle out of reach 
of content-determining norms.  
 Let’s suppose, then, that we possess slur concepts whose semantic profile is distinctive 
from neutral counterpart concepts. In what way is the distinctiveness to be explained? To make the 
problem stark, I will assume that slur terms, roughly, pack in the idea that the members of their 
extensions have a negative normative status in virtue of such membership, and that such “packing 
in” can be understood in terms of the slur’s inferential profile.22  
 The account of natural language slur terms from which I draw most directly is Robin 
Jeshion’s.23 Though I’ll be leaving out many important aspects of her account, a few key features 
will be especially fruitful in our investigation. First, is that Jeshion is interested in a particular sub-
class of slurs she calls “dehumanizing slurs”. This is, perhaps, the difference between the slurs 
commonly receiving focus in current philosophical discussion and the more toothless classic 
examples, like ‘boche’. Dehumanizing slurs involve the attribution of a diminished normative status 
to—a dehumanization of—their targets. Whereas a normal use of ‘boche’ seems to imply that 
Germans are cruel (as the standard accounts go), a dehumanizing slur term like ‘fag’ might rather 
presuppose, say, that its targets are inferior, such as to make them fit for poor treatment or less 
consideration as members of the moral community.  
Whatever the particular implication, it is that, in virtue of one’s membership in the relevant 
descriptive category—in this case, being a gay or non-heterosexual man—one has a negative 
normative status. The implication has normative content—it is about how targets ought to be or 
deserve to be treated—and this normative content is alleged, in the sincere use of the slur, to obtain 
in virtue of membership in the target class. These are the two features of Jeshion’s account, adapted 
                                                           
22 Compare Hom’s (2008) take on this packing-in, in terms of a predicated status—which would imply, 
implausibly for these cases, that the term has no extension. 
23 Jeshion (2013b). Camp (2013) takes the view that slurs conventionally signal a speaker’s allegiance to a 
derogating perspective on the targeted group. 
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in rough outline, which I will draw upon. Again, while I agree at this level of abstraction with 
Jeshion’s account, the significance of these claims about slur semantics is, for us, the problem they 
may pose down the line for a norm-based metasemantics.24 
 This sort of semantic account, involving, in addition to an extension, a kind of derogation 
on the basis of membership in the extension can be construed in an inferentialist way. That is, we 
can take these details and translate them into a package of basic inference patterns associated with 
(to use a neutral term) the slur term.25 I’ll continue to use ‘fag’ as my chief example in this section, 
but to avoid further mentions of the slur, I’ll mostly say ‘F(slur)’.  
For example, the following would be the canonical inference, couched in language, 
associated with slurs terms: 
 
  INPUT: ‘x is a gay man’ 
 SLUR ATTRIBUTION: ‘x is an F(slur)’ 
   OUTPUT: ‘x has a negative normative status’ 
 
Full-blown Inferentialism about public language has considerable baggage.26 All that we need to 
assume, to generate the problem, is the possibility of explaining the fact that a concept has its 
content in terms of associated inferences. 
                                                           
24 The claim that we actually possess slur concepts with a distinctively bad semantic profile is comparatively 
compelling, and this is one reason why I focus on slur concepts. 
25 For simplicity of formulation, I leave off the in-virtue-of qualification. For some purposes it is important 
that the negative normative status is thought to obtain in virtue of the truth of an instance of INPUT, and not 
just an accidental consequence whose obtaining can be reliably inferred from the truth of the instance of 
INPUT. Whether that is alleged, the inference in this pattern is made purely on the basis of membership, so 
the epistemic and moral badness, if any, of the inference itself will remain. 
26 In addition to the many commitments associated with Inferentialism, the problem surrounding the alleged 
concept TONK looms. Warren (2015) argues that this problem is not insurmountable. The fact that slurs are 
terms and concepts we actually possess, rather than artificial constructions, makes a difference here. This is 
related to Warren’s suggestion that a Tonklish language cannot be homophonically translated into English. 
We should also deny that inferences like these are reference-determining, or, like Hom (2008), we will 
predict null-extension. 
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 Brandom’s Inferentialism27 provides a helpful model of a normative theory of content 
(including a norm-based metasemantics) that is both friendly to this sort of inferential construal of 
slurs’ canonical patterns of us and includes a commitment to the relevant sort of normative 
predictions. As Brandom contends that we are to explain meaning and content in terms of the 
inferential commitments—understood in a normative way—which we incur in relation to particular 
terms and concepts, his theory would predict, if this is the canonical inference pattern associated 
with slurs, that we ought to abide by it. As neither this commitment nor our interest are specific to 
Brandom, I’ll detail explicitly the theoretical choices that lead into our problem.28 
 A certain kind of functionalist about mental states will believe that slur beliefs can be 
understood along something like the above, inferential lines, structurally speaking. With talk of 
input states and output state, we can explain the nature of the slur-belief. For a conceptual role 
semantics of concepts, this can be taken more atomistically to mark off the particular slur concept in 
question. For example: 
 
             INPUT-STATE: x is a gay man. 
 SLUR ATTRIBUTION: x is an F(slur) 
          OUTPUT-STATE: x has a negative normative status.  
  
                                                           
27 See especially Brandom (1994, 2000, 2013). Brandom is an especially interesting point of comparison for 
my purposes, as the way in which his metaethics infects his metasemantics renders his theory incapable of 
accommodating robust anti-individualism. See fns. 38 and 39 below for more on this point. 
28 Allan Gibbard’s (2012) normative metatheory of meaning is nearly as congenial to these commitments, 
though the ‘metatheory’ bent of Gibbard’s explanation of content, entailed by his expressivism, makes this 
somewhat delicate. I argue that these aspects of Gibbard’s theory render it inadequate as a theory of content 
in other work. My own preferred norm-based metasemantics for concepts, which will cite norms in a wide 
enough way to explain anti-individualism, will face the normative challenge posed by slurs most starkly. The 
challenge behind this dialectical situation is that the better a norm-based metasemantics can handle anti-
individualism, the worse it appears to handle slur terms and concepts. 
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Again, my interest is not in the question of whether this kind of profile can fully account for the 
meaning of any term or the semantics of any concept.29 But accounts like this can be taken to 
provide at least one element of the slur concept’s canonical pattern of use. Doing this, we may 
derive the following metasemantic claim: 
 
 Take conceptual profile f* for a given concept S: 
 
  INPUT: x is a gay man. 
  S-state: x is an S. 
  OUTPUT: x has a negative normative status. 
 
When f* is the canonical pattern of use for concept S, then, and because of this, S has the 
content of F(slur).  
 
This way of phrasing the claim is a common one. But it obscures a parameter in metasemantic 
accounts we took pains to make transparent above. That parameter is the relation that can obtain 
between an individual, a concept, and a canonical pattern of use, whose instantiation the 
metasemantic account cites in its explanation of the semantic facts about an actual concept. In other 
words, the metasemantic claim here is silent as to what it takes for f* to represent the canonical 
pattern of use for an actual concept. Taken normatively, the claim will be that  
 
When agent A ought to use concept S in ways which are in conformity with the profile 
characterized by f*, then concept S has the content F(slur) for A. 
 
                                                           
29 There is a special problem for translating a certain kind of expressivist semantics for a linguistic item to a 
semantics for a concept. The present semantic account’s inspiration is Jeshion’s expressivist account of slur 
terms, so the worry is particularly relevant. To sidestep the worry myself, given my aims, I simply transfer 
some of the important features of the account into a functionalist kind of conceptual semantics—a move 
Gibbard himself appears to endorse (Gibbard 2012, p. 111 and fn. 17).  
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With this claim in the open, we can see clearly what the problem is for a norm-based metasemantics 
of anything like the rough shape described thus far. The problem is that the inferences described in 
f* are inferences that we ought not to carry out. If this is true, then it would seem that the 
metasemantic account cannot explain the content of slur concepts. If we ought not to use S in 
accordance with f*, then the normative metasemantics fails to even predict, let alone explain, that 
F(slur) is the content of S.30  
 We ought not to infer, on the basis of someone’s membership in a category like gay man, 
that he has a negative normative status—i.e., is inferior, deserves worse treatment, etc.—in virtue of 
such membership. Such inferences are bad both morally and epistemically. 
 Epistemically speaking, the inferences do not help one to get onto the truth. This is so even 
if, for example, the overt homophobe were correct that an inference from membership in a targeted 
category to bad-making features of members (and so, perhaps, a negative normative status) are in 
general truth-preserving. This is because the output is a belief that the negative normative status is 
grounded in category membership, and this is, in these kinds of cases, always false.31 Since the 
homophobe is not correct even about the in general truth-preservingness of the weaker inference, 
the slur inference package is doubly epistemically bad.  
                                                           
30 This formulation of the problem lends itself to an interpretation on which there is no problem unless the 
‘ought’s involved are all all-things-considered ‘ought’s, such that the determination that we ought not to 
carry out these inferences will imply that we not ought to carry them out the relevant sense. As will become 
clear, the problem does not disappear just because one weakens the strength of the ought involved. As it turns 
out, however, beginning with these strong ‘ought’-claims is not unfair to the leading proponents of normative 
theories of content. For example, Gibbard (2012, pp. 13-15) makes clear that the ‘ought’ relevant to his 
theory of content is Ewing’s primitive, all-things-considered ‘ought’ (though he goes on to offer an 
expressivist account of this ‘ought’—see fns. 28, 29, 37, and 49 in this paper on this point). This is designed 
to elucidate the sense in which we ought not to believe contradictory claims, for example, as Gibbard 
generalizes the normative import of meaning and content from facts like this. I ultimately do contend that we 
need to move away from these kinds of simple normative models to do justice to the phenomena and to 
resolve the slur issue.  
31 Some may wonder why I even mention or guard against this idea. My aim is to assume that the stronger 
inferences are packed into slur concepts, in order to preclude discussion of whether or not the weaker 
inference could be in general truth-preserving. The question is mentioned in the body in order to make clear 
that it is an upstream issue for our purposes, given that I assume the stronger inference is involved. 
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 Given the beliefs involved and existing patterns of oppression, carrying out these inferences 
is also morally bad. Doing so reflects in one’s own thinking oppressive structures and patterns. It 
also subjectively (that is, from the agent’s point of view) licenses acting on the belief of a negative 
normative status. Such licensing will also make more likely the communication of one’s beliefs, 
further promoting a tendency among individuals to contribute to patterns of oppression.32 Making 
the inference also goes beyond the badness of finding oneself having the product belief, or having a 
conditional belief corresponding to the inference, since the inference requires the cooperation of 
one’s will in the bad way of thinking. Thus, the tempting maneuver of simply ruling out moral 
norms from the realm of intellectual activity would not aid in solving the problem posed by slur 
concepts. 
 If we ought not to follow the pattern of inferences above, then it would seem that the simple 
norm-based conceptual metasemantics predicts that we do not possess the concept determined by f*. 
This is our problem. In the interest of clarity, I’ll point out here that the grounds just explained for 
claiming that we ought not to follow f* do not automatically imply that it is not the case that in 
some other sense or on other grounds, we ought to do so. That is, ought not in itself does not 
automatically imply not ought, particularly if we might identify different grounds or senses of 
‘ought’. However, the slur case is instructive in part because these two judgments have their own, 
independent force. We don’t just think that there is some sense in which we ought not to use the slur 
or think is slurring ways—we think that this sense, if not itself an all-things-considered ought, 
corresponds with the fact that it’s not the case that we positively ought to abide by slurs’ canonical 
patterns of use.33 
                                                           
32 I mean “oppressive” and “oppression” broadly. Some may want to reserve the term for cases in which the 
patterns and products have a certain character. I believe that, as it turns out, the targets of dehumanizing slurs 
are also the targets of oppression. But I’m also of the mind that the more fruitful phenomenon to identify is an 
oppressive force, which may obtain even when, on a more strict definition, oppression would not. 
33 Thus, retreating to reasons—a move Gibbard rules out for his own normative theory of content (2012, p. 
15)—or a pro tanto sense of ‘ought’ is not a panacea here—on the intuitive level, we both ought not and not 
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 What we can’t do at this stage, as I explain below, is simply to rely on a prior semantic 
sense of ‘ought,’ as the norm-based metasemantics must explain what this sense is if it is to bear 
any theoretical weight. Further, as I also explain, if we are to succeed in explaining anti-
individualist cases, we cannot cleave our metasemantics to the kinds of specific norms cited in 
standard normative theories of content, like Brandom’s and Gibbard’s. That is, we cannot rely 
entirely on, for example, social norms to recover the metasemantic oughts, since social norms on 
their own will not be enough to explain the data a norm-based metasemantics needs to explain. In 
the next section, I’ll primarily be identifying potential grounds for the required, though perverse, 
norms. This will not settle the metatheoretical or normative issues implicated in attempting to 
respond to the slur problem by identifying some grounds for the relevant norms. I’ll be arguing in 
Section VI that we ought to develop the norm-based metasemantics in certain particular directions 
in order to transform the identification of grounds for perverse norms into a full solution. 
  
V. PERVERSE NORMS  
AND THE SLURRING PERSPECTIVE 
 
I’ve articulated what I consider to be the most forceful locus of the slur problem for a norm-
based metasemantics. This locus involves the dehumanizing perspective on slur targets expressed in 
the sincere use34 of a slur term. But set aside my specifically epistemic or intellectual wrongs, and 
the special necessity involved in the case of dehumanizing slurs for the moment. Can’t we get a grip 
on the slur problem just from the fact that it is bad to use a slur term in obvious respects? After all, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ought, even in some weak sense, to abide by these inferences. See Gibbard (1990, pp. 160-164) for the 
interdefinability of the relevant normative notions and Broome (2015, 2018) for compelling arguments that 
oughts, rather than reasons, lie at the foundation of normative matters. Gibbard, Kripke, and others using 
what I call the “simple model” of the normative import of content facts rely on the a priori character of the 
normative import, on which the most natural construal of the relevant ‘ought’-claims is a strong one—such 
that, for example, natural facts could never wholly explain them. 
34 On Jeshion’s framework, a sincere weapon use of a slur term. Since we are discussing slur concepts, I set 
this aside, along with the expressivist element of Jeshion’s analysis, though both raise questions about the 
way in which conceptual semantics and natural language semantics can or should be understood in parallel. 
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norm-based metasemantics should, if it is to be extensionally adequate, predict that we ought to 
apply a concept like F-SLUR, or the term ‘f-slur’, to certain people, but we ought not to do so.  
One reason why this is not an optimal formulation of our problem is that it invites an 
obvious but, given our aims, unhelpful response.35 In the case of public language reference and 
norms of application, it’s natural to claim that the sense in which we ought to apply the term is a 
special semantic sense of ought, whose application depends on our meanings, or on the prior 
interest of semantic correctness, and perhaps on a prior norm of truth.36 This sense can be stipulated 
not to conflict with a moral ought. 
 Our version of the problem, involving the inferential interpretation of the dehumanizing 
perspective on the targets of slurs, preserves the objective epistemic badness of the slur pattern of 
thought even if we could in principle rely on norms of truth to salvage a semantic norm favoring 
some aspect of slur usage. The norm-based metasemantics thus cannot respond to the slur problem 
simply by invoking norms of truth. The deeper philosophical point regarding such norms is that the 
norm-based metasemantics is in the project of citing norms to explain content, and the norms just 
mentioned—specific norms of truth concerning applying a particular term—depend, like the moral 
norms concerning its use, on prior semantic or intentional facts of precisely the kind we are trying 
to explain.37 We will proceed to investigate the normative and metasemantic situation with respect 
to the dehumanizing perspective associated with slurs for these dialectical and substantive reasons. 
                                                           
35 My interest is in making the problem as forceful as possible so that we can test whether or not a norm-
based metasemantics has resources with which to address it. This is one reason why the fact that there are 
some relatively obvious things to say on the bare-reference construal guides the discussion away from that 
model. 
36 See Richard (2008), especially Chapters 1 and 2, for grounds to resist the idea that, even in the case of 
language, there would be truth-oriented semantic norms in the case of slurs. This is partly why we are 
focusing on thought rather than language.  
37 On the framework articulated by Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Asa Wikforss (2009), “Content Engendered 
Normativism” derives norms from content, but “Content-Determining Normativism” explains contents the 
basis of norms. The latter sort of normativism explains the norms relevant to content and how they explain 
content, and thus cannot rely on a prior semantic ought or, as Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss argue, on any norms 
of truth governing belief formation. A norm-based metasemantics is a form of CD Normativism, not CE 
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The problem I’ve identified is a problem for a norm-based conceptual metasemantics. We 
can distinguish between deflationary and non-deflationary responses to this problem. A deflationary 
response claims that slurs do not in fact have the kind of canonical pattern of use I’ve attributed to 
them. A non-deflationary response accepts that slurs have the relevant kind of canonical pattern of 
use and attempts to explain how, on the favored metasemantics, we can nevertheless explain how it 
is that we can realize the specified relation to slurs’ canonical patterns of use, and thus possess slur 
concepts. Non-deflationary responses can, in principle, identify sources for the needed norms or 
attempt to finesse the normative prediction of the metasemantics, holding fixed the general sort of 
use profile at issue. While, in pursuing a non-deflationary response, I identify sources for norms 
with the needed content, I also explain why, due to the normative situation, this will not provide a 
full solution without further developing our metasemantics.  
 I’ve explained that we are interested in the promise of a certain kind of metasemantics, and 
that this motivates us to assume that slurs have the problematic kinds of canonical patterns of use. 
Therefore, we will not focus on deflationary responses to the problem, which might attempt to draw 
on semantic accounts of a wholly non-inferential character.38 What we will have to develop are 
ways that we could explain the obtaining of the normativist’s specified relation between normal 
agents and slur concepts’ canonical patterns of use, despite strong surface appearances that they do 
not obtain—i.e., that we ought not (and not ought) to conform to the relevant patterns in thought. In 
this section, I explore explaining the realization of the normativist’s specified relation by identifying 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Normativism, and so cannot rely on a ‘semantic’ ought. I respond to their arguments against CD 
Normativism in Tracy (forthcoming), arguing, in part, that their arguments rely on construing CD 
Normativism as rule-oriented in a strong sense rather than as norm-oriented, relating to Kripke’s arguments 
for Normativism. 
38 One other prominent kind of deflationary strategy is conditionalizing the relevant norm. Thus, rather than 
prescribe the pattern of inference described above, the norm may prescribe only that if one is to use the slur 
term or concept, then one ought to conform to the canonical pattern. One reason for ignoring this approach 
here, in addition to its dialectical irrelevance, is that even the conditional normative claim is false.  
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grounds of the relevant norms; in the next section, I explore ways of reconceiving the normative 
relation itself. 
 I argue that two strategies for explaining norms applying to conceptual activity, taken 
together, constitute an avenue for explaining how norms with the relevant kind of perverse content 
can arise and proliferate in a community. The first strategy, entrenchment, concerns, in the first 
instance, a solitary individual. The second, social intrusion, explains how the individuals not 
reached by entrenchment can be brought into normative uniformity with entrenched individuals.39 
I’ll make a few clarifications about the kind of explanation we might look for, then I’ll provide an 
in-principle ground-up explanation based on these strategies for slur norms, which plausibly extend 
to the actual world.  
 These strategies rely in part on the relevance of dispositions to the norms governing concept 
use. Given that a norm-based conceptual metasemantics is naturally contrasted with dispositional 
alternatives, one might wonder whether this means that, for the normativist, the facts about which 
concepts we possess and express simply float free of individual psychological properties like our 
dispositions. But while it is important for the normativist I envision that, in principle, norms on use 
can be determined by factors beyond individual factors, dispositions do not have to be irrelevant to 
these explanations. Entrenchment exploits this fact in order to explain how otherwise repugnant 
norms of use may arise, thus, potentially, explaining the norms required to determine slur contents.  
 In the practical domain, examples abound of how non-normative individual features like 
dispositions can help to determine the content of the norms that bind an agent. Suppose that when 
Tomlin wakes up to an alarm, she is disposed, in the normal situation, to turn off the alarm instead 
of hitting snooze. Very often, the result is that she oversleeps. Given this situation, Tomlin ought to 
                                                           
39 Both strategies have ethical implications. If concepts can originate and spread in the ways I suggest, then 
there are moral reasons to think and talk in certain ways, even to possess or deploy or not to possess or 
deploy certain concepts, in light of the metasemantic effect. This carves out additional space for what 
Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 2013b) call conceptual ethics.  
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do something else—for example, depending on some other facts about her, maybe she ought to go 
to bed earlier, or maybe she ought to set a second alarm, or a third, to function as the snooze alarms 
would. To be sure, these facts depend on some larger scheme of normative facts about the costs of 
oversleeping and so forth. But, in that scheme, Tomlin’s dispositions help to ground the fact that 
she ought to do some range of rather particular things. 
 Let’s now consider some related elements of the quus case utilized by Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein in his argument about the normativity of content—in which there is a question about 
the meaning, for an individual, of her ‘plus’ word or sign.40 Supposing a finite history of usages of 
‘plus’ below a certain threshold of numerals—say, ‘57’—two interpretations are available: the 
meaning on which the result for two numbers is their sum, and another on which the result for two 
numbers is the result of the distinct quaddition operation. One option is to claim that how to 
interpret the agent’s ‘plus’ sign is a matter, in part, of what is done with it by members of her 
community.41 One might also claim, as some interpreters do, that this is because one ought to 
conform to the community practice, and that facts like this are central to the phenomenon of public 
meaning. This explanation requires that there be some reasonable question between addition and 
quaddition, given the agent’s actual use of ‘plus’. For a range of actual and hypothetical cases, the 
agent does use ‘plus’ in conformity with both meanings. Community use comes in to distinguish 
between these for our individual. Very plausibly, though, community use can only provide this 
determination on the background of similar-enough use patterns by our individual. Were she to 
have used ‘plus’ so far synonymously with ‘divided by’ or with ‘tiger’, for example, community use 
would not be enough to make it the case that she genuinely expresses addition with ‘plus’. 
                                                           
40 Kripke (1982). Much of the subsequent literature on Kripke and Wittgenstein and the normativity and 
publicity of language draws out points related to those I make here. 
41 Allan Gibbard (2012), for example, considers this option on the way to giving his normative ‘metatheory’ 
of meaning—not to be confused with a genuine metasemantic explanation like the normative one discussed 
here. Gibbard seem to assume, incorrectly, that this maneuver would be adequate to account for anti-
individualism.  
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Plausibly, this could be because she will not be brought into the range of the community norm for 
use, given her divergence in basic disposition.  
 While this scenario nicely illustrates the point to come about the bearing of a kind of social 
norm on an individual’s concept use, the main observation I want to make initially is that 
dispositional facts can make a normative difference for the use of concepts. It is less in need of 
defense in this context is that community facts can set up norms of use for an individual, drawing in 
part on facts about the kind of corrective mechanisms that can be applied to an individual’s use. The 
availability of that explanation suggests that an individual’s own dispositions can make a normative 
difference. In the story told in the previous paragraph, the agent can be subjected to community 
standards and interpreted in common with other community members because her use is 
recognizably neutral between two interpretations. She is capable of recognizing a corrective process 
as relevant. If she does not use the term in such a way that she could recognize addition as a 
genuine way of going on, then community norms may not be norms for her. In that case, the 
question of how she ought to use her term or concept may largely be a question of which initial 
beliefs and dispositions she has involving it. In these situations, one determiner of rational norms 
may well be one’s starting cognitive position.  
 This normative dynamic between an individual’s internal states and community facts allows 
us not only to predict the anti-individualist verdict in Carla’s case, but also to accommodate the 
intuition that, were Carla different enough, she would not share the commonly-used concept 
VICARIOUSLY. Suppose Carla’s initial confidence that ‘vicariously’ is synonymous with 
‘excitingly’ is so high that nothing would persuade her to change her mind. We may then judge that 
she would indeed deploy the concept EXCITINGLY when she has a belief sincerely expressed by the 
term ‘vicariously’.  
 If the individual’s starting dispositions of thought make room for the community norms to 
apply to her use of a concept, those starting dispositions can also, ultimately, make a normative 
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difference. If a certain range of starting dispositions is needed for the application of a community 
norm, then a dispositions out of that range may result in a different normative verdict. On a norm-
based metasemantics, these normative differences can sometimes make a conceptual difference. If 
all of this is correct, a normative metasemantics can draw on community facts and on internal, 
dispositional and cognitive facts to identify the norms applying to an individual’s use of a concept. 
 This framework for the explanation of norms allows for the kind of dual story I contend we 
can tell about individual users of slur concepts. While we all would like to claim that in general we 
all ought not to infer on the basis of one’s membership in the slurred class that one has a negative 
normative status, an individual’s actual dispositions of thought may be so entrenched that these 
negative norms don’t settle the norms governing her own intellectual activity. Consider, for 
example, someone whose thinking has been so shaped by homophobic ideology that she is as 
disposed to infer along the slur pattern with the concept expressed by her use of ‘f-slur’ as she is to 
infer from someone’s being a bachelor that they are not romantically attached. No amount of 
rational persuasion would bring her to be able to appreciate that the two statuses are plainly 
unconnected with one another. As such, the analogue of the correction referred to above may not be 
viable. Given this, it may not be true that, with her concept, abstracting from its content from the 
agent’s point of view, she ought to think with it as we would recommend. She may be left with the 
rational inertia of her own entrenched starting point. 
 Showing how precisely these normative mechanisms are to be brought to bear in particular 
cases is a much more involved project. My goal is only to show that, in principle, entrenchment 
could explain the failure of publicly-recognized or agent-independent norms to reach an 
individual’s usage of a concept, and that one’s intellectual starting point may enjoy a privileged 
normative position in such isolation. This may, in the end, involve an epistemic analogue of 
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something paralleling the ought-implies-can principle, or at least an ought-to-think implies a can-
recognize-as-a-possible-way-forward principle.42  
 Entrenchment on its own has its limitations. Given the patterns of use under discussion, it is 
clear that many of us, despite our possessing slur concepts, are not anywhere close to entrenched 
with respect to any commitment to carrying these patterns out. This is where social norms may play 
a direct role, in bringing those of us who are not entrenched into some degree of normative 
conformity with those who are entrenched in a particular pattern of use. 
 One might begin, in trying to account for contrary norms for a non-entrenched concept user, 
with slur terms in public language. Whether or not an individual endorses the problematic 
inferences, there is a kind of social norm connected with the common use of slur terms in 
communicative acts expressing derogatory thoughts, via which problematic inferences can be 
publicly carried out or made manifest.43 When a racist community instantiates racial slurs, for 
example, we get some socially-derived reason to use terms as they do, and to believe and infer as 
they do. The deeply entrenched homophobes in a linguistic community, I contend, may not be 
reached by certain broader epistemic norms or even developing social norms—in fact, she may be 
able to ground her own norms, and may be able to ground social norms for other language users.  
We are concerned with norms of at least a very similar kind to the epistemic norms 
governing response to testimony. Such norms will be sensitive not only to which belief is to be 
found in another’s mind, but also in her degree of confidence in that belief. So an entrenched user 
                                                           
42 Making this more visible requires addressing too many inessential questions. Those who believe in the wide 
application of this principle, even to intellectual activity, will readily admit that an individual’s being unable 
to recognize one way of going on with a concept as a way of going on with the same concept, and thus being 
in a sense unable to do so, can make at least a negative normative difference. The question will then be which 
norms do apply to an individual’s use, and the answer may be grounded only in the agent’s cognitive state, in 
her prior beliefs and dispositions of thought. 
43 Perhaps obviously enough, I have in mind here norms directing conformity with prevalent usage of a term 
thanks to a mutual interest in communication and a common expectation of performance. Such norms tend to 
favor conformity with precedent, even if we may discover reasons for instituting certain kinds of linguistic 
change. 
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can set the stage for inquiry in common with others in discourse much as she set her own stage by 
starting out entrenched. In common linguistic situations, the obligation to get things right is relaxed 
in comparison with a norm for social cooperation, deference, etc. These situations are familiar. 
Suppose that a relative makes overtly racist inferences, using a slur term and expressing a slur 
concept. One or two others may communicate assent, and the rest may be silent. Plausibly enough, 
if anyone, say a child, had no strong prior belief about the matter, social and epistemic norms will 
bend toward the racist pattern of thought. For the rest of the participants, there may now be a local 
social norm in place to favor the relevant pattern of thought. 
This is, unfortunately, a very ordinary kind of situation. It shows the power of one 
individual’s state of mind to generate even intellectual norms, of a kind, for others. This is perhaps 
less easy to notice than the mere transmission of racist patterns of thought from one person to 
another. But it ought to be noted in general that this can happen in a way which enjoys the sanction 
of at least some kind of normative principle.44 While the point is far from our main one, this shows 
the depth of responsibility we have for intervening in social situations like the one described 
above.45 Tolerance in these cases is not harmless, and it can create a perverse normative situation 
for those involved, especially those without strong beliefs either way to begin with.46  
If entrenchment works—if one determiner of rational norms can be one’s starting cognitive 
position—then we can explain how an individual could generate the norms for herself which are 
required (not necessarily sufficient) to possess and deploy slur concepts; if social norms apply to 
                                                           
44 These mechanisms can thus potentially help to explain the peculiar way in which the use of slurs seems to 
make auditors complicit in the embedded perspective—at a minimum, we can explain this in cases in which 
the slur’s usage is socially established enough to signal allegiance to the associated inferences. See Camp 
(2013, p. 333) for reasons why this kind of complicity is significant in the investigation of slur semantics.  
45 Lynne Tirrell (1999) makes vivid the importance of bringing derogatory terms like slurs into critical 
discourse, in part based on the view that these terms can be understood, as above, in terms of their inferential 
commitments. In other work in progress, I explain the moral significance of the metasemantic factors 
explained here. 
46 This may be so even if such behavior did not have distinctively metasemantic import, as discussed in fn. 
37.  
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intellectual activity as explained, however directly or indirectly, then we can explain how 
individuals who generate slur norms for themselves can also generate norms from others in ordinary 
speech situations. In this way, I contend, a normative conceptual metasemantics has the resources, 
in principle, to explain how it is that, on both an individual and community level, concepts whose 
nature is given by patterns of use that we ought not, in certain respects, to instantiate, can be 
explained.47 
The ultimate viability of both of these strategies depends on the resolution of open 
questions. Most obviously, whether social norms could apply to intellectual activity. One might 
believe that the norms governing different domains of activity do not interact—e.g., that moral 
norms govern overt acts, epistemic norms govern intellectual activity, and so on. But notice that this 
idea also would seem to preclude the possibility that any moral norms could apply to intellectual 
activity. If they don’t, then the main force of the objection from slur concepts would be deflated. 
The plausibility of the claim that, in general, we ought not to instantiate the slur patterns of thought 
would rest with the claim that that is true epistemically. But this, on its own, is less worrying. It is 
plausible that the main kind of epistemic norm directs belief in light of evidence. The slur pattern is 
bad because the product is false. Unless we believe that what one really ought to believe at any 
stage in conducting inquiry is just whatever would result immediately in a true belief, then 
epistemic norms derive part of their force from what is rational, depending on one’s internal states. 
If we allow a bridge between these two faces of epistemic goodness to raise the problem for a 
                                                           
47 In a way, I may seem at this point to be in a similar normative position to Langton’s (1993) reliance on the 
legitimating force of subordinating speech acts. Such norms are obviously not good candidates for generating 
verdicts about how we ought to live simpliciter. On the other hand, recognizing the (somehow) normative 
force of some mechanisms of oppression seems to be important to understanding their peculiar evils. Mary 
Kate McGowan’s (2019) extremely interesting and compelling recent work on contends that some of the 
harms of such speech involve a perverse normative situation like the one I identify here. 
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normative metasemantics, then the above strategies for explaining perverse norms are also fully 
available.48  
Aside from these dialectical points, I should note again the limited scope of my aims in this 
section. I’ve argued that there are ways of explaining how perverse norms for the relevant kind of 
intellectual activity can be generated. This shows that the initial verdict that not only is there a sense 
in which we obviously ought not to engage in the canonical slur usage patterns, but that there is also 
no normative force behind such patterns, may be too strong. At any rate, we’ve identified grounds 
for the relevant kind of norms for the relevant patterns of use, though, as I explain in the next 
section, this does not imply that we simply ought to conform to slur usage. But we’ve explained 
that, contrary to our initial intuitive judgments, there may not be a total lack of (perverse) norms 
directing conformity with the slur patterns.  
This leaves open several important questions that must be resolved before we can claim that 
this provides a complete solution to the slur problem for any actual, detailed norm-based 
metasemantics. Most prominently, we need to get clearer on what sense or what kind of ought is 
cited by the metasemantics to determine the import of the moral and epistemic norms against slur-
pattern conformity. We have not shown that we ought, all things considered,  to conform to slur 
usage, and we should not find ourselves doing so. Thus, we need to get clearer on exactly what the 
norm-based semantics is committed to normatively and exactly how it can make use of these 
perverse norms. 
 
 
 
                                                           
48 Their success may rest on the question of whether the oughts cited by the metasemantic account are always 
swamped out by moral oughts. For these grounds count as a solution, it will have to be the case that moral 
norms do not both apply to concept use and contribute only decisive or conclusive reasons. Barring that 
possibility, my mechanisms for showing how individual and certain social factors can contribute to the 
explanation of otherwise problematic norms may be capable in principle of swamping out moral concerns, in 
which case we will need to draw on some of the ways of maintaining that we ought not to conform to slur use 
that I explain below. In this section, my aim is just to identify potential grounds of the problematic norms. 
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VI. METASEMANTIC NORMS: SOURCES AND SENSES 
 
Here is where we are at this point in developing strategies for solving the slur problem for a 
norm-based metasemantics: The first stage, in the previous section, concerns the problematic 
perspective on targeted classes embedded in slur concepts—the problem of how there could be a 
normative profile that would fit the relevant semantic profile in such a way as to provide an 
adequate explanans for a slur concept. I offered two strategies for explaining the origin and 
prevalence of the relevant norms: entrenchment and social intrusion. In this section, I offer and 
examine some ways forward for treating the apparent resulting conflict between these norms and 
the norms militating against conformity with slurs’ canonical patterns of use, such that we ought not 
to conform to such patterns even if we can identify relevant, perverse norms. 
We must consider in more depth what the basic norm-predicting commitment of the norm-
based metasemantics can be, in what ways we might plausibly develop this normative element, and 
whether any of these ways of understanding the normative matters relevant to the metasemantics 
will help to show how it can make use of perverse norms to explain slur concepts. I explain four 
paths into this tangle: (1) identifying and cleaving the metasemantic commitment to a semantic 
ought, (2) what I call metasemantic fundamentalism, (3) modifying the behavioral content of the 
metasemantic norms, and (4) what I will call semantic splitting. 
Let us begin with the general normative notion at issue, to examine the possibility that a 
specific or narrow sense of ‘ought’ can be of use to us in cordoning off the metasemantic norms 
from moral and other troublesome norms. In light of the motivation from anti-individualism, it’s 
natural to look for a very broad range of normatively significant factors, in order to permit the 
metasemantics to make use of a broad range of facts to help determine content. If we use such a 
broad potential range of normative factors in constructing the metasemantics, we are left with the 
problem that, all things considered, we ought not to engage in the slur’s canonical patterns of use. 
Thus, citing some source of the needed positive norms, as in the previous section, may not 
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ultimately be enough, without a further treatment of these metasemantic normative matters. I’ll 
begin treating these matters by discussing in more depth the intuitively attractive option of relying 
on some specifically semantic sense of ought to side-step the slur problem. 
In developing a norm-based metasemantics, particularly in the project of explaining 
incomplete understanding or anti-individualism, we cannot rely on a pre-established semantic sense 
of ought to simply deny that there is a problem for us to solve surrounding normatively significant 
concepts (and terms) like slurs. If there is a distinctive kind of norm that is relevant to 
metasemantics, we will have to explain what this sense is and what sort of factors are relevant to 
grounding it. Below, I explain why the most plausible ways of constructing this kind of response are 
unsuccessful. Though I will explore ways of finessing the normative ingredients in the 
metasemantics, I advocate doing so in a way that does not establish any specifically semantic sense 
of ought or rely primarily on any particular grounds of norms, but rather on screening off certain 
post-semantic norms from metasemantic explanations, identifying a different behavioral content for 
the metasemantic normative explanans.  
First, I want to discuss the potential significance of the fact that the most objective moral 
and epistemic norms giving rise to our problem seem to be post-semantic. In much the same way 
that pragmatic facts are traditionally conceived to obtain in virtue of the semantic properties of a 
given utterance, objective moral and epistemic facts concerning, for example, what we ought to 
believe in light of what’s true or how we ought to think in light of oppressive patterns and histories, 
obtain in virtue of prior semantic or intentional facts. Accordingly, a first gambit for turning the 
explanation of perverse norms into a complete solution to the slur problem might be to simply deny 
the metasemantic relevance of post-semantic norms. Just as pragmatic implicatures won’t change 
our understanding of an expression’s literal meaning, moral facts about how we ought to use our 
terms and concepts given their meanings won’t be eligible to play a metasemantic role. Let us call 
this move, maneuver number 2 in this section’s toolkit, metasemantic fundamentalism—the claim 
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that, of the factors marked off by our metasemantic theory as explanatory significant, the content-
determining role is played by the most fundamental of these factors.  
For example, we might claim that only the most fundamental normative facts governing the 
use of a concept are metasemantically relevant. We can revise the basic metasemantic claim of the 
norm-based metasemantics, invoking a general principle I’ll label metasemantic fundamentalism, so 
that it says something like the following:  
 
For all agents A, concepts S, contents C, when the fundamental package of norms 
applying to A’s use of S has it that A ought to deploy S in accordance with the 
CPU of C, then, and because of this, C is the content of S for A. 
 
In our case, entrenchment and social intrusion may help to establish the most basic norms 
applying to our use of a slur. These may, according to the norm-based metasemantics, ground the 
fact that the slur has its distinctive content or semantic profile for us. With metasemantic 
fundamentalism, any norms that apply in light of these facts do not play a content-determining role. 
This would provide an adequate treatment of the bare-reference construal of the problem 
posed by slurs, as the kind of moral facts militating against conformity with the relevant pattern 
only obtain thanks to the semantic facts at issue. As indicated above, however, this alone will not 
provide an adequate solution to our problem. First, the slur problem, as articulated in Section IV, 
draws on the badness of a profile of use for slur concepts that does not presuppose a prior 
interpretation of slur terms or concepts. This is one reason why I took care to formulate the slur 
CPU and the metasemantic claims as carefully as I did. The use profile relevant to determining the 
content of slur concepts (and, perhaps, slur terms) is something with which we ought not to 
conform, partly for moral and epistemic reasons, even prescinding from assuming the nature or 
content of the slur concept itself.  
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Further, even if we could in principle screen off moral norms from our metasemantic 
explanations, it remains that the central element of the explanations offered by the metasemantics is 
a fact about how one ought to use the concept. Moral and epistemic norms, while temptingly judged 
irrelevant in principle, will not be irrelevant to determining how we ought to use a concept. The 
normative question we must ask under a norm-based metasemantic framework is wide—how ought 
I to use the concept in question? Moral and epistemic norms will be relevant to answering this 
question. Further, nothing we’ve said so far has discouraged an understanding of the relevant ought 
as an all-things-considered ought or as a final, action-guiding deliberative conclusion. Thus, it 
seems possible that our desired metasemantic explanation will suffer from the defect that, as soon as 
we have the grounds to explain the slur concept, moral norms may simply override whatever norms 
ground the content, knocking out the slur concept before it’s even possessed.  
 Still, whatever precisely the metasemantic norms are, they may be more specific and may 
be of a different kind from the sorts of norms that will obtain only thanks to the semantic facts—for 
example, general moral facts about contributing to oppression or wounding others. These sorts of 
facts certainly may weigh against the metasemantic norms, just as they may weigh against truth-
oriented semantic norms for language use. But this does not imply that there is no reality to either of 
the contrary norms. However, any norms governing the use of the slur may be relevant to the 
determination of content, on the norm-based metasemantic theory as initially formulated. 
 There are other ways, aside from metasemantic fundamentalism, that we might attempt to 
construct our metasemantics, such that it draws only on the kinds of norms explained in the 
previous section, but is not required to take account of the norms militating against canonical slur 
usage. We can also further explain the normative details of a norm-based metasemantics in such a 
way that the clash of norms will not pose a metasemantic problem. We can do this in at least two 
ways.  
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First, we could specify the sense or kind of ought in a way that attempts to adhere to our 
intuitive sense of what the norms relevant to metasemantics might be. Specifically, we can take 
advantage of the fact that linguistic practice and the methodology of linguistics draw heavily on 
normatively relevant features of individual dispositions and social factors, corresponding to the 
explanations of perverse norms offered in the previous section, tending to ignore other norms like 
objective epistemic norms or moral norms. Thus, there may be a principled way of filling in the 
normative ingredients in the norm-based metasemantics in a way that will not ultimately be 
threatened by the presence even of overriding contrary norms from other domains.  
There are problems with this strategy, related to the problems arising for reliance on a 
semantic ought. First, if the goal is to rehabilitate some semantic sense of ‘ought’, this sense will 
have to be a genuinely normative sense. Any identified sense will face the question of whether it is 
genuinely normative, or, like some notions of teleofunction deployed in the theory of content, is it 
not. If it is genuinely normative, we will still have to face the ultimate normative conflict with 
moral and epistemic norms. Second, cleaving to these kinds of grounds for norms will make the 
metasemantics overly narrow, as with the kinds of norms featured in the metasemantic theories of 
Gibbard and Brandom. A norm-based metasemantics relying on some narrow, established set of 
grounds for normative facts involved will be unable to explain all the various determinants of 
content, and similarly for any sense of ought based on such grounds. Going any wider than norms 
having something to do with epistemic norms may in fact be an unwelcome scenario for Gibbard 
and Brandom, whose norms may be best understood as elaborating the epistemic norms most 
relevant to concepts and meanings. Gibbard claims that only the subjective oughts of rationality can 
be relevant, and Brandom claims that only the socially sanctioned inferential commitments 
undertaken by concept deployment are relevant. A plausible way of developing a maneuver on this 
first track will require some new and broad sense of ought. 
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Second, we could specify the kind of behavior relevant to the metasemantic account in such 
a way that the individual and social sources of norms which I’ve explained have the 
metasemantically relevant kind of behavior as their content, but moral and objective epistemic 
norms have a different kind of behavior as their content, such that a normative conflict would not 
arise automatically—in any case, not from the direct appearance of two normative claims involving 
the same sense of ought which give contradictory prescriptions about the exact same content.  
Here is an example of that kind of specification: The metasemantically relevant behavior is 
not simply a type of behavior (such that the normative explanans would be something like A ought 
to apply S to Fs, where the prescription is detachable, meaning that for each F, the agent ought to 
apply S to it), but is rather itself a general tendency, perhaps a tendency to direct one’s behavior in a 
certain direction in response to certain situations. Thus, the normative explanans in the 
metasemantic account might be something like A ought to tend her usage toward applying S to Fs. 
In our case, this might take the form: A ought to tend her usage of S to conform to the inference-
pattern associated with f*. Note that, due to multiple levels of removal from particular occasions of 
use, this claim neither implies that A ever actually ought to use S nor that she ought to have the 
product belief of f*, in any particular case. 
On this specification, we avoid an automatic or logical conflict between the 
metasemantically relevant norm and a moral norm directing us against each particular instance of S-
applying behavior. This comports with the sense that what’s relevant to basic semantic and 
conceptual grasp is something at the level of general competence rather than something at the level 
of one’s exact behavioral patterns. A norm-based metasemantics need not neglect this insight, 
developed in the leading disposition-based theories, for example in Fodor’s asymmetric dependency 
theory.49 Further, not only does this shift avoid the automatic clash of metasemantic and moral or 
                                                           
49 The best example in this direction—though to the other extreme—may be Fodor’s Asymmetric 
Dependency Theory. See Fodor (1987, 1990). This is related to metasemantic foundationalism, discussed 
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broad epistemic norms applying to particular acts, beliefs, and inferences, but it no longer requires 
the metasemantics to offer anything like an explanation of a sense in which we ought to actually 
instantiate the problematic patterns of use.   
There is much to be said in favor of the second kind of specification. The most significant 
reason is that cleaving too narrowly to a social-individual norm as on the first specification will 
cause trouble when it comes to non-social anti-individualist cases.50 In order to explain how our 
mental contents depend on a wide variety of factors, we must leave the grounds of our 
metasemantic norms relatively open. However, the second tack provides us with a framework 
whose normative tenability remains to be seen, in the face of the badness of any particular instance 
of conformity with canonical slur usage. For this strategy to work, it must be possible that we have 
norms governing our general tendencies in one direction, but we have even all-things-considered 
reason not to perform any conforming instances. 
 The fourth and final kind of response I will explain, though only in rough outline, is 
semantic splitting. The splitting here refers to distributing the canonical profiles of use across more 
than one thinker. If this is possible, then norms governing interpretation can play a metasemantic 
role in establishing a concern like a slur concept. 
The semantic account of slur terms with which we began is Robin Jeshion’s expressivist 
account of slur terms. In setting up the special normative and metasemantic challenges of this 
chapter, we converted this partially expressivistic account of slur terms into an inferential profile for 
slur concepts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
above. The key difference may be that this insight seems to be a highly theory-general insight within Profile 
Metasemantics, metasemantic foundationalism is a theory-general move in Relation Metasemantics.  
50 The problem for extant versions of this strategy results from commitments perhaps most explicit in 
Brandom’s “Global Anti-Representationalism?” in Price (2013): “…I want to understand the normative 
statuses that confer conceptual content as themselves instituted by socially articulated practical normative 
attitudes” (p. 89, fn. 4). I argue that Allan Gibbard’s (Gibbard 2012) reliance on the subjective oughts of 
rationality renders his own view similarly inadequate in other work. 
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Though it was clear that this was done in the interest of making sharp some lurking 
foundational problems for any norm-based metasemantics, the possibility of translating between 
these two sorts of account is related to some unanswered questions about expressivism as a 
semantic theory and about the relations between meaning, representation, expression, and mental 
representation. As noted above, Allan Gibbard, one of the originators of contemporary expressivism 
and perhaps its most prominent defender, has claimed that it might well be that, as Jason Stanley 
has claimed, expressivism about language has as its proper mental analogue functionalism about the 
mind. 
However, this should be somewhat puzzling. The original form of expressivism took up the 
view that sincere utterances of (at least) atomic sentences containing normative vocabulary express 
non-belief mental states of the speaker. As with Jeshion’s account, what’s semantically distinctive 
is that these mental states are not predicated—in fact, nothing is being predicated by virtue of the 
element treated expressivistically in such accounts—but rather, their presence could be inferred by 
an auditor from a sincere use. Any competent speaker using these terms in such utterances should 
only do so if they are in the mental state expressed. In the case of ethics, these mental states are 
something like desires, inclinations, or plans. In Jeshion’s case, the mental states are themselves 
normative judgments, but judgments related to sincere utterances on the model of expression, not in 
such a way as to donate to the sentence any truth-conditional content. Thus, the sincere user of the 
slur does not say that her targets are inferior, deserve worse treatment, etc., though these attitudes 
are expressed by her usage. As Jeshion points out, the notion of expression here should be 
understood in such a way as to preserve this expression even if the actual user does not in fact have 
the relevant attitudes.  
The intended virtue of expressivism was, originally and most fundamentally, that providing 
an expressivist understanding of ethical or normative language, in terms of conative rather than 
cognitive mental states, would result in the disappearance of any apparent corresponding normative 
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belief. The hope was that expressivism could show how normative talk is related in special ways to 
action, in a way that drew predication of any normative property by the user out of the picture.  
On this classical understanding of expressivism, it would seem that the most natural 
inferential profile to attach to the relevant expression-types has to do with the inferences an auditor 
could reliably draw from sincere usage. Why is such an inference semantic? On a pure expressivist 
account, this is all there is to the meaning of the expression. Further, it is plausible that a speaker 
who uses the relevant expression in the sincere utterance of an atomic sentence but does not in fact 
have the mental state expressed by the sentence exhibits a semantic error, or a failure to understand 
the meaning of the utterance. This is related to the classical expressivist’s ability to explain the tie 
between normative talk and action—it gives substance to the feeling that someone who says “I 
ought to keep my promises” but has no intention to do so simply fails to understand fully what she 
is saying. If one understands the meaning of “I ought to keep my promises,” one would not say this 
without having the corresponding intention.  
The strategy of semantic splitting is to take seriously the distinctiveness of the expressivist 
picture, in our case helpfully applied to slurs themselves by Jeshion, and to construct an inference-
based profile of use with a wider eye than the language user herself. Rather than pack in the 
derogatory perspective by placing it in the position of an inferred consequence for the thinker or 
language user, we can place the derogatory perspective in the canonical profile of use at the location 
of a canonical consumer of the slur usage. This preserves our ability to explain the offensiveness of 
slurs, and the badness of slurs, even in cases where the user believes it to be a neutral term of 
categorization—and to do so on the basis of the slur’s semantics. This is also not a deflationary 
strategy, because it does not wipe the dehumanizing aspect of slurs from their semantic profile. 
Semantic splitting is not metasemantic splitting—this is a revision to the canonical profile 
of use associated with slurs, and, as far as we have said, not a universal revision to the type of 
canonical pattern of use permitted as a general metasemantic constraint. It merely entails the 
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availability of a different, less individualistic kind of semantically relevant profile of use for slurs. 
The norms governing slur usage will thus, correspondingly, be norms governing not just the usage 
of slurs by a speaker or thinker, but the reception of such usage. Because of this, all the norm-based 
metasemantics needs is a way to ground the norms governing interpretation such that one ought to 
understand slur users as expressing a certain set of attitudes about their targets.   
This proposal has been articulated in terms of language, due to the original point 
concerning classical expressivism. There is no obvious reason why the same sort of semantic 
picture cannot be given at the level of thought. However, we should also consider the possibility, 
which I will not defend at any length here, that complex, socially determined meanings like the 
meanings of normative terms or the meanings of slurs simply help to individuate corresponding 
concepts. Given the lack of clarity surrounding the notion of a concept—which I have avoided as 
much as possible throughout this discussion—and the need to hold that concepts are more than a 
mere property or an extension or intension, we might think that, sometimes, a mere difference in 
meaning, given by the kind of semantic profile and metasemantic norms I have outlined, can 
sometimes help to differentiate two concepts which might otherwise be semantically identical—
e.g., our two concepts for Irish people. Either way, directly in terms of a concept’s canonical 
interpretation or indirectly in terms of concept individuation, semantic splitting can provide a 
satisfying treatment of the metasemantic and normative situation with respect to slurs. 
While there are many details to be filled in about any particular norm-based metasemantics, 
there are principled ways of constructing such an account that will directly address the problem 
arising from the badness of slur usage and the clash of norms concerning problematic canonical 
patterns of use, as well as metasemantic maneuvers that provide an alternative, non-deflationary 
treatment of slur metasemantics. Thus, while my initial target was the slur problem construed as 
evidence of a lack of certain perverse content-determining norms, showing how we can solve that 
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problem provides the basis for multiple theoretical and normative resources to show how we can 
treat the clash of norms in theoretically satisfying way.51 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 We have shown that a normative metasemantics has resources upon which to draw in 
solving the slur problem. We have found that those resources include the ability to explain content-
determining norms partly in terms of dispositional facts and facts about one’s cognitive position and 
subjective commitments. We also saw that, given reasonable assumptions about the norms 
concerning intellectual activity, social facts can also play a role in the explanation of content. This 
is as we should have expected from the significance of anti-individualist cases in motivating a 
normative metasemantics.  
 I thus explained how we can account for the perverse norms that are necessary to 
accounting for the challenging data with respect to slurs. I noted that it remains that, in the most 
neutral or general sense, we ought not to abide by slurs’ canonical patterns of use. While I then 
showed that there are principled ways to accommodate the lingering clash of norms, and to precisify 
the ought-claims relevant to metasemantic explanations in terms of the non-normative content of 
the normative claims, so that we can fully solve the slur problem, doing so adequately will require 
developing the details of a norm-based metasemantics at a lucid level of detail, both normatively 
and meta-theoretically, that has not yet been achieved by advocates of norm-based theories of 
content. As I believe doing this is the most promising way of explaining anti-individualism about 
                                                           
51 I develop my own more detailed metasemantic account in other work. Part of why the slur problem is so 
philosophically rewarding is that existing normative theories of content do not face down these 
metatheoretical and normative issues in any detailed or satisfying way. One can view Brandom’s 
Inferentialism as the most detailed example, though his account is, as I read it, an exemplar of the first 
strategy just explained for specifying the normative explanans, in a way that renders the view incapable of 
accommodating anti-individualism. A point I cannot dwell on is that stepping away from subjectivist 
metasemantic theories like Brandom’s and Gibbard’s allows for a cleaner break between semantics and 
metasemantics, such that a normative, use-theoretic metasemantics is not automatically in tension with truth-
conditional semantic theory. A relevant point I have been able to argue only implicitly here is that admitting 
deontic dilemmas is not an adequate way of avoiding or treating the slur problem. 
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the mental and incomplete understanding of our concepts, I am optimistic that a satisfying norm-
based metasemantic explanation can be achieved.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
52 I hope that the reader will bear in mind the relatively limited aims of the present chapter: to show that there 
is a deep worry concerning slurs and metasemantics—in this version, a norm-based metasemantics in 
particular—and to show that, in principle, there are ways of developing fruitful responses to this problem that 
also show that a norm-based metasemantics is in general a tractable framework for particular, partially a 
posteriori or empirical explanations of concepts on the ground. I have also provided some reasons to believe 
that we ought to develop this kind of framework in ways that diverge from its standard forms in the 
discussion of the theory of content and the normativity of content. 
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Chapter 5: Beyond Convention 
 
 
Theories of meaning offer answers to the following question: what is it for an expression in 
a public language to have a meaning for a community? Conventionalism about meaning provides 
the following answer to this question: Linguistic expressions have meaning for a community in 
virtue of facts about the conventional use of expressions in the community. The aim of this Chapter 
is to argue that conventionalism about meaning is false. I argue that an expression can be 
meaningful for a community without being subject to conventional use in that community. While 
criticisms of conventionalism tend to focus on its social and cognitive requirements on meaning, I 
focus on the broader and more fundamental requirement that there be a regularity in the use of 
meaningful expressions. I argue that the kind of regularity needed for convention is not necessary 
for meaning. If that is correct, facts about convention do not constitutively explain the facts about 
the meaning of public expressions. 
 
 
  158 
I. OUTLINE 
This paper has 6 sections, including this introduction and a concluding section. Section 2 is 
an introduction to the relevance of conventions to the inquiry into the nature of public meaning. In 
Section 3, I explain the major insight of the current leading accounts of convention: that 
conventions can be self-perpetuating regularities in behavior, in addition to a public agreement. I 
draw from the leading accounts of linguistic conventionality—Lewis’, Schiffer’s, and Millikan’s—
what I’ll call the Core Conventionalist Condition on the meaningfulness of linguistic expressions: 
that there be a self-perpetuating regularity in their use. I will direct my objections toward any 
conventionalism that adopts the self-perpetuating regularity requirement on conventions. In Section 
4, I consider how best to interpret the common self-perpetuating regularity requirement. I argue 
that, even on the most plausible and charitable interpretation, self-perpetuating regularities in the 
use of an expression are not necessary for it to have a meaning. I will introduce a Burge-inspired 
case of meaningful language use in a dogmatic linguistic community. I will argue that, on the 
various interpretations of the self-perpetuating regularities of the Core Conventionalist Condition, 
conventionalism predicts that this use of language is not conventional in the relevant community, 
and therefore not meaningful. If this use is indeed meaningful for the community but not 
conventional for that community, then conventionalism cannot be true. Section 5 provides a 
sustained defense of the claims I make about the central case.  
 
II. CONVENTIONALISM AND ANTI-CONVENTIONALISM 
 
In this section, I introduce conventionalism and anti-conventionalism about meaning and 
briefly explain conventionalism’s appeal. In section 3, I will discuss the worry that conventions are 
to be understood on the model of explicit agreements. I will explain how conventionalism has 
moved beyond that model, thanks to David Lewis’ emphasis on self-perpetuating regularities in 
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behavior, and begin to delineate the core commitment of conventionalism, drawn from Lewis’, 
Schiffer’s, and Millikan’s accounts of linguistic conventionality.  
Conventionalists about linguistic meaning claim that a linguistic expression’s having a 
meaning for a community just is its being subject to certain conventions of use among members of 
that community. 
 
Conventionalism: An expression has a meaning for a community in virtue of its 
being subject to conventional use (of a kind to be specified) in that community. 
 
Stephen Schiffer, for example, has said “that x means something in a group G is a matter of 
convention.”1 This is perhaps the clearest endorsement of conventionalism in the literature. Lewis 
endorsed the view, if you accept that his “actual-language question”—the question of which 
assignment of meanings to expressions is the one that is used by a community—just is the question 
of which expressions are actually meaningful for a community, as Schiffer and Loar do.2 Lewis 
says “a language L is used by a population P if and only if there prevails in P a convention of 
truthfulness and trust in L, sustained by an interest in communication.”3 If we understand this as a 
theory of meaning, so long as we understand languages to include all expressions, we can interpret 
Lewis as a conventionalist.4 Similarly, Loar, in giving his conventional theory of meaning, assumes 
that there is “an overall convention… which makes L the language of [population] P.”5 
                                                      
1 Schiffer (1972), p. 87.  
2 Schiffer (ibid.), esp. Ch. 5, and Loar (1976). 
3 Lewis (1975), p. 8. As indicated, Lewis’ languages in this sense include an assignment of meanings to 
expressions. So the question is which assignment corresponds to the actual meanings of linguistic 
expressions. 
4 Harris (Unpublished MS) takes Lewisian Conventionalism, without hesitation, to be Lewis’ view. 
5 Loar (1976), p. 155 
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Schiffer later argued against conventionalism.6 But it remains a popular, perhaps dominant 
view among philosophers of language7, and perhaps among linguists who have an opinion on the 
subject.8 It has been taken to represent the best bet for the Gricean Program (explained shortly), and 
it has been taken to be what Grice aimed for in his own work.9 Many of the philosophers who have 
attempted to provide or improve accounts of the conventionality of language seem to do so in order 
to support something like conventionalism.10 Endorsement of it is implicit in talk in philosophy and 
semantics of the “conventional meanings” of linguistic expressions, as a way, in effect, of talking 
about their semantic contents. Perhaps the greatest evidence that conventionalism remains 
widespread is the degree to which it is argued against. 
I will lump those who believe that conventionalism is false under the broad category of 
anti-conventionalist. Anti-conventionalists maintain that the correct account of what it is for an 
expression to have a meaning for a community need not mention that its use is part of any 
convention.  
 
Anti-conventionalism: It is not the case that an expression has a meaning for a 
community in virtue of its being subject to conventional use in that community. 
 
Any theorist who adopts a non-conventionalist constitutive account of meaning facts is, 
ipso facto, an anti-conventionalist.11 Arguments against conventionalism tend to be levied against a 
                                                      
6 Schiffer (1989) 
7 Rescorla (2011) 
8 For less prominent, but similar, conventionalist theories, see Bennett (1976), Blackburn (1984), and Davis 
(2003). These theories all accept the self-perpetuating regularity requirement. 
9 Laurence (1996), p. 269. For argument against this interpretation, see Neale (1994). 
10 As discussed, this includes Lewis (1969), (1975), Schiffer (1972), and Loar (1976). For more, see Millikan 
(2005), Burge (1975), Bach and Harnish (1979), Clark and Marshall (1981). 
11 For example, Horwich defends a version of a dispositional use-theory of meaning, and is thereby opposed 
to conventionalism. This opposition becomes explicit on pp. 60-61 of Horwich (2005). It is interesting to 
note that the crucial difference between Horwich’s view and a weakened form of conventionalism may 
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conventionalism that makes use of some particular account of conventions or the conventions of 
language. Many such arguments focus on Lewisian conventionalism, as it has been so influential. 
Daniel Harris, for example, has recently argued that the mutual knowledge conditions of Lewisian 
conventionalism render it inadequate as a theory of meaning.12 In this paper, I’ll be making a more 
general argument that applies to a range of conventionalist accounts. To the extent that conventions 
must have the self-perpetuating regularity feature (to be explained) that I draw from the leading 
accounts of convention, I will be making a general argument in favor of anti-conventionalism.  
Conventionalism is a theory of meaning in the following sense: it aims to specify the facts 
in virtue of which expressions have the meanings- the semantic contents- that they have.13 I do not 
mean that it offers an account of the nature of meanings, or contents. In this paper, I, along with the 
conventionalists, presume the antecedent existence of contents or meanings, and seek out the facts 
in virtue of which they are the meanings of certain expressions for particular communities. 
Theories of meaning in this sense come in two main kinds: those that invoke facts about 
agents’ intentional (content-bearing) mental states and those that do not. Theories of the latter kind 
attempt to account for the semantic properties of language in wholly non-semantic terms. 
Horwich’s use-theory of meaning, for example, is a single constitutive account of linguistic and 
mental intentionality—the account of meaningful language thus does not cite intentional mental 
states.14 Leading conventionalist accounts, on the other hand, make reference to the intentional 
mental states behind communicative acts. As such, they are a way of carrying out the Gricean 
                                                                                                                                                                 
simply be that Horwich does not focus on the self-perpetuating character of regularities of use, whereas this 
forms the core of convention.  
12  Harris (2014). Harris (Unpublished MS) does offer a more general argument, to the effect that 
conventionalist accounts conflate causal and constitutive explanation of semantic facts. 
13 This way of putting this kind of theory of meaning is close to that used in Speaks (2014). Theorists of 
meaning use ‘is constitutive of’, ‘in virtue of’, ‘makes it the case that’, and other such phrases to describe the 
project. The goal of metaphysical reduction is explicit in Schiffer’s work. See also Neale (2004, 2005) for 
these descriptions.  
14 See Horwich (1998, 2005, 2009). For other leading non-mentalist theories of linguistic meaning, see 
Brandom (1994), Davidson (1973, 1974), and Devitt (1981). 
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Program. This is the project of accounting for the meaningfulness of language partly in terms of the 
intentional mental behind states behind acts of communication.15   
In this paper, I will not contest the aspirations of the Gricean Program. I grant for the sake 
of discussion that the meaningfulness of language is secondary to the intentionality of mental 
states; the correct account of the former phenomenon may make essential reference to the latter. I 
only dispute the claim that facts about conventions are what constitute the facts about meaning. 
Accordingly, I will also not object to conventionalism on the grounds that it provides an account of 
public language meaning that cannot be extended to mental representations. 16 Now, I’d like to 
make a couple of clarifications about what kind of facts a theory of meaning like conventionalism 
attempts to explain.  
First, these are facts about the semantic properties of types of expressions, not directly 
about expression tokens. In the coming paragraphs, I use an example involving my dog 
Clementine. It is in virtue of what “dog” means generally for members of our linguistic community 
that this instance, or token, of the word “dog” has the meaning that it has. This is the same 
semantic fact that would partly explain the meaning of your uses of the word “dog”. The property 
of the type of word “dog” by which it means DOG generally for members of our linguistic 
community is an example of the kind of semantic property targeted by a theory of meaning.17 
Second, as was explicit in the previous paragraph, these semantic facts are community-
relative. Most philosophers working on the nature of meaning take it that expression-types only 
                                                      
15 This project took initial shape in Grice (1957), and was carried out by Grice and others, perhaps most 
notably Schiffer (1972), who later argued that the project is doomed to failure (1989). See especially Grice 
(1968) and (1982), collected in Grice (1990).  
16 Some would not accept an account of meaning that is not unified across mental and public representations. 
For example, Horwich (2005, p. 31) claims that “insofar as a public expression and its mental correlate have 
exactly the same meaning, then their having that meaning must be constituted in exactly the same way.”  
17 I follow the convention in this literature of using words in small-caps to refer to meanings, whatever they 
might be- the simplest idea to grab onto for “dog” is that its meaning is a concept. 
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have meanings relative to some community of agents that might use or respond to them. 18 For 
example, the fact that “dog” means DOG is really the fact that “dog” means DOG for the 
community of English-speakers. Our subject, then, is what it is for an expression-type to mean 
something for a given community. This is a ternary relation between a type of expression, a 
community of agents, and a semantic content.  
I will also assume for this paper that there is a genuine third relatum- also called a 
meaning- here (a proposition or propositional constituent: perhaps a concept, a Kaplanian 
character, a set of possible worlds, a function, etc.). These meanings are the strict semantic contents 
of the expressions of a language. I will sometimes talk of an expression’s meaning, without 
explicitly mentioning any community of agents. An expression has a meaning in this sense if there 
is some community for which it has a meaning. The nature of this relation between an expression-
type, a content, and a community—what it is for it to obtain—is the subject of this paper.  
Another kind of meaning often thought to be closely related to this sort of expression 
meaning is speaker’s meaning. In the Gricean Program, speaker meaning provides the intentional 
base for a theory of linguistic meaning. Focusing briefly on this notion can serve to illuminate our 
target and also to set the stage for a more detailed discussion of conventionalism.  
Speakers typically mean something by the words they use. For example, I might mean that 
Clementine is lazy by saying “Clementine is lazy”. This is an intentional action, by an agent, with 
an expression token, directed toward a particular content. Grice called this kind of meaning 
“occasion meaning”, which he thought to be determined by, roughly, what the speaker intends to 
communicate by tokening an expression. Speaker meaning involves a particular speaker, a 
particular act, a particular expression token, and a particular content.  
Our subject is the independent matter of what the expression-types used actually mean for 
our speaker’s community, independent (in principle) of the particular intentions of any individual 
                                                      
18 These communities can, in principle, consist solely of a single agent.  
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speaker.19 Suppose I mean that Clementine is lazy by saying “Joe is lethargic.” The speaker’s 
meaning here is that Clementine is lazy. Notwithstanding this fact, it remains that the meaning 
(semantic content) of the expression-type (in this context) in our language is that Clementine is 
lethargic.  
Leading accounts of the conventionality of language (particularly Lewis’ and Schiffer’s)—
on which conventionalism is based—follow Grice in focusing on the relation between expression 
meaning and the use of expressions in acts of speaker meaning. They think, roughly, that the 
conventions that ground linguistic meaning are conventions of engaging in acts of speaker 
meaning. We have a convention of using sentences containing the word “lethargic” in acts of 
speaker-meaning involving LETHARGIC, but no convention of using sentences containing 
“lethargic” in acts of speaker-meaning involving LAZY. A theory of meaning based on acts of 
speaker meaning needs to explain what takes us from mere speaker meaning to stable, community-
wide semantic contents for expression-types. Conventionalists think that conventions for the use of 
expressions in acts of speaker meaning (understood broadly here) provide this explanation. 
Whether or not one believes that conventionalism is correct, there clearly are conventions 
of language. I can mean LAZY by “lethargic”, but in doing so, under normal circumstances, I 
manifest a mistake about what is conventionally done with “lethargic” in my community. 
Generally, speakers in our community use “lethargic” to mean something other than what I meant 
by it. Intuitively, the fact that what is generally done with “lethargic” does not involve the content 
LAZY indicates that we do not have a convention linking “lethargic” to LAZY. This illustrates the 
intuitive connection between convention and regularities in behavior that will become our focus. It 
is what is actually done in a certain type of situation in a given community that may or may not be 
counted as conventional; conventions are conventional regularities, or patterns, in behavior. In our 
                                                      
19 To be clear, this is distinct from the issue of the role of intentions in individuating the semantic properties 
of individual uses or tokens. For a primary battle-ground of that issue, see Donnellan (1968) and MacKay 
(1968). 
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example, LAZY can’t be the conventional meaning of “lethargic” for English speakers, because 
there is no pattern or regularity of using “lethargic” to mean that. 
I’d like to make clear, in the remainder of this section, why conventionalism has seemed so 
plausible. After making conventionalism as plausible as possible and identifying the common 
element in familiar accounts of convention, this common core will form my target. 
Conventions of language, at least as understood by conventionalists, very clearly fit the 
form required for a Gricean theory of meaning, presupposing intentional mental states and their 
contents. For clarity’s sake, I’ll briefly explain the structure of the conventionalist account of 
meaning more schematically to show this.  
Our analysandum is a relation between an expression-type, a semantic content, and a 
community. This is a fact of the form: expression-type σ means c for members of population P. 
Conventions of language entail a certain connection between an expression-type, a regularity in 
use, and a community. These are facts of the form: expression-type σ is used according to 
conventional regularity R in population P. Conventionalists identify uses that are directed toward a 
content. So we can pull exactly the right kind of semantic relation out of conventional use of an 
expression, conventional meaning: expression-type σ is used according to a conventional regularity 
in P linking σ to content c. According to the conventionalist, this conventional meaning just is 
expression meaning.  
The question for a theory of meaning is, what beyond mere acts of speaker meaning is 
required for expression-types to have a meaning for a community? The conventionalist realizes that 
there are patterns or regularities in these communicative acts of speaker meaning. She contends that 
the regularities that underwrite meaning are conventional regularities. Why do conventionalists 
need to cite conventional regularities? Are patterns in use not enough to capture meaning? Next, 
I’ll explain how conventional regularities can explain the reasons we have to use words in certain 
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ways, and then, by looking closer at Lewis’ account in particular, the important role for a certain 
kind of regularity—a self-perpetuating regularity—in conventions.  
One goal for theories of meaning is to explain the sense in which the use of meaningful 
language seems subject to evaluation as mistaken or correct. Using “lethargic” to mean LAZY 
under normal circumstances, for example, involves some kind of mistake. What kind of mistake is 
this? One fact about which this use exhibits a mistake is this: “Lethargic” is linked by convention 
in our community with the content LETHARGIC, not LAZY. Thus conventional practice offers a 
standard by which to judge particular uses as mistaken or correct. As Crispin Wright says, “[n]one 
of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment of language save by reference 
to the authority of securable communal assent on the matter.”20 On a conventionalist view, we can 
claim that correct use is use in conformity with convention, and mistaken use is use that does not 
conform to convention.  
Why, though, might we worry about identifying this kind of standard? Mere conformity 
with convention does not seem, in itself, to provide anything of much importance. The deeper issue 
is to discern what it is about meaning that gives us reason to use “lethargic” to mean 
LETHARGIC, and reason against using “lethargic” to mean LAZY. 21  Briefly, I’ll say how 
conventionalism accounts for such reasons by explaining reliably effective communication. There 
is a convention of using “lethargic” in a particular way in our linguistic community. As such, we 
can rely in general on our audience’s also participating in this convention. When I say “Clementine 
is lethargic,” in conformity with convention, my audience is likely to recognize what I mean. If I 
use it to mean something else, I risk being misunderstood. My use of “lethargic” to mean LAZY 
will not, in usual circumstances, be understood as desired, since this use is not the common 
                                                      
20 Wright (1981): p. 220 
21 This motivation interacts in interesting ways with the debate between Davidson and Dummett over the 
social aspect of language. See especially Davidson (1984), (1986), and Dummett (1978), (1994). Connecting 
these dots is a task for another occasion. Heck (2006) has an illuminating recent discussion of these issues. 
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practice. Acting in conformity with conventional regularities in communicative acts increases the 
likelihood of communicating successfully. It is in this way that, more generally, conventions of 
language give us a practical reason to use words in conformity with standard use and a reason 
against using them out of conformity.22  
In sum, if we are looking to ground the meaningfulness of language in facts about the 
intentional states of agents, conventional language use appears to fit the bill. Conventional 
regularities in the communicative acts of speakers appear to provide a satisfying route from speaker 
meaning to expression meaning, and delineate a sensible boundary between these two phenomena. 
23 Next, I’ll show how self-perpetuating regularities form the common core of the leading accounts 
of the conventionality of language. I will export that condition to conventionalism in general, 
which is typically treated as a theoretical extension of one of these accounts.  
 
III. THE SELF-PERPETUATING REGULARITIES OF CONVENTION 
In this section, I’ll present the most plausible characterization of conventionalism available 
today. In doing so, I will ensure that my argument is directed against a conventionalist theory that 
is both maximally defensible and general to leading accounts. I will argue that even this most 
plausible conventionalism contains a self-perpetuating regularity requirement on linguistic 
convention that is not a requirement on meaning. 
Conventionalism makes a claim about the relation between meaning and convention. The 
viability of this claim depends, of course, on the nature of convention. How should we understand 
conventionality? As illustrated in the above discussion of the conventions in the use of “lethargic”, 
the intuitive idea of a convention involves patterns or regularities in behavior. A first stab at this 
                                                      
22 It is commonly thought that there are more than just instrumental reasons to use words in accordance with 
their meaning. One who holds this view would not be moved by this attempt to account for the normativity of 
meaning, and would not be inclined to accept conventionalism. For a recent example, see Gibbard (2012).  
23 Avramides (1997) has a helpful treatment of Lewis’ and Schiffer’s accounts of convention as ways of 
accounting for linguistic meaning in terms of conventions in acts of speaker meaning, as part of the Gricean 
Program.  
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notion might say that a behavior becomes part of a regularity when it is generally done (in a certain 
type of situation). “Lethargic”, for example, is generally used in a particular way by English-
speakers in certain communication situations; the fact that its use is conventional for us is rooted in 
this fact. Using “lethargic” to mean LAZY is not what we do—there is no regularity in performing 
this behavior, and that is why it is intuitively not conventional for us. 
My claim is that the leading accounts of the conventionality of language, if used to inform 
conventionalism, result in the following commitment:  
 
Core Conventionalist Condition (“CCC”): if expression e has a meaning for 
community C, then there is a self-perpetuating regularity in the use of e in C.  
 
Why “self-perpetuating” regularity? The regularities in use discussed above have the following 
feature: uses proliferate; future cases occur thanks, in part, to past cases. A conventional regularity 
is not just a collection of discrete acts. It is a collection whose members are part of a reinforcing 
explanatory chain. We use “lethargic” in the proper way now because others have done so before.  
The reader may wonder, can’t there be conventions to behave in certain ways that are not rooted in 
a regularity in behavior? Can’t we establish a convention by agreeing to it? The first step in 
understanding why conventionalism is committed to the CCC is to appreciate that the most 
plausible conventionalism does not make foundational use of public agreement.  
Some of the most familiar conventions are established by explicit agreement or overt 
enforcement. The Geneva Convention, for example, was formed deliberately, by agreement, with 
the help of political institutions. Certain conventions of etiquette, like not putting elbows on the 
dinner table, are maintained by overt decisions plus explicit instruction that others do similarly. 
Those that are so instructed must also overtly agree to the behavior for it to perpetuate through 
them in turn.  A model of convention built from conventions like these would hold that what makes 
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a regularity in behavior count as conventional is just a certain kind of explicit agreement. To 
establish these conventions, we must in some fashion decide on them, publicly and together. 
One of the historically most significant reasons to doubt that language could possibly be at 
bottom conventional is that there has been no explicit agreement about our use of language. How 
did a convention for language arise, if not through a language? This same sort of worry faces any 
explicit-agreement-based conventionalism about meaning. Suppose, on that model, language is 
only meaningful thanks to convention, through explicit agreement. This agreement would itself 
have been in a public language, whose meaning would in turn need to be explained, either, 
regressively, through convention or through some other means, in which case conventionalism is 
not the correct account.24 Before we home in on a conventionalism to evaluate, it is worth getting 
clear on just how the debate has moved past the idea that conventions must be thought of on the 
model of explicit agreement. In doing so, we identify the most plausible conventionalist answer to 
the question of how language becomes subject to convention. 
 We need a model for conventions that will allow us to maintain that language use is 
conventional without requiring that the convention be initiated explicitly. Explaining how 
conventions could arise from the weight of precedent, rather than by explicit agreement, was one of 
the main motivations for David Lewis’ influential account of convention.25 It will prove very useful 
to explain the role and importance of self-perpetuating regularities for Lewis’ theory, so that we 
can appreciate why they are regarded as a necessary condition on conventionality.  
For Lewis, the way in which a convention is a rationally self-perpetuating solution to a 
certain kind of coordination problem is its defining feature: 
 
                                                      
24 This worry was given voice by Russell (1921), and Quine in the forward to Lewis (1969) 
25 It is not the case that Lewis put this issue to bed entirely. As recent as 2005, Horwich (2005 p. 31) claims 
that “conventional agreements about how concepts are to be expressed could be reached only with the help of 
meaningful public language, and so cannot constitute it.” 
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“Conventions are regularities in action… which are arbitrary but perpetuate themselves 
because they serve some sort of common interest. Past conformity breeds future 
conformity because it gives one a reason to go on conforming; but there is some 
alternative regularity which could have served instead, and would have perpetuated itself 
in the same way, if only it had got started.”26 
 
In other words, conventional regularities are stable solutions among multiple agents to a 
coordination problem. I will explain this more slowly.  
In a coordination problem, two or more agents require knowledge of what the other will do 
in order to make a decision. Reasoning about the situation, without knowledge of what the other 
will do, will not determine a course of action for the agents involved. For example, if you and I 
want to meet up in Manhattan for lunch on Tuesday, neither of us will know where to go without 
some information about where the other person will go. According to Lewis, if there is a 
convention guiding our action, there is a place we have gone, and perhaps generally go, in this type 
of situation. Our knowledge that this is what we both do gives us reason to conform on each 
occasion. If we end up meeting at Grand Central once, that may be enough to get a convention 
going, if it thereby becomes where we generally meet. One way for some possible action to 
become the thing we do generally is for us to explicitly agree to it. But in a convention, for Lewis, 
what explains our conformity directly is our knowledge of what we generally do, and only 
indirectly any agreement to do so. When we do establish a convention by explicit agreement, the 
behavior becomes conventional because the agreement gives us mutual expectations of a regularity 
in behavior (something we generally do), and, thanks to this, will realize them. Either way, for a 
convention to obtain among a group of agents, the behavior must, minimally, count as what is 
generally done in a certain type of situation in that community. 
                                                      
26 Lewis (1975): pp. 4-5 
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Given the crucial role of mutual expectation and deliberation, Lewis’ conventional 
regularities are rationally self-perpetuating regularities in behavior. The core idea here is that of a 
regularity in behavior that perpetuates itself in a certain way. According to Lewis, the mechanism 
of perpetuation is our mutual expectations. Why do we have the expectation that the regularity in 
general obtains, or that it will be followed in the case at hand? If the only way of getting the 
expectation is through explicit agreement, we eliminate conventionalism as a theory of meaning. 
For Lewis, conventions can get going from any special salience of one way of acting over others—
salience that generates the right kind of mutual expectations of action. I have to know that the 
option is salient for you, and you likewise for me. The above case illustrates the main way this 
happens in the conventional explanation of behavior: precedent. Our mutually witnessing what was 
done on one occasion makes that action especially salient, in the relevant way, on subsequent 
occasions. If I believe that meeting at Grand Central is what we generally do, based on my 
witnessing instances of its being done, I will believe that it is what will be done now, and so have 
reason to do likewise myself. Here is a clear explanation, in prose, of Lewis’ understanding of 
conventions and the essential role of self-perpetuating regularities:  
 
“Coordination by precedent… [is] this: achievement of coordination by means of shared 
acquaintance with a regularity governing the achievement of coordination in a class of past 
cases which bear some conspicuous analogy to one another and to our present coordination 
problem. Our acquaintance with this regularity comes from our experience with some of its 
instances… 
…We come to expect conforming actions not only in past cases but in future ones as 
well. We acquire a general belief, unrestricted as to time, that members of a certain 
population conform to a certain regularity in a certain kind of recurring coordination 
problem for the sake of coordination… 
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…And our expectation of future conformity is a reason to go on conforming, since to 
conform if others do is to achieve a coordination equilibrium and to satisfy one’s own 
preferences. And so it goes—we’re here because we’re here because we’re here because 
we’re here… 
This is the phenomenon I call convention.”27 
 
This excerpt from Lewis’ account of convention vividly illustrates the regularity requirement, and 
why it plays such an important role. Further, it is explicit in this passage that a conventional 
regularity contains a precedent. This will become important as we develop interpretations of the 
self-perpetuating regularity requirement in the next section. Lewis’ mechanism of perpetuation of a 
conventional behavior is mutual expectation, via salience, via precedent. But what it is for a 
conventional regularity to perpetuate is for the future occurrences to occur thanks to past instances. 
If there is no room for explicit agreement, and the behavior is not independently optimal (i.e., there 
is a coordination problem), then the conventional regularity must be established through precedent. 
And once it gets going, the convention sustains itself by each instance drawing from and serving as 
a sort of precedent.  
Schiffer’s account 28  is considered Lewisian, as it also maintains that conventions are 
regularities in behavior propelled by precedent and the expectations it generates. Let me briefly say 
what Lewis and Schiffer claim about language in particular, to make clear just how they fit into the 
dialectical picture we’ve been sketching. Lewis contended that the conventional regularities of use 
underlying meaningfulness are those of uttering an expression when a certain state of the world 
obtains, and of believing that the state of the world obtains upon witnessing a use of the 
                                                      
27 Lewis (1969): pp. 41-42 
28 I’ll note once again that what I’m calling “Schiffer’s account” is not his current view of the matter, but his 
early attempt to work out the details of a conventionalist theory of meaning along lines that draw on a theory 
of convention that is very similar in key respects to Lewis’. 
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expression.29 The first regularity is roughly the same as a regularity in performing certain acts of 
speaker-meaning with an expression, and the second roughly a regularity in such acts so as to 
satisfy the speaker’s communicative intentions. 30  On this rough characterization, Lewis and 
Schiffer are in agreement about what it is we conventionally do with our language, since Schiffer 
explicitly states that the relevant linguistic regularities are regularities in speaker-meaning.31 The 
common interest regularities in these acts serve is the in-general reliability of effective 
communication with language. Herein lies the central asset of Lewisian conventionalism: if 
meaning just is conventionality, conventionalism explains how we can reliably communicate with 
meaningful expressions. In each instance, we can coordinate on an expression-content pairing 
thanks to the conventional regularities in the content-directed use of language. 
Taking this close look at Lewis’ account allows us to appreciate how there can be 
conventions that have not been explicitly adopted. Since the conventionalist cannot claim that the 
meaning of language is fundamentally constituted by explicit agreement, her key resource is a self-
perpetuating regularity in behavior. For Lewis, in fact, agreements are only relevant to conventions 
insofar as they generate the mutual expectations that ground a regularity in behavior. Next, I will 
show that Schiffer and Millikan, who provide the other leading accounts of linguistic 
conventionality, also endorse the regularity requirement on convention. This sets up my general 
argument against conventionalism. 
Above, I called Schiffer’s account “Lewisian”. In fact, Schiffer’s account of the 
conventionality of language does not differ from Lewis’ in any respect that bears on our discussion. 
                                                      
29 It’s worth mentioning explicitly that for Lewis the conventions of language govern the whole-utterance-
types of a language. It is only derivatively that our language involves a particular compositional structure.  
30 Rescorla (2011). This skirts, harmlessly for our purposes, over Lewis’ characterization of languages as 
intrinsically meaningful abstract entities and of our conventions as being truthful and trusting with respect to 
one language’s assignment of meanings to expressions rather than others. 
31 Bennett (1976) offers another conventionalist account joining Schiffer in explicitly taking the convention 
as a convention in acts of speaker-meaning. One alternative is Williamson’s (2000) knowledge norm on use, 
treated as a convention of use. 
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However, the statement of his account of convention is even more explicit than Lewis’ in its taking 
non-explicit conventional regularities to include a case of precedent. He claims that there is a non-
explicit convention in a community G to perform a type of action x only if “there is a precedent in 
G for doing x” and “on the basis of [this], almost everyone in G does x”. 32 Along with Lewis, 
Schiffer claims that the mechanism of this connection is the mutual expectations of conformity 
generated by the precedent.  
Both of these accounts clearly include the self-perpetuating regularity requirement on 
convention. Even when there is explicit agreement, the agreement serves to initiate the self-
perpetuating regularity in actual behavior. These accounts explicitly include a precedent as part of 
such regularities. Millikan offers the leading alternative to Lewisian accounts. The next step is to 
show that Millikan’s account has the self-perpetuating regularity condition on convention as well. 
To that end, I’ll now explain how Millikan’s account diverges from Lewis’ and Schiffer’s, and how 
it nevertheless retains the self-perpetuating regularity requirement. 
Millikan’s account of the conventionality of language is the leading alternative to Lewis’.33 
She argued that the way in which conventional behaviors perpetuate can be wholly precedential, 
and not at all rationally driven. She proposes an account that focuses on the self-perpetuating 
regularity and strips away most of Lewis’ additional requirements. Here is Millikan’s introductory 
statement of her alternative account to Lewis’ of the conventionality of language: 
 
 “The conventionality of natural language is captured in much simpler terms than 
David Lewis’s, displaying its continuity with more rudimentary conventions 
involving neither coordinations, regular conformity (either de facto or de jure) nor 
rational underpinnings. This “natural conventionality” is composed of two simple 
characteristics: (1) natural conventions are reproduced patterns, (2) they are 
                                                      
32 Schiffer (1972): p. 154 
33 Millikan (1998), (2005) 
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proliferated due partly to weight of precedent, rather than due, for example, to their 
intrinsically superior capacity to perform certain functions.”34 
 
The central element here is a reproduced pattern, with a certain kind of perpetuation. As we’ve 
been using the phrase, this is a self-perpetuating regularity. A conventional type of behavior must 
be reproduced, and must be reproduced thanks to its own instantiation. Millikan’s account brings 
into focus a plausible way to understand conventional regularities in behavior: it’s about 
reproduction, not regular conformity. However often the behavior is instantiated, its instances must 
have a certain connection to be under the right sort of regularity. For both Millikan and Lewis, the 
connection is roughly that future instances of the behavior occur, in large part, thanks to the past 
precedents of the behavior. Their main disagreement is about the mechanisms of this explanation.  
 We have now seen that Millikan, Lewis, and Schiffer all endorse the self-perpetuating 
regularity requirement on linguistic convention. Any conventionalist theory drawn from these 
leading accounts is thus committed to our condition:  
 
Core Conventionalist Condition (“CCC”): if expression e has a meaning for 
community C, then there is a self-perpetuating regularity in the use of e in C.  
 
Briefly, I’d like to emphasize why it’s important for conventionalism that the self-
perpetuating regularity obtain in the community for which the expression is meaningful. The 
obvious reason is that the conventionalist’s explanandum is a relation between an expression-type, 
a content, and a community. The facts cited in our constitutive explanation must also be facts 
concerning these three things, or from which the right sort of relation between them is 
metaphysically derived. A conventional link between an expression and a meaning can only 
constitutively explain meaning for a community if it is a conventional link in that community.  
                                                      
34  Millikan (2005): p. 1. (Page numbers are from the electronic version offered by Oxford Scholarship 
Online.)  
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The less abstract reason is that an expression’s having a meaning for a community is 
connected with how reliably it can serve communication of that meaning among its members. As a 
theory of the nature of facts about meaning, conventionalism has to ground its constitutive 
explanation in facts that will be able to explain this connection between meaningful expressions 
and communication. 35 But only conventions within a particular community will be able to explain 
the facts about meaningful communication in that community. It is only because we participate in 
a regularity in acts of speaker meaning with “x” that we are able to use “x” reliably in 
communication as a meaningful expression. Since conventionalism must provide an explanation for 
meaning-explained communication, it is compelled to cite conventional facts—and thus 
regularities—within a community to explain meaning in that community. 
I’m drawing the CCC from the leading accounts of linguistic convention.36 But I will not 
further engage the issue of whether or not Lewis, Millikan, and Schiffer definitively endorse 
conventionalism, as I’ve spelled it out. My attack is directed towards conventionalist accounts of 
meaningfulness that are based on Lewis’, Millikan’s, and Schiffer’s accounts of the nature of 
conventions and the conventions of language. Since these are the best and most influential accounts 
on offer, I take myself to be targeting all of the most plausible versions of conventionalism on 
offer.  
In the remainder of the paper, I argue that the Core Conventionalist Condition is false. If 
this is indeed a commitment of any conventionalism about meaning, this constitutes a general 
argument against conventionalism. I will argue that an expression’s having a meaning does not 
require any self-perpetuating regularity in its use.  
                                                      
35 This is an important (and uncontroversial) point, but I do not have space to devote to a defense and 
literature review here. For very instructive such defense and review, see Harris (2014).  
36 Lewis, Millikan, and Schiffer give the most influential accounts of the conventionality of language. All of 
other accounts- including conventionalist accounts- mentioned in this paper (mostly in footnotes) accept the 
regularity requirement. Convention is clearly regarded in the literature on this topic as entailing a regularity 
in use. A conventionalism that adopts any of these accounts of conventionality would also have the regularity 
requirement.  
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IV. UNUSUAL USES AND SELF-PERPETUATING REGULARITIES 
 In the previous section, we saw that the leading accounts of the conventionality of 
language place the following condition on conventional language: that its use be part of a self-
perpetuating regularity. We saw that Lewis and Schiffer are explicit about conventional 
regularities’ including a past precedent. Such regularities are self-perpetuating in the sense we 
specified: future cases occur thanks to these precedents. Conventionalism claims that an 
expression’s being meaningful for a community depends constitutively on its being governed by a 
conventional regularity of use in that community. As such, I take the best available 
conventionalism to be committed to the Core Conventionalist Condition. In this section, I will 
consider various interpretations of this requirement, using one main counterexample that applies to 
all. I will conclude that conventionalism is false on this basis. 
 First, I want to clarify the self-perpetuating regularities of convention drawn from the 
above accounts. We can rule one interpretation out immediately. Millikan understands Lewis’ 
account as requiring that the conventional behavior be what is regularly done in a community. This 
is something along the lines of what is typically, usually, or often done, tied to frequency in the 
occurrence of the behavior. But of course a conventional regularity in the use of an expression does 
not depend on any frequency of use of the expression. Our discussion of and excerpts from Lewis’ 
account did not feature any frequency in use. It depends only on a precedent self-perpetuating into 
the future.  
The inclusion of a past precedent was explicit in both Lewis and Schiffer. Millikan’s term 
for “self-perpetuating regularity” was “reproduced pattern”. This requires more than precedent. It 
requires reproduction; the precedent must be a precedent for some actual instance. She says, “all 
that is required is that there be a mechanism that produces the second on the model of the 
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first…”.37 A natural interpretation is that there must be actual first and second instances. Another is 
that there must be some mechanism for reproduction that would form any future instances on the 
model of the first. We will start with the stronger proposal for the precise nature of these self-
perpetuating regularities. With the minimal understanding, explicit in all three accounts, of self-
perpetuating regularities as involving an actual precedent and a connection to other instances, I will 
consider the range of workable proposals. I will consider proposals requiring a past precedent, and 
those that allow that initial uses are already part of a regularity. I will consider proposals requiring 
that there be actual reproduction, and those requiring only a mechanism of reproduction. My 
counterexample applies to all of these. Here is the strongest proposal, requiring a past precedent for 
convention and actual reproduction: 
 
Past-Future Actual-Token Regularity: If there is a self-perpetuating regularity 
in community C of performing actions of type x, then there is, in C, at least one 
past precedent of doing x, and at least one other event of doing x which occurs 
after and is owed to the precedent. 
 
The problem for conventionalism on this proposal, which requires a prior precedent for a 
current use to be part of a self-perpetuating regularity, is that there are cases of meaning without 
prior precedent. On this understanding of self-perpetuating regularities, an initial use cannot 
already be part of a convention.38 The corresponding version of the CCC, then, claims that an 
initial use cannot be meaningful. But there can be meaning without precedent, as my next example 
shows.  
 This case is inspired by examples devised by Burge to argue against Lewis’ account of 
convention. In “Knowledge and Convention”, Burge argues that the arbitrariness and knowledge 
                                                      
37 Millikan (2005): p. 24 
38 Lepore and Stone (forthcoming, 2015) fault this proposal, taken from Lewis, for ruling out improvised uses 
from the realm of meaning. [FIX] 
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conditions Lewis proposes on conventions, and thus on conventions of language, are too strong. 39 
One of the cases he uses to make this point is the case of a religious community whose members 
believe that their own language is divinely commanded. They will thus never prefer, and will never 
regard themselves as having sufficient reason, to use a different language, even if everyone else in 
the community were to use it. 
Suppose that there is a community just like this, the Halps. The Halps are forbidden from 
using any foreign language. In fact, they are forbidden from engaging in any linguistic 
communication with one another, except using their own Halp language. This community has a 
rival community, the Dards, with parallel beliefs and a completely different set of used linguistic 
expressions. Both communities believe that their languages are divinely commanded. As such, they 
never, not even once, communicate with one another using language. A third community, the 
Strotes, unknown to these two and much more advanced, has studied these two communities 
extensively from afar, and has developed a translation manual for the most frequently-used 
expressions in these two languages. As part of a sociological experiment, the Strotes have left each 
of the rival communities with a copy, and both communities have engaged in thorough study of its 
contents, believing them to be sent by God. 
It is intuitively obvious that, given the communities' prohibitions against any use of a 
foreign language, and the complete lack of any history of use of another language, each community 
has a convention of using its own language, and has no convention of using the alternative 
language. Intuitively, there even seems to be an explicit convention in each community against 
using the alternative language.  
The Dards use “tavi” as the Halps use “tomorrow”. The Halps believe they have a grave 
obligation never to use “tavi” to communicate, and have never used any Dard word before. 
Nevertheless, if a Halp has an accidental slip into the Dard language, using “tavi” instead of the 
                                                      
39 Burge (1975) 
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Halp word “tomorrow”, she will be understood. The common knowledge of the alternative 
language allows its elements to serve the Halps perfectly well in communication. This use is 
successful, and not accidentally. It is not just that this token of “tavi” happened to facilitate 
communication. In this social context, uses of the word-type “tavi” will reliably enable the same 
communicative acts as “tomorrow”. “Tavi” has meaning for the Halps, as well as for the Dards.  
The public prohibition against using non-Halp expressions is designed to preclude the 
possibility of such expressions’ being or becoming conventional for the Halps. On the current 
proposal for self-perpetuating regularities, the use of “tavi” is not part of a self-perpetuating 
regularity for the Halps, since there is no prior precedent of such Halp use. If there is no self-
perpetuating regularity in the use of “tavi” for the Halps, then there is no convention for the use of 
“tavi” among the Halps. If conventionalism is true, this implies that “tavi” does not have a meaning 
for the Halps.  
 Being a first-used expression for any Halp, “tavi” does not have a precedent in this 
community. If anything, it is the precedent. So, if the Past-Future Actual-Token Regularity 
requirement is right, conventionalism is false. But perhaps there can be convention without prior 
precedent. Can a behavior be conventional, even in its first instance? If it can, the following is a 
better proposal for the precise requirements of self-perpetuating regularities: 
 
Current to Future Actual-Token Regularity: If there is a self-perpetuating 
regularity in community C of performing actions of type x, then there is a past or 
current instance of x, e, which is responsible for some instance of x that occurs 
after e.  
 
 On this proposal, unlike the first, even the first instance of a behavior can qualify as part of 
a self-perpetuating regularity, and so also as part of a convention. The problem for this proposal is 
that it requires an actual second instance, owed to the precedent. We can stipulate with ease that 
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“tavi” will never occur among the Halps again. We could even stipulate that it will never be used 
again, by anyone. This does not undermine its being meaningful now. So, if the connection 
required for self-perpetuating regularities is a connection between actual instances, this case, as a 
one-off (but repeatable and reliable) use, falsifies the CCC.  
But there is another sort of connection: that between actual instances and possible future 
instances. This is consonant with the spirit of the self-perpetuating regularity requirement. Were we 
to perform the conventional behavior in the future, after its initiation, the precedent would, in part, 
explain it. In other words, a mechanism of perpetuation is set in place, even if it never actually 
results in a future token. The following requirement, then, is the conventionalist’s best bet for 
turning our single use into part of a self-perpetuating regularity: 
 
Current to Possible Future-Token Regularity: If there is a self-perpetuating 
regularity in community C of performing actions of type x, then there is a past or 
current instance of x, e, such that, were there to be a future instance of x, it would 
be owed to the occurrence of e. 
 
 Still, this condition does not hold in the case of our Halp’s use of “tavi”. After all, it 
occurred now accidentally, and succeeded on the basis of prior features of the social situation. 
Would future uses occur thanks to this use, as a precedent, or thanks to these same features? The 
prohibition for the Halps against this use does not change. As long as the community survives, it 
sticks genuinely to its strict religious beliefs. No Halp will ever consider, on the mere basis of this 
use, violating her grave obligation by repeating it. This use will not serve as a precedent for future 
uses. Were a Halp ever to use “tavi” in the future, it would again simply be thanks to what she 
knows about the Dard’s use of the word and the errant influence of this knowledge and its resultant 
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competence on her behavior. The initial, accidental use does not perpetuate, and does not set up a 
mechanism for perpetuation for future instances.  
In sum, it facilitates reliable understanding, but not thanks to any convention of use in this 
community. This use initiate any convention. Given the community’s beliefs, the use will not 
perpetuate, nor will it change the reasons had by members of the community to use or not use the 
expression on future occasions. Any future accidental uses like this will occur and facilitate 
communication thanks to the same social and psychological factors, and not at all thanks to this 
past accidental use. “Tavi” is meaningful for this community, but it is not part of a self-
perpetuating regularity in use in this community.40 
 
V. THE ABSENCE OF CONVENTION 
 
 This section gives a sustained defense of the claim that there is no potentially meaning-
constituting convention of using “tavi” for the Halps. I will respond to the following specific 
objections: (i) that there may be a version of the self-perpetuating regularity requirement I have not 
considered, (ii) that a Lewisian strategy for accommodating the unused parts of, say, English will 
also allow for the accommodation of “tavi”, (iii) that our speaker becomes part of the Dard 
linguistic community, partaking in its regularities of use, (iv) that there is a regularity of 
understanding “tavi” among the Halps, (v) that there is an explicit-agreement-convention among 
the Halps for use of “tavi”, or precedent, in the use of the dictionary, and (vi) that there is still a 
dependence of meaning on convention in my case. It will become clear why I used a quite 
contrived scenario to make my point: it evades objections that apply to many other plausible cases 
of meaning without convention. I will deal with these sometimes-interrelated objections as 
separately as possible, and in a natural order. 
                                                      
40 I orient the sequence of possible interpretations of the Self-perpetuating Regularity Requirement around a 
single case in the interest of space and simplicity. See Lepore and Stone (2015) for the alternative, offering 
different cases speaking narrowly to different requirements. 
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(i): Do my proposals really exhaust the possibilities for the regularity requirement?  
 
The range of proposals considered above seems to me to be exhaustive, given the core idea 
in self-perpetuating regularities of a connection between instances, including a precedent. This idea 
was drawn directly from the explicit accounts of Lewis, Millikan, and Schiffer. But one might 
wonder why the emphasis on a precedent is so important. So that we do not lose track of the 
conventionalist’s subject matter, I’ll give a brief intuitive argument for the importance of actual 
behavior to convention. 
Some distinction must obviously be made between the actual conventions among members 
of a community and the merely possible conventions among members of that community. And in 
the case of language, the conventionalist cannot make use of any public agreement establishing a 
convention.  
Why is it that we have a convention for keeping our elbows off the dinner table, but no 
convention of keeping our elbows off the dinner table and high-fiving after the meal? We certainly 
could begin high-fiving after dinner. But until we do (absent any public planning), there is not any 
convention between us to do so. High-fiving after dinner is a merely possible convention for us. To 
get it going, we would need to either discuss it, or to simply begin doing it in the right 
circumstances. If mere potential for actual behavior were sufficient for convention, we would have 
many conventions that have been neither done nor considered, like high-fiving after dinner, a 
clearly unconventional behavior. This is why all of the accounts of convention discussed in this 
paper rely on self-perpetuating regularities in actual behavior in the absence of public agreement.  
With this brief intuitive argument, and the endorsement of the leading conventionalist 
accounts on offer, as surveyed, I rest with the assumption, for the purposes of this discussion, that 
conventionalism is committed to the Core Conventionalist Condition: that all meaningful 
expressions are part of a self-perpetuating regularity in use, involving some actual uses and tokens. 
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While I think this reflects a genuine requirement on non-explicit convention, this is not the place to 
defend that requirement at length. Opponents of this requirement are free to take the argument of 
this paper as conditional upon the acceptance of that requirement. 
 
(ii): What of the many expressions of English that are never used?  
 
There are many sentences of English that are never used. Some are too long to use. 
Additionally, reason to use some ordinary-length sentences simply doesn’t arise. For example, it’s 
probable that no-one has ever said “The tree in my oven hasn’t sprouted any french fries yet.” But 
this sentence is surely part of English. The conventionalist must have a strategy for accommodating 
sentences like this. This appears to be an unused expression, part of no regularity in behavior, that 
is nevertheless part of our linguistic conventions. The above versions of the self-perpetuating 
regularity requirement, drawn from Lewis, Millikan, and Schiffer, don’t seem to allow this. 
Whatever strategy conventionalists have to accommodate unused expressions, can it also allow 
“tavi” to be part of a convention, even if it is not part of a self-perpetuating regularity in use?  
Lewis’ way of accommodating these unused expressions of our language is to describe our 
linguistic regularities in use at the level of the entire language containing them. If our regularity can 
be, as Lewis’ account has it, at the scale of a whole language at once, we’ve been speaking English 
all along. 41  This is not the place to delve into the issue of how realistically to describe our 
regularities in use at such a scale. Such an inquiry could draw on the biology and psychology of 
language use and the productive procedures (or grammar) implicit in our actual use of particular 
expressions.42 
                                                      
41 My example is not of a completely improvised expression because of the common dependence of such 
expressions on other conventions in the same community. For lots of cases of novelty and apparent non-
conventionality, see Lepore and Stone (forthcoming, 2014).  
42  One of the central, unanswered objections to Lewisian Conventionalism targets the need for this 
accommodation. Hawthorne (1990, 1993), Schiffer (1987, 1993, 2006). Lewis replies to the first of Schiffer’s 
and Hawthorne’s objections in Lewis (1992). Their replies seem to have won the day. As Rescorla (2011) 
notes, there remains hope of making use of a Chomsky-inspired view like that of Higginbotham (1986), and 
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But precisely this possible strategy is obviated by my Burge-inspired case of linguistically 
dogmatic communities. “Tavi” is not a part of the Halp language, however we describe any 
compositional principles implicit in their actual use of their own expressions. I think this point is 
fairly obvious. But one rationale for confidence is that “tavi” is a basic linguistic item, and the 
compositional procedures I have in mind are for construction of complex meaningful expressions, 
like sentences, from syntactically atomic linguistic units—“tavi” is not compositionally 
meaningful, so to speak.  
However, in the face of the fact that there is no such constructive accommodation to be had 
for “tavi”, there is another challenge to make toward this case. The accidental use is not part of a 
regularity of use in members of the speaker’s community. But it is part of an acknowledged 
convention—in the Dard linguistic community. Linguistic competence without behavioral 
participation in a linguistic community’s conventions of use is not an exotic phenomenon. My case 
makes it especially sharp. But the same holds true of any individual with knowledge of a dialect, 
register (a vulgar one, for example), or foreign language, who not only does not use its expressions 
but would not use them.43 In such situations, however, the individual ordinarily gains competence, 
in part, by exposure to actual uses. As such, there is some regularity in understanding actual tokens, 
which could serve as observed precedents, even if there is not, for these individuals, any self-
perpetuating regularity in use. This is not present in my case.  
But our user does end up performing a type of act that is governed by convention in the 
Dard community. Conventionalism attempts to ground facts of meaning in facts about conventions 
in a particular community. Maybe this use is enough to bring the speaker into the Dard linguistic 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Larson and Segal (1995), that language users have tacit knowledge of a compositional semantic theory. But 
this strategy was already addressed in detail by Schiffer (ibid.), who claims that it cannot help a 
conventionalist theory like Lewis’, and, as noted by Davies (2003), it has not been worked out in any detail.  
43 I thank David Kaplan for impressing upon me just how common this sort of situation is, and for bringing 
the particular example of registers to my attention. My example not only makes the division of linguistic 
communities vivid, it also precludes any regularity in response to actual uses.  
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community, such that the convention of use obtains in the community of the Dards plus our 
speaker. And maybe this allows conventionalism to predict its meaningfulness for her. 
 
(iii): Perhaps our speaker, in making use of the alternative language, becomes a part of the other 
linguistic community, such that her use becomes part of their conventional regularities.  
 
How can this help the conventionalist? I have been trying, on the conventionalist’s behalf, 
to connect this isolated Halp use of “tavi” with other actual or possible Halp uses of “tavi”. Since 
the right sort of connection could not be made, I concluded that there was no self-perpetuating 
regularity among the Halps in this use. But there are other uses of “tavi”—by the Dards. While 
there is no self-perpetuating regularity in the Halp community, maybe our Halp’s use is part of the 
Dard’s conventional regularities. Remember, conventionalism, with good reason (to which we will 
return shortly), cites and explains community-relative facts: facts about convention in a community 
to explain facts about meaning in that community. So the worry must be that there is a self-
perpetuating regularity connecting our user to the Dards’ linguistic community, such that their 
convention extends to her as well. 
No reasonable understanding of linguistic communities will allow this inclusion. First, 
these are two very distinct social communities. Their members do not ever actually interact. One 
does not become a member of the other community merely because one does something that is 
conventional in this other community. Any special, convention-independent sense that can be given 
to linguistic communities would draw on the intentions or context of individual agents to classify 
them as members of a given linguistic community. Our agent will not and does not intend to use 
this alternative language to communicate with the members of the other community. This sounds 
similar to cases of unused but familiar dialects or registers, discussed above. But even in those 
cases, which seem meaningful for, despite being unused by, an individual, the individual’s 
competence is typically derived from observation of the uses of clear participants in the 
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convention. Our user has never witnessed any Dard use of their language. She has knowledge of 
their language, but is neither part of nor even witness to the community of speakers who commonly 
use that language.  
Further, the explicitly community-relative accounts of convention we saw, Lewis’ and 
Schiffer’s, do not make reference to any convention-independent understanding of these 
communities. Their linguistic communities just are the collections of agents among which the 
convention persists in general. This suggests that to see where the relevant communities are, we 
should look to where the relevant regularity occurs and perpetuates. For this individual, in her 
actual linguistic community, there is a use with no regularity and no perpetuation. If the Strotes 
later want to update their translation manual, after our Halp’s accidental use, they will still look to 
Dard usage of the Dard language and to Halp usage of the Halp language. 44 The accidental use by a 
member of the Halp community does not impact the conventional regularities in use in the Dard 
linguistic community.  
Most crucially, this strategy of linking our user with the Dard linguistic community would, 
at best, allow conventionalism to predict that “tavi” has its meaning for the Dards plus our speaker. 
But the datum it must explain is that “tavi” has its meaning for the Dards and for the Halps—at a 
minimum, for our speaker and her audience, for whom “tavi” is a reliable means of 
communication. These are two distinct linguistic communities, and this use does not unite them.  
 
(iv): Is there a self-perpetuating regularity in understanding? 
 
The discussion of divided language communities brought out the worry that there is, 
among the Halps, a regularity in understanding, even if there is no regularity in use. It’s true that, 
in some sense of understanding, the Halps have been understanding the language they’ve studied, 
                                                      
44 I owe this device to David Kaplan. It does not settle all of the relevant questions, but it is a very useful 
intuition pump for dividing up linguistic communities. 
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in studying it. But they have not been understanding any uses or acts of speaker meaning. As part 
of the Gricean Program, our conventionalism is an attempt to ground facts about meaning in facts 
about the conventional regularities in intentional behavior. The intentional behavior is the use of 
words in the communicative acts of speaker meaning. These acts are what the conventionalist 
contends are subject conventional regularities.  
Lewis does supplement his view of linguistic convention with a response regularity. But 
these are responses to genuine uses of language in communicative acts. Having some association 
between a word and a content, even to the extent that one would know how to understand and put 
the word to use in communicative contexts, does not suffice for actual communication.45 Further, a 
regularity in private cognitive activity it is not the kind of regularity conventionalists contend 
grounds facts about meaning. Since there is no regularity in use, there is also no relevant regularity 
in understanding.  
These theoretical commitments also bear on the idea that the translation manual itself is a 
precedent, part of a relevant self-perpetuating regularity. There are several reasons why the 
translation manual is not a part of any regularity in use in the Halp community. First, a Halp did not 
produce it. More importantly, it contains only mentionings of expressions, not uses of expressions. 
It bears reminding that conventional regularities must be regularities in a single type of behavior. 
This has been explicit in all statements of the commitments of conventionalism throughout this 
paper. The Halp’s accidental use of “tavi” was a genuine communicative use. Whatever “use” (by 
the Strotes) of “tavi” occurred in producing the translation manual was not this type of behavior. I 
can grant that there is some connection between two instances of the same physical word-form in 
these two behaviors. But since they are not the same behavior, they are not part of the same self-
perpetuating regularity. Conventions are conventions of doing some particular thing. Thus, while 
                                                      
45  For discussion of the response relevant to satisfying genuine communicative uses, see Grice (1957), 
Strawson (1964) and Recanati (1986). 
  189 
the dictionary may be a fine tool for coming to know a language—and even, if I’m right, to make a 
new language meaningful for a community, it is not itself the instrument of an act of 
communication, and so is not part of the sort of behavior or response targeted by our 
conventionalism about meaning. The dictionary does not include any convention-constituting 
precedent in the kind of linguistic behavior exhibited in the Halp’s genuine communicative use of 
“tavi”.   
The Halp usage also provides us with a rather direct, intuitive route of response to any 
objection that regards my treatment of conventionalism as unfair because I haven’t considered 
some proposal or other for the nature of convention: In the Halp community, there is a convention 
against using any of the Dard expressions. This is a convention brought about by public agreement. 
Let’s suppose, for the sake of vividness, that the Halps meet regularly to re-affirm their 
commitment, all publicly agreeing, “I shall not use any words other than those of the chosen Halp 
people.” The existence—and complete acceptance—of this convention intuitively precludes the 
possibility of any convention running counter to this convention in the same community in which 
this convention prevails. There cannot be a convention—wholly sincerely adopted and 
conscientiously followed—and another actual convention to, in effect, violate the former 
convention. Of course, there are cases when public agreement conventions can be taken over by a 
self-perpetuating regularity convention. But this is not what happens in our case. The use was 
wholly accidental and is not part of any countertrend, even in this one individual. There is simply 
no convention in the Halp community, or any portion thereof, for using Dard expressions.  
The objector may respond, but there is no convention among Halps against understanding 
uses of Dard expressions. But, recall, there must, for convention among the Halps, be a self-
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perpetuating regularity in their understanding of genuine uses.46 Can there be a self-perpetuating 
regularity in understanding uses, even if there is no self-perpetuating regularity in uses themselves? 
It seems that there could be, if current or past understanding among Halps is the source of 
perpetuation in that understanding. And it is not. Accidental Halp use of Dard expressions, as well 
as Halp understanding of those uses, it not owed to past instances of this behavior. Use and 
understanding come from a different sort of familiarity with the Halp language than participation in 
any convention. The Halps have established a competence with the Dard expressions, without 
taking on any conventions in their treatment of those Dard expressions.  
Two further points. First, it is again not clear that there actually can be a convention to do 
something that is not a public and willed behavior. That is, an internal activity like understanding 
may be precluded from convention altogether. I can think of no examples of what are intuitively 
conventions purely for some kind of cognitive attitude, rather than an observable and controllable 
behavior. 47  Part of the deep explanation for this may be that internal acts cannot perpetuate 
throughout the community the way that conventional behaviors do, through publicly-observable, 
salience-producing precedents. 
Second, if one does not accept this first point, we can stipulate that the Halps also have an 
explicit agreement to not understand any Halp uses of a Dard expression. If we again accept that 
sincere public agreement and near-universal conformity rules out the possibility of a violation’s 
being conventional, then we have ruled out even the understanding of Dard expressions as a 
                                                      
46 None of the leading accounts surveyed in this paper are suited to non-behavioral conventions. If there were 
an understanding of convention that allows this, it would be non-Gricean and would not obviously be suited 
toward offering a conventionalist account of meaning. Exploring this possibility is beyond this paper’s scope. 
47 To substantiate this somewhat more theoretically, consider that Lewis understands conventions to be stable 
(self-perpetuating) solutions to recurring coordination problems, and coordination problems are problems of 
coordinating action among multiple agents. The problem is which action to choose, when doing so rationally 
requires information about what the other agent will do.  
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convention among the Halps. 48  There is neither a convention of use nor a convention for 
understanding Dard expressions among the Halps, however you want to cut it. The Halps have 
linguistic competence, and the meaningfulness to which such competence gives rise, without any 
relevant self-perpetuating regularities. 
 
(v): Is there an explicit agreement convention involving the dictionary? 
 
I’ve been assuming that there is no explicit agreement—but didn’t the Halps study the 
translation manual on the basis of a public agreement to do so? I did not specify this. I could 
specify the case so that this is not a worry. Rather than decide to study the manual together, the 
Halps could study the manual individually, each in secret. I’ll now add a couple of facts to the case 
as assurance that the expressions will reliably serve communication, despite this secrecy. For 
assurance that communication with Dard expressions is reliable, suppose that the Halps believe that 
only these two languages exist. Of course, when the Dard expression is used, others will realize 
that the user studied the manual. On this background, since they still each study enough to develop 
competence, the Dard expressions are still meaningful for them. But now there is no public 
agreement whatsoever to do anything with the translation manual. And, remember, they did not 
create it, so there is no possible agreement in its creation. I leave for another day discussion of the 
sheer implausibility of attributing any convention-constituting agreement to the Halps in the case as 
initially described. I only remind the reader that on the three accounts of convention we considered, 
there is no room for a convention constituted by agreement that does not in turn set in motion a 
                                                      
48 Note that the negative convention I’m alleging is more than the mere existence and belief in a negative 
norm, or prohibition, against using a foreign language. It involves a mutual, public decision about how to 
behave, which, as I’ve specified, guides actual choices of conformity. 
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regularity in behavior. Since we’ve ruled out self-perpetuating regularities in the Halp case, we 
know that none was set in motion by an agreement.49  
As a final reminder and intuitive plug, Millikan’s account makes no room at all for any 
explicit agreement to ground a convention. Lewis and Schiffer make room for explicit agreement to 
initiate a convention, but only when it sets in motion the regularity in behavior required for 
convention. Aside from the theoretical motivations discussed throughout this paper, why would 
they do this? Consider again the case in which we decide to set up a convention for high-fiving 
after dinner. Suppose we explicitly agree to do this, but neither of us intended to follow through, 
and we immediately forget. Is high-fiving after dinner now a conventional behavior for us? 
Intuitively, it is not, as predicted by the above accounts of convention. We cannot simply decide 
what the conventional behaviors are. Conventions are all about the things we do. This is, at base, 
why they are unsuited to provide a theory of meaning. 
 
(vi): Isn’t there still dependence on conventions—those of the other community? 
 
 I have devoted a probably unnecessary amount of space throughout the paper to 
emphasizing just why conventionalism roots facts about meaning for a community in conventional 
facts in that same community. Doing so highlighted the core fact about meaning, uncontroversial in 
this debate, that it is intimately tied to reliably effective communication. Explaining this connection 
is one of the main burdens on a theory of meaning, and conventionalism’s appeal is drawn chiefly 
from its identifying facts that ground reliably effective communication. Recall that this is also the 
source of its main secondary appeal: that it has an account of the norms of meaning. This 
                                                      
49  I addressed in sub-section (iv) the separate issue of whether or not the dictionary could count as a 
precedent. In short, since the dictionary does not involve the same type of behavior as the Halp’s genuine 
communicative use of “tavi”, it cannot form the precedent for this use in such a way that they could be part 
of the same conventional regularity (which must be a regularity in a single type of behavior). 
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commitment of conventionalism was the source of my main defense of the conventionalist’s 
commitment to cite conventional facts in a community to explain meaning facts in that community.  
 But the determined conventionalist has the following response open to her: I take this 
commitment too strongly.50 Conventionalists should modify their account to abandon the strong 
requirement that meaning facts in a community necessitate conventional facts in that community. 
The account should hold instead that meaning facts in a community necessitate conventional facts 
simpliciter. After all, my counterexample is a case in which there is clear convention in one 
community, though not, if I’m right, convention in all of the communities for which the relevant 
expression is meaningful. It thus applies to the stronger, but not the weaker, of these two possible 
conventionalist proposals.  
 I am sympathetic to both the thought that conventionalists could abandon the strong 
community-matching requirement and to the thought that it is hard to see how my case does not 
feature some kind of threatening dependence on convention. Given these sympathies, and given 
that my conventionalist thesis is quite standard, I will abstain from consideration of the merits of 
this formulation and offer a simple amendment of my example that does away with dependence of 
any kind on convention.  
 In our example, there are two rival communities, the Halps and the Dards. Expressions of 
the Dard language become meaningful for at least some Halps without becoming conventional for 
that group. But they are still conventional for the Dards, and this is some part of the long-term 
explanation of how they become meaningful for the Halps. The modification is simple: There never 
were any Dards. Their existence was a myth delivered with evidence manufactured by the Strotes, 
our observer community. We may now, in fact, suppose that the Strotes conducted their experiment 
in order to test whether or not a wholly unconventional language could be meaningful for an actual 
                                                      
50 Again, Harris (2014) argues forcefully that conventionalism has the strong commitment to accounting for 
reliably efficient communication with meaningful signals. He also contends that conventionalists and other 
theorists of meaning broadly accept this burden. 
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community. Nothing else about the example needs to change. The Halps still acquire the same 
competence with the ‘Dard language’ and still do not adopt any conventions for its use. In fact, 
there is now no communitarian response to give to my case either. Above, I argued that there is not 
a reasonable understanding of linguistic communities that would allow that our Halp partakes in 
the Dards’ conventional regularities. But now there simply is no Dard community, linguistic or 
otherwise.51  
 On this modification, there is no linguistic convention for the use of “tavi” that could play 
a role in an explanation of its meaningfulness for the Halps. I’ve argued that there are reasons to 
require that only the conventions among members of a community be used in a constitutive 
explanation of meaningfulness in that community. But even if one were to attempt to defend a 
version of conventionalism that did not abide by this requirement, we’ve found that an expression 
can still have a meaning without any convention at all in its use.    
 
VI. MEANING WITHOUT CONVENTION 
 
  Given the Core Conventionalist Condition, then, conventionalism about meaning is false. 
This is true whatever understanding of the self-perpetuating regularities one might reasonably take. 
While it is common to object to conventionalism on the basis of the particular account of 
convention that is used, my argument generalizes over all leading accounts of convention. At the 
very least, it generalizes over the stated views of Lewis, Millikan, and Schiffer, who all seem to 
require actual reproduction of a behavior for it to be part of a conventional regularity. If I’m right, 
it also generalizes over any tolerable conventionalist modification of this requirement. Further, it 
                                                      
51 This modification can be extended to preclude even any Halp belief about a current convention. Suppose 
the dictionary came with a note telling the Halps that God is going to test their commitment. The note also 
says that no one currently speaks this alternative language. But they must study this manual well enough that 
if a demon using the other language is ever created and sent to them, they would understand it. Despite this 
ability, they must never use the language themselves, and must punish any uses severely. They will still learn 
the language, and will have no belief that the language they’re learning is conventionally used by anyone.  
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adds to the chorus of objections to the propositional attitude requirements of Lewisian 
Conventionalism the following result: that it does not survive an amendment that does away with 
those requirements entirely, since it would retain the self-perpetuating regularity requirement. 
Conventions of use, even on the most minimal interpretation derived from Lewis’ and Millikan’s 
accounts, do not constitute meaning. Where does this leave the inquiry into the nature of public 
meaning? 
 In the previous section, we saw a case of an expression for which there is no self-
perpetuating regularity of use in a community, despite its being meaningful for members of that 
community. Meaningfulness does not constitutively depend on conventional regularities. It can 
arise more generally through our ability to rely on an expression in communication. This ability 
may be owed to a convention, but it may be owed instead to natural or known features of the 
expression, the social situation, and our partners in communication. If there is a positive theoretical 
suggestion on offer here, it is that the ability of an expression to reliably serve in communication 
may be more than a sign or symptom of meaning—it may just be what it is for an expression to 
have a meaning. If that is so, then conventions will be one ground of meaning—one ground among 
others. If this proposal is right, there is room for a theory of meaning to accommodate the insights 
of many accounts of the grounds of meaningful expressions.  
 In any case, if there is a regularity requirement on conventional behavior, then 
conventionalism fails as a constitutive account of what it is for an expression-type to have meaning 
for a community, however minimally we might try to interpret that requirement.  
 Most of this dissertation has been devoted to the philosophy of mind and to conceptual 
metasemantics. This Chapter focused on one type of theory of meaning or metasemantics for 
natural language, though the point made is deeply related to the broader argument of the 
dissertation. One thread of the previous discussion has been that norms deserve and can sustain a 
foundational place in conceptual metasemantics, by contrast with non-normative individualistic and 
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social factors. One notion that has featured in this discussion is the notion of a rule. We have 
examined reasons to believe that internal rules guiding intellectual performances cannot be the 
determiners of content, and we have seen that social rules carry analogous problems—as rules need 
to be realized in someone’s mind or through some collection of minds, they will not, on their own, 
account for the independence of our conceptual repertoire from purely subjective factors.  
 The notion of a rule was significant for our purposes because, due to the work of 
Wittgenstein and Kripke, the notion of a rule has become closely tied to the discussion of the 
normativity of meaning and content. I have emphasized that this notion is not, in the most basic or 
crucial sense, a normative notion, though a rule’s role is, indeed, to guide behavior. Its most 
important failing, though, is its tie to actual behavior and to what an agent or collection of agents 
actually recognizes as binding or guiding. Rules, by contrast with norms (in the sense I have used 
it) do not constitutively depend on such recognition.  
 In the case of natural language metasemantics, the notion of convention has a similar 
prominence to the notion of a rule in the context of mental content. 52  Given the preceding 
discussion, the notion of convention is fascinating in that, at least as Lewis defined it, raises 
something at the level of bare behavior—regularity in use—to a theory of meaning by invoking 
social facts to give some regularities the status of a kind of malleable and particular social rule. At 
any rate, Lewisian conventions draw on the ways in which our behavior and our beliefs affect what 
is rational in conditions of mutual dependence and partial ignorance, in order to render a verdict 
about what is rational and, at the same time, a fact of meaning for a community, however minimal. 
 This picture rightly tries to capture something normative about meaningful public language 
meaning. But in its ultimate reliance on something at the level of behavior in the form of 
                                                      
52  I set aside here the kind of theory of meaning, typically idiolect meaning, tying meaning closely to 
psychological rules or principles, as this simply draws together some of the key flaws of the non-normative 
theories we have been discussing into a single picture of language and psychological competence. See Devitt 
(2006), Ignorance of Language, for an instructive critique of such theories that is deeply related to the points 
I have canvassed throughout this dissertation. 
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regularities, the picture suffers from the same kind of inadequacy as performance-based theories of 
mental content. In the course of criticizing conventionalism, I have tried to highlight what is 
appealing about the attempted recovery of a kind of normativity while showing that regularities 
cannot form the basis of theory of meaning or content, right along with bare behavior, dispositions, 
or rules.53 In the course of motivating a normative theory of content generally and in discussing the 
kinds of norms and normative factors that can play a foundational role in a sound metasemantics, 
we have thus canvassed a wide range of leading theories of meaning and content and found them 
inadequate. Even in the case of language, relying on behavioral or internal factors renders a 
metasemantic theory inadequate, even if those factors are supplemented by some sort of modal or 
dispositional inflection or some sort of social sanction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
53 Thus, Horwich’s use theory of meaning, discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, also proves inadequate as a 
theory of meaning centered on regularities in use, which is the most minimal and, if my arguments are sound, 
nevertheless flawed element in conventionalist theories of meaning and dispositional theories of content.  
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Chapter 6: Building Meaning with Norms 
 
 
 
 
In this concluding chapter, I review the main claims of the dissertation, stake out the resulting 
metasemantic framework and take stock of the prospects both for a norm-based metasemantics and 
for metasemantics in general in light of the preceding chapters. 
 
I. REVIEW 
 
As I said in the Preface, the topic of this dissertation is the possibility of providing a 
constitutive explanation of intentional relations. While I did not attempt a reduction of any intentional 
relations, my treatment of conceptual and linguistic metasemantics could be understood as steps on 
the road toward understanding the fundamental nature of intentional relations themselves. 
The starting point for the dissertation was the thesis of anti-individualism and the claim that 
anti-individualism motivates bringing normative factors into our metasemantics. By discussing a 
variety of examples in Chapter 1 and generalizing the lessons of Chapter 2, we clarified that the 
proper understanding of the general thrust of the semantic data cited in motivating our norm-based 
metasemantics is perhaps more properly called anti-subjectivism in metasemantics. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, a norm-based theory constructed with this in mind is not vulnerable to the charge that it 
entails a regress of rules, unlike other kinds of normative theories of content. 
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If we are to go normative to accommodate anti-subjectivism, the normative factors cited in 
our metasemantics must not themselves be narrowly derived from subjective factors. Despite similar 
motivations, Allan Gibbard’s normative metatheory of meaning was found to falter on this score, as 
his theory relies ultimately on the subjective oughts of rationality, which are narrowly fixed by a 
thinker’s internal states. As I briefly argued, Brandom’s Inferentialism, broadening its normative 
element to the level of a social practice, similarly fails to explain how our meanings and contents can 
vary solely with respect to our external, non-social environment, holding all subject-oriented factors 
constant.  
Our response to this situation can take two forms. First, we can conclude that the norms 
relevant to meaning and content determination must be of a certain, alternative character. Gibbard 
uses subjective norms of rationality, Brandom uses socially-and-individually-derived norms of 
reasoning, and we must use something else. Second, we can conclude that these theories may have 
been wrong in attempting to identify a single type or source of norm, rather than leave the normative 
ingredient in their accounts more open. Of course, Brandom and Gibbard are both after much more 
than identifying the best general sort of metasemantic framework—both are attempting to explain 
semantic facts in normative terms as well and attempting to bring the facts of meaning and content 
within their broader theories of normativity. These projects direct their theories toward the attribution 
of meaning and content rather than constitutive metaphysical explanations of intentional relations, 
as well as to a corresponding collapse of semantics and metasemantics into one norm-based account. 
Our motivation from anti-subjectivism also left us without prior metaethical commitments to force 
the normative ingredient in our norm-based metasemantics to take any particular form.  
We thus proceeded more conservatively from Chapter 2 into Chapter 4’s investigation into 
the challenge posed for any norm-based metasemantic theory by slur terms and concepts, by 
formulating the norm-based conceptual metasemantics at issue in that chapter in terms of a general 
fact about how a thinker ought to use a particular representation. We did not identify the ought 
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involved as having any particular character or source. As we saw, this rendered the theory particularly 
vulnerable to the problem that we have very clear and strong reasons not to use slurs in accordance 
with their canonical patterns of use. This problem required us to develop the norm-based 
metasemantic framework in further detail and to identify specific resources it can deploy to not only 
explain the norms relevant to content, but also to show how they can do their explanatory work on 
the background of contrary moral and epistemic norms in the case of terms like slurs. In this course 
of this exploration, we did not attempt to identify a specifically semantic ought. Rather, we adopted 
metasemantic fundamentalism, considered a generalized formulation of the normative ingredient, on 
the model of imperfect rather than perfect duties, and explained a way of preserving a non-
deflationary approach to the slur problem while modifying the basic normative commitment relevant 
to slurs such that the perverse norms favoring slur usage, drawn from subjective intellectual norms 
and social norms, turn out not to be the norms needed to explain slur metasemantics at all. 
This last proposed development of the basic norm-based metasemantic framework was in 
part a reconsideration of the semantic and metasemantic relationship between language and mind, 
including bringing the interpretive side of slur usage into the picture. In Chapter 5, the focus turns 
largely to public language, though the increased attention to interpretation continues. I argued that 
the most minimal understanding of convention does not enable conventionalist theories of meaning 
to explain cases in which there are not regularities of use matching actual meaning available for use. 
This argument represents an extension of the general program of the dissertation to the case of 
language. In the end, I suggest that we were, once again, wrong to rely on rules and regularities of 
use, rather than on norms of use. Conventionalism in particular may well identify the correct sort of 
normative facts—instrumental normative facts surrounding a sentence’s suitability for 
communication—but err in attempting to construct a constitutive explanation of meaning in terms of 
one realizer or ground of these normative facts. Rather, I suggest, these normative facts may 
themselves be the constitutive basis for meaning facts.  
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II. PROSPECTS 
 
Such instrumental normative facts are not hostile to naturalism about meaning. These facts 
are established by nothing more, metaphysically speaking, than the very kind of facts concerning 
expectation and interpretation utilized by conventionalists. Further, as conventionalist explanations 
of public language meanings have enormous explanatory power, so would the corresponding norm-
based theory. Especially relevant for our discussion, though this is not the place to develop the point 
in detail, is that expressive content is capturable in terms of the kinds of rules of use at issue in 
conventionalist accounts of meaning just as well as descriptive content. This distinction, made by 
David Kaplan in service of a reconsideration of the idea of meaning as use in the case of expressive 
terms, can be captured, metasemantically, on the side of the interpreter, as both the expressive and 
descriptive content of an utterance will correspond with particular ways in which one ought to 
understand or respond to it.1 The expressive content of ‘oops’ is captured by the fact that, as Kaplan 
would put it, it is governed by a rule to use it only if one has made a minor mishap, giving its 
expressive content. By using ‘oops,’ one puts one’s auditor in a position to infer that one has made a 
minor mishap, given that there is mutual knowledge of this rule of use. Kaplan’s distinction between 
descriptive and expressive content is more general than the distinction, discussed in Chapter 4, 
between descriptivist and expressivist theories as traditionally understood, since expressive content 
can be perfectly world-oriented. More centrally for Kaplan’s discussion, though I’ll put it in my own, 
rough terms, the content is placed into the conversational context; though it is not contributed as at-
issue or asserted content, it is contributed thanks to the term’s semantics and not just due to pragmatic 
factors. These two kinds of rules governing these two kinds of usage can be exploited in explanations 
of meaning in terms of conventional use, even if only as the particular ground of the facts of public 
meaning in these conventional cases.  
                                                           
1 Kaplan (Unpublished MS). 
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What this means for our purposes is not only that there can be a sound norm-based 
metasemantics for natural language on a model largely given to us by conventionalist approaches, 
but that the approach has the power to capture the distinct kind of semantic and metasemantic profile 
discussed in Chapter 4 for accounting for slurs in a more genuinely expressivistic way. The program 
of using norms to ground metasemantic facts seems well in order with respect to natural language, 
including the need to accommodate the specific kinds of semantic proposals used in the dissertation. 
If my arguments about the need for norms in the case of conceptual metasemantics ultimately carry 
over to the case of public language, this will mean that, as I’ve argued in the case of conceptual 
metasemantics, natural language metasemantics is only strengthened by bringing in norms. At the 
very least, norms can help to explain some of the challenging cases we’ve discussed, and bringing 
norms into the picture does not render the theory at all subjectivist or anti-realist. 
Since the discussion of conceptual metasemantics forced a discussion of the semantics and 
metasemantics of slur terms, this success enables us to profess with some confidence that there is no 
reason to think that the normativist project on the side of the mind will falter because of these 
concerns about natural language. In fact, as we’ve seen, the general project is more readily successful 
in the case of public language, since existing proposals would suffice to underwrite and explain the 
kinds of norms at issue in public language meaning.  
The norms relevant to content were, however, harder to explain and identify. This was in 
part because I insisted on strictly separating semantics and metasemantics and prescinding as much 
as possible from assuming a prior metaethics and from assuming a prior semantic framework. Still, 
we saw in Chapter 4 that there are very concrete ways of explaining the kinds of intellectual norms 
at issue in conceptual metasemantics. General norms of thought governing particular representations 
can be shaped by internal principles of reasoning as well as by social norms.  
One might wonder whether these kinds of explanations are in tension with the main starting 
point of the dissertation, which is the need to use norms to help to explain anti-individualism and, 
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ultimately, anti-subjectivism. Don’t these norms, then, need to be quite objective in the relevant 
senses? In a way, it suffices to point out that the use of subject-derived norms to explain some of the 
facts of content is not in tension with the claim that these kinds of norms are not sufficient to account 
for all such facts. Indeed, the openness of the norm-based metasemantics to objective normative 
factors is what gave rise to the slur problem in the first place. The main norms used to generate the 
problem were objective epistemic norms concerning truth and moral norms. As I’ve maintained, a 
successful norm-based metasemantic theory for concepts will leave its explanations open to exploit 
norms of various kinds from a variety of sources. Framing the basic metasemantic claim in terms of 
a general normative fact concerning its use for an individual preserves this openness. 
While we may be able to make use of a variety of grounds for these general normative facts, 
it remains to be seen whether these general normative facts themselves are an obstacle to naturalism 
about mental content. Though I address this to some degree throughout the dissertation, my interest 
is in assessing the prospects for using normative facts to explain meaning and content. Ultimately, 
we may have to move on to metaethics proper to consider whether normative facts themselves are 
some kind of threat to global naturalism, in order to determine whether naturalism about the mind is 
threatened by the kind of program I propose.  
However, as the kinds of naturalist theories about the mind attempting a more direct 
reduction or explanation of mental facts in terms of natural facts have been unsuccessful, it may be 
only a mark in favor of my proposal that the ultimate success of naturalism about the mind may rest 
on the ultimate success of naturalism about normativity. Even if this is so, I regard it as a success to 
have made inroads toward explaining metasemantic facts when it comes to the mind in partially 
normative terms. To my mind, it is a mark of plausibility that not all of the interesting questions have 
been answered. As with using normativity about conceptual metasemantics to explain anti-
individualism, it may only be fitting that the fraught nature of normativity helps to explain the fraught 
nature of mental content. 
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Still, there may lurk in my metasemantic arguments an interesting metaethical argument. If 
I’m right, understanding conceptual metasemantics requires bringing an objective kind of 
normativity into the picture. In some sense then, it may be that there is an argument for some kind of 
moral realism from realism about intentional facts. We may have to allow that there are objective 
normative facts in order to explain the basic facts of mental content.2 While I’ve at times tried to 
emphasize that the question of how my metasemantic claims interact with metaethical issues is 
delicate and complicated, it does seem that the explanations I contend are required in order to explain 
mental content make essential use of norms that are in significant senses objective. There are real 
and metaethically significant senses in which normative matters cannot be strictly subject-dependent 
if they are to play these explanatory roles.  
However, this degree of subject-independence is not automatically in conflict with 
naturalism about normativity. The committed naturalist should not obviously find my proposal 
disturbing, even if my arguments generate a commitment to some kind of moral objectivism or 
realism. At any rate, reducing these two philosophically challenging categories to one remains an 
accomplishment, even if a certain kind of account of the remaining category is needed for a fully 
satisfying metaphysics from one point of view or another. I’ve argued that a subject-independent 
normativism about the intentional, primarily conceived of as a thesis about the best framework for a 
metasemantics for concepts and natural language, is the most promising basis for an adequate theory 
of intentional relations. If the framework articulated in this dissertation can be satisfactorily 
developed, a proper philosophical account of representational phenomena and mental phenomena 
will partially be revealed. If the ultimate accounting of these phenomena depends on an explanation 
of normativity, then we may have discovered one reason why directly naturalistic or reductive 
accounts of these phenomena have not succeeded. If it turns out that the nature of normativity entails 
                                                           
2 Terence Cuneo (2014) develops in great detail an analogous argument with respect to speech acts, which he 
contends cannot be understood without genuine normative facts governing linguistic behavior.  
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that these phenomena will ultimately resist a full naturalistic reduction, then we will have learned 
something deep about the fundamental nature of reality and its relation to the nature of thought.  
 
III. PROMISES 
 
To close, I’ll mention some attractions of the framework that go beyond its ability to explain 
the objectivity of mental content and its superiority to rival theories.  
First, as we saw in Chapter 4, the framework allows us to articulate some of the perverse 
power of oppressive forces as they show up in our thought and talk. Embeddedness in social 
situations and epistemic situations reflecting oppressive structures can shape our conceptual 
repertoires in ways that we might have wished to resist. On the flip side, using terms and concepts 
that are in relevant respects non-ideal can affect the conceptual structures and intellectual 
commitments of those with whom we share interlocutory communities. Thus, the use of terms like 
slur terms contributes not only to a perverse epistemic situation, but also to a pernicious or 
metasemantic network. Though I did not develop this point, these forces are surely mutually 
reinforcing. Further, they can operate entirely independently of our intentions or awareness. Given 
this kind of situation, we can see why it can be so important to actively resist being drawn into these 
structures as a mechanism of reinforcement, witting or unwitting, by denying or denouncing 
commitments, by proscribing or prohibiting the use of terms of abuse, or changing the kinds of 
interpersonal and social assumptions that help to generate the norms underwriting these structures. 
Second, the notion of analyticity is deeply related to some of the concerns that have 
motivated work on the normativity of meaning and content. Given that one of my aims has been to 
develop a way of going normative about meaning and content that does not draw its motivation from 
these kinds of concern, I did not discuss analyticity. We can observe, however, that the kind of 
semantic and metasemantic profiles discussed in Chapter 4, on the background of the arguments of 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3, can provide the basis for a sense in which there are “truths of meaning” that do 
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not entail anything about the subjective commitments of any particular individual. It’s worth noting 
that the attacks on the idea of particular beliefs or inferences being in some sense internal or essential 
to a meaning or concept developed over the past century criticize the idea that an individual must in 
fact believe or psychologically reflect these commitments. On my framework, there may be 
substantive content definitive of a particular meaning or concept, made real as part of an individual’s 
conceptual repertoire by norms of which they might well be unaware. The sense of analyticity this 
might help to resuscitate does not in any obvious way, then, justify or explain any semantic or 
conceptual source of a priori knowledge, justification, or warrant.3  
This is related to the divergence of my motivation of the normativity of content from the 
discussion ensuing from Wittgenstein or from Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein. It may not help us 
to recover a sense in which our semantic or conceptual competence by itself licenses or directs us to 
think a certain way. It may not help us to ground one domain of knowledge in our semantic or 
conceptual competence. Whatever normative sanction is generated by such competence, or by full 
mastery, might, as far as we’ve seen, always have an independent source giving our concepts their 
nature in the first place. This is in some ways a consequence simply of the fact that we are grounding 
meaning and content on normative facts, rather than grounding normative facts on the facts of 
meaning and content.4 Still, it may be philosophically fruitful to develop any sense in which there 
are truths of meaning or distinctively conceptual commitments, in part because this may help to 
explain the intuitions that there are such truths or commitments that have led to the grander 
philosophical programs we leave aside. 
 
                                                           
3 Similarly, it will not rescue the kinds of individualistic semantic and metasemantic pictures taken from the 
work of Frege and Russell that provoked Kripke’s criticism in Naming and Necessity (1980). 
4 The resulting view about analyticity would, for this reason, have much in common with Gillian Russell’s 
(2008) fascinating treatment of the analytic/synthetic distinction in its claims about epistemology, but diverge 
substantially from it in the order of explanation offered between meaning and norms. 
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